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Abstract  
This study examined the ability of students to correctly discern between truthful and deceptive 
messages from a group of second language English speakers. Recent studies have found a ‘lie bias’ 
when making veracity judgments towards second language speakers. This lie bias may be 
problematic in a country such as South Africa where the majority of the population communicate, to 
a greater or lesser extent, in their second language. In this study participants (n=64) made 
classifications of 24 messages as either truthful or deceptive. The messages were created by second 
language English speakers who were asked to describe a truthful or deceptive event. The results 
revealed that there was a significant difference between the way that first and second language 
participants made their judgments. It is argued that this difference can be attributed to the notion 
that second language participants require more cognitive effort, than their first language 
counterparts, to understand and classify messages.  
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Cognitive Load, Deception Detection, Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT), Lie Bias, Lie 
Detection, Online Survey, Second Language, South African, Truth Bias, Veracity Judgments 
  
IV 
 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements: .............................................................................................................................. I 
Declaration .......................................................................................................................................... II 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................................. III 
List of Tables .................................................................................................................................. IX 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. X 
Definitions ...................................................................................................................................... XI 
Chapter 1 – Introduction and Background ........................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2. Problem Statement ................................................................................................................ 1 
1.3. Research Questions ............................................................................................................... 3 
1.4. Significance of the Study ...................................................................................................... 4 
1.5. Research Design .................................................................................................................... 4 
1.6. Chapter Overview.................................................................................................................. 5 
1.6.1. Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework. ................................................................................ 5 
1.6.2. Chapter 3 Literature Review. ......................................................................................... 5 
1.6.3. Chapter 4 Research Method. .......................................................................................... 6 
1.6.4. Chapter 5 Results. .......................................................................................................... 6 
1.6.5. Chapter 6 Discussion. .................................................................................................... 6 
Chapter 2 – Theoretical Framework .................................................................................................... 7 
2.1. Introduction and Theory Background ................................................................................... 7 
2.2. Assumptions .......................................................................................................................... 8 
2.2.1. Communication. ............................................................................................................. 8 
2.2.2. Cognitive Load and Interaction. ................................................................................... 10 
2.2.3. Norms and Expectations. ............................................................................................. 11 
2.2.4. Deception. .................................................................................................................... 11 
2.3. Relevant Constructs ............................................................................................................. 13 
2.3.1. Interactivity. ................................................................................................................. 14 
V 
 
2.3.2. Task Demands. ............................................................................................................. 16 
2.3.3. ‘Expectation of Normality’. ......................................................................................... 22 
2.3.4. Bias............................................................................................................................... 25 
2.3.5. Constructs Not Included............................................................................................... 31 
2.3.6. Critique......................................................................................................................... 31 
2.4. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 33 
Chapter 3 – Literature Review ........................................................................................................... 35 
3.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 35 
3.2. Deception............................................................................................................................. 35 
3.2.1. Deception Cues. ........................................................................................................... 35 
3.2.2. Deception Detection. .................................................................................................... 40 
3.3. Possible Variables ............................................................................................................... 42 
3.3.1. Age. .............................................................................................................................. 42 
3.3.2. Gender. ......................................................................................................................... 43 
3.3.3. Race. ............................................................................................................................. 44 
3.3.4. Culture. ......................................................................................................................... 46 
3.4. Second Language ................................................................................................................ 49 
3.5. Second Language Deception ............................................................................................... 52 
3.6. Conclusion of Literature ...................................................................................................... 55 
3.7. The Current Study ............................................................................................................... 56 
3.7.1. Hypotheses. .................................................................................................................. 58 
3.8. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 58 
Chapter 4 – Research Method ............................................................................................................ 60 
4.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 60 
4.2. Research Design .................................................................................................................. 60 
4.3. Phase 1 – Research Instrument ............................................................................................ 62 
4.3.1. Sampling. ..................................................................................................................... 63 
4.3.2. Interview schedule and pilot interviews. ...................................................................... 65 
VI 
 
4.3.3. Senders. ........................................................................................................................ 67 
4.3.4. Procedure. .................................................................................................................... 68 
4.3.5. Ethical considerations for the first phase. .................................................................... 71 
4.4. Phase 2 – Veracity Judgments ............................................................................................. 71 
4.4.1. Online survey. .............................................................................................................. 72 
4.4.2. Sampling. ..................................................................................................................... 75 
4.4.3. Administering the research instrument. ....................................................................... 78 
4.4.4. Ethical considerations for the second phase. ............................................................... 79 
4.5. Data Analysis ...................................................................................................................... 80 
4.5.1. Variables. ..................................................................................................................... 80 
4.5.2. Statistical techniques. ................................................................................................... 84 
4.5.3. Content analysis (research question 5). ........................................................................ 89 
4.6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 90 
Chapter 5 – Results ............................................................................................................................ 92 
5.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 92 
5.2. Descriptive Statistics ........................................................................................................... 92 
5.2.1. Demographical data. .................................................................................................... 92 
5.2.2. Constructs..................................................................................................................... 94 
5.3. Inferential Statistics ............................................................................................................. 96 
5.3.1. Research Question 1: Are second language speakers more likely than chance to be 
judged as deceptive? ................................................................................................................... 97 
5.3.2. Research Questions 2 and 4 (Gender and language status of receivers). ..................... 98 
5.3.3. Research Question 2: Is there a difference in judgments or confidence when the 
gender of the sender is taken into account? .............................................................................. 101 
5.3.4. Research Question 3: Is there a difference in judgments or confidence when the race 
of the sender is taken into account? .......................................................................................... 102 
5.4. Content Analysis ............................................................................................................... 104 
5.4.1. Research Question 5: What are the perceived deceptive cues that receivers looked for 
to base their veracity judgments? ............................................................................................. 104 
VII 
 
5.5. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 107 
Chapter 6 – Discussion .................................................................................................................... 109 
6.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 109 
6.2. Response-Rate and Biographical Information .................................................................. 109 
6.3. Research Questions ........................................................................................................... 110 
6.3.1. Research Question 1: Are second language speakers more likely than chance to be 
judged as deceptive? ................................................................................................................. 111 
6.3.2. Research Question 2: Is there a difference in judgments or confidence when the 
gender of the receiver / sender is taken into account? .............................................................. 113 
6.3.3. Research Question 3: Is there a difference in judgments or confidence when the race 
of the receiver / sender is taken into account? .......................................................................... 114 
6.3.4. Research Question 4: Is there a difference in judgments or confidence when the first- / 
second language status of the receiver is taken into account? .................................................. 115 
6.3.5. Research Question 5: What are the perceived deceptive cues that receivers looked for 
to base their veracity judgments? ............................................................................................. 119 
6.4. Limitations and Recommendations ................................................................................... 125 
6.5. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 128 
References ........................................................................................................................................ 130 
Appendix A ...................................................................................................................................... 140 
Interpersonal Deception Theory ................................................................................................... 140 
Appendix B ...................................................................................................................................... 143 
Interview Questions (Pilot Questions) ......................................................................................... 143 
Appendix C ...................................................................................................................................... 144 
Interview Questions (Final Questions) ......................................................................................... 144 
Appendix D ...................................................................................................................................... 145 
Research Procedure (Sender Information Form) .......................................................................... 145 
Appendix E ...................................................................................................................................... 149 
Video Release Form ..................................................................................................................... 149 
Appendix F ....................................................................................................................................... 151 
VIII 
 
Sender Email ................................................................................................................................ 151 
Appendix G ...................................................................................................................................... 152 
Ethical Clearances ........................................................................................................................ 152 
1. Department of Psychology Ethical Clearance. .................................................................. 152 
2. Senate Ethical Clearance 1. ............................................................................................... 154 
3. Senate Ethical Clearance 2. ............................................................................................... 156 
Appendix H ...................................................................................................................................... 158 
Survey ........................................................................................................................................... 158 
Appendix I........................................................................................................................................ 166 
Receivers email 1 ......................................................................................................................... 166 
Appendix J ....................................................................................................................................... 167 
Receivers email 2 ......................................................................................................................... 167 
Appendix K ...................................................................................................................................... 168 
Content Analysis Code list ........................................................................................................... 168 
 
 
 
  
IX 
 
List of Tables  
Table 4.1 Statistical Techniques According to Research Question ................................................... 62 
Table 4.2 Senders by Gender and Race ............................................................................................. 68 
Table 4.3 Sampling of Receivers by Gender and Race ...................................................................... 77 
Table 4.4 Compilation of Constructs According to the Gender and Race of Senders ....................... 82 
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics Concerned with the Age of Receivers ............................................. 93 
Table 5.2 Frequency Scores of the Demographics of Receivers ....................................................... 93 
Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Veracity Constructs as Scored by the Receivers .................. 95 
Table 5.4 Descriptive Statistics of the Confidence Constructs as Scored by the Receivers .............. 96 
Table 5.5 One-Sample T-Test Comparing the Veracity Constructs to Chance ................................. 97 
Table 5.6 ANOVA Measuring the Difference between Gender and Language Status on the Truth 
Construct .......................................................................................................................................... 100 
Table 5.7 ANOVA Measuring the Difference between Gender and Language Status on the Lie 
Construct .......................................................................................................................................... 101 
Table 5.8 Paired Sample t-Test by Sender Race .............................................................................. 103 
Table 5.9 Shapiro-Wilk Test for the Paired t-Test by Sender Race (Table 5.8) .............................. 103 
Table 5.10 Content Analysis (Most Frequent) ................................................................................. 105 
Table 5.11 Content Analysis (Relatively Frequent) ......................................................................... 105 
Table 5.12 Content Analysis (Least Frequent) ................................................................................ 106 
Table 5.13 Categories of Nonverbal Cues Related to Deception .................................................... 106 
 
 
 
 
  
X 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 4.1 Visual overview of the research design ............................................................................ 61 
Figure 5.1 Average frequency of receivers making correct veracity judgments ............................... 95 
Figure 5.2 Average confidence on deception judgments as reported by the receivers ...................... 96 
Figure 5.3 Average correct veracity judgments by receivers according to their language status ...... 99 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
XI 
 
Definitions 
Accuracy Refers to the correct classification of truthful messages as ‘Truth’, and deceptive 
messages as ‘Deceptive’ (Burgoon, 2015).  
Bias An inclination towards selecting one specific choice instead of another (Reber, 
1985). 
Cognitive 
Load 
The amount of mental effort, attention, and working memory required to 
accomplish a specific task (Greene, O’Hair, Cody, & Yen, 1985; Vrij, Granhag, & 
Porter, 2010). 
Constructs “The attributes of people societies, and organisations that social scientists wish to 
measure.” (Terre Blanche, Durrheim, & Painter, 2006, p. 142) 
Constructs 
within this 
study 
The constructs in this study include various combinations of the judgments from all 
the receivers, combined according to the desired attributes and message veracity of 
the senders. The list of terms below is used to define the constructs that were 
compared in this study. 
Total – All the messages 
Truth – All the truthful messages 
Lie – All the deceptive messages 
Confidence Total – Confidence in judgments on all the messages 
Confidence Truth – Confidence in judgments on the truthful messages 
Confidence Lie – Confidence in judgments on the deceptive messages 
Female Total – All the messages by female senders 
Female Truth – All the truthful messages by female senders 
Female Lie – All the deceptive messages by female senders 
Male Total – All the messages by male senders 
Male Truth – All the truthful messages by male senders 
Male Lie – All the deceptive messages by male senders 
Black Total – All the messages by black senders 
Black Truth – All the truthful messages by black senders 
Black Lie – All the deceptive messages by black senders 
White Total – All the messages by white senders 
White Truth – All the truthful messages by white senders 
White Lie – All the deceptive messages by white senders 
Confidence Female Total – Confidence scores of all the messages made by female 
senders 
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Confidence Male Total – Confidence scores of all the messages made by male 
senders 
Confidence Black Total – Confidence scores of all the messages made by black 
senders 
Confidence White Total – Confidence scores of all the messages made by white 
senders  
Deception A message that was created with the intention to convince someone of a notion that 
is known to be false by the messenger, without the intended person’s knowledge, 
consent, or forewarning (Vrij et al., 2010). Levine (2014b) views deception as an 
umbrella term that includes lies; “Other forms of deception include omission, 
evasion, equivocation, and generating false conclusions with objectively truth 
information” (Levine, 2014b, p. 380). For the purpose of this study the terms 
‘deception’ and ‘lying’ are used interchangeably (Levine, 2014b). This is because 
this study deals exclusively with lying as a form of deception. 
Deception 
Detection 
The correct classification of truthful and deceptive messages (Burgoon, 2015). 
Decode The ability of receivers to interpret the messages created by senders, and assign 
meaning to them. This may be in the form of truthful or deceptive judgments 
(Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Reber, 1985).  
Emotional 
Leakage 
The theory that emotional expression is not completely under conscious control. 
This purports that emotional expressions can ‘leak’ out when the emotions are felt 
strongly (Porter, ten Brinke, & Wallace, 2012). 
Encode The process where senders attempt to form a credible message. This is done by 
attempting to create a message, as well as managing their nonverbal behaviour, to 
seem more believable (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Reber, 1985). 
Heuristic “Simple rules for making complex decisions or drawing inferences in a rapid 
manner” (Baron, Branscombe, & Byrne, 2009, p. 39) 
Lingua 
Franca 
“the ‘contact’ language between two mutually incomprehensible languages.” (Firth, 
1990, p. 270) 
Micro-
expressions 
A brief and uncontrollable emotional facial expression that lasts 1/25 to 1/5 of a 
second. Micro-expressions occur when someone feels an emotion strongly, and 
attempts to conceal or mask the emotional expression (Porter et al., 2012). 
Nonstrategic 
Behaviour 
An unintended and commonly unconscious processes where emotions or cognitive 
processes are observable through unintended behaviours during communication. 
This is sometimes referred to as ‘leakage’ and be associated with revealing the 
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complexity of a message, or the sender’s ‘true’ feelings (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). 
Receiver Refers to the participants (including discussions of various deception detection 
studies) who are asked to observe, and interpret, the behaviour (or aspect of the 
behaviours), of senders in order to judge the truthfulness of their message (Buller & 
Burgoon, 1996; Reber, 1985). 
Second 
Language 
Refers to the language that a person learned after their first or home language 
(Crowther, 1998). This study considers all participants whose first language is not 
English, as second language English speakers, and thus does not consider if English 
was indicated as a third or even fourth language. 
Sender Refers to the participants (including discussions of various other studies) who 
creates and delivers truthful or deceptive messages. This may be accomplished 
through video recorded messages, face to face interaction, or written accounts 
(Buller & Burgoon, 1996). 
Strategic 
Behaviour 
Deliberate actions that are taken in order to accomplish a specific goal. This could 
be to get a specific messages across, be more convincing, or seem more credible 
(Buller & Burgoon, 1996). 
Veracity ‘Truthfulness’, ‘a Truth’ (Crowther, 1998). 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction and Background 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Recent studies have shown that speaking in a second language can have an adverse effect on one’s 
credibility (Lev-Ari & Keysar, 2010). Informed by the Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) the 
current study was undertaken to discover if there is indeed a bias towards believing that second 
language speakers are deceptive more often than chance, within the South African context. In order 
to accomplish this, this study investigated how accurately a sample of first and second language 
English speaking South African participants could correctly classify truthful and deceptive 
messages delivered by second language speakers.  
 
This type of research is especially pertinent in interactions when listeners (receivers) do not 
have access to sufficient contextual information to indicate if the message is truthful or deceptive. 
Within these interactions the receivers may only have access to what the person (sender) says, and 
possibly their nonverbal behaviour. Previous studies indicated that the nonverbal behaviour of 
second language speakers may be associated with deception, which increases the likelihood for 
second language speakers to be disbelieved (Evans & Michael, 2014).  
 
The first chapter introduces the purpose of this study, as mentioned above, as well as provides 
an overview of this dissertation. This overview provides a discussion of the problem statement, as 
well as the research questions that were derived from previous studies within this field. The 
significance of the study is briefly introduced. This is followed by, a description of the research 
design. The chapter concludes with an overview of the chapters to follow  
 
1.2. Problem Statement 
Previous studies have shown that people are usually not accurate in making judgments on the 
truthfulness of others’ statements. These studies have indicated that our ‘normal’ ability to judge the 
veracity of others is much closer to chance, and that we could be just as accurate if we flipped a 
coin. Though receivers interpretations are not accurate, they are likely to believe that a message is 
truthful more often than deceptive, resulting in a ‘truth bias’ (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Some 
studies have attempted to find behavioural cues that are indicative of deception, based on the 
additional cognitive load and emotional leakage associated with lying. Although there is evidence 
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that shows that there is an observable difference between being deceptive and being truthful, there 
are no behavioural cues that are reliably diagnostic of deception (DePaulo et al., 2003).  
 
More recently some studies have found that there appears to be a ‘lie bias' against senders 
speaking in their second language, regardless of deception detection ability of the receivers who 
make the judgments. Whilst the findings suggest that the judgments are persistently not accurate, it 
did show that the receivers were more likely to make deceptive judgments, than truth judgments, 
towards second language speakers (Da Silva & Leach, 2013; Evans & Michael, 2014). This could 
naturally pose a problem for senders who have no choice but to speak their second language in 
order to be understood. The most obvious examples of this will be at an airport terminal or under 
police interrogation, where a person is forced to speak in their second language because a translator 
is not available.  
 
In a country such as South Africa, with 11 official languages (Statistics South Africa, 2012), this 
may be a daily experience for many people. In South Africa, where English is used daily as the 
lingua franca (Khokhlova, 2015), only 9.6% of the population reported English as their first 
language (Statistics South Africa, 2012). Furthermore, the researcher was not able to find any 
deception detection research conducted in South Africa, thus making it difficult to generalise the 
results from international studies into this particular context. Therefore, the potential for a lie bias 
towards second language speakers is currently unknown within South Africa.  
 
This study therefore aimed to support previous international works by gaining a better 
understanding of deception judgments within the South African context. By building on previous 
work this study contributes to the literature through addressing some of the gaps left from 
international studies. This study intends to build on previous work by looking at a different 
population as considered by previous research, thus diversifying the literature (Evans & Michael, 
2014) and by considering a sample of receivers who were more accustomed to listen to second 
language speech (Da Silva & Leach, 2013). 
 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the possibility of a second language lie bias 
in veracity judgments. This could help to increase the literature on deception detection with second 
language speakers within the South African context. Language is closely tied with race and culture 
within South Africa (Khokhlova, 2015). Therefore, this study also attempted to account for 
potential racial differences in both the senders and receivers as possible mediating factors in 
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deception judgments. In addition, differences in veracity judgments as a result of gender and the 
first or second language status of receivers were assessed.  
 
1.3. Research Questions 
Based on the previous discussion, the formalised research questions for this study include the 
following: 
1. Are second language speakers more likely than chance to be judged as deceptive? 
The question above addresses the main purpose of this study. However, recognising that 
making veracity judgments may be influenced by various perceptual and social factors; three 
additional research questions were asked to ascertain whether the first question involves a general 
bias against second language speakers or if there are other influences not yet accounted for within 
this context.  
 
Because of differences in gender socialisation, as well as popular perceptions about gendered 
social perception (Hodges, Laurent, & Lewis, 2011), this question is aimed at discovering if there 
could have been an effect on the participant’s performance or judgments because of gender. 
2.  Is there a difference in judgments or confidence when the gender of the receiver / sender is 
taken into account? 
 
Within the South African context language and race are intimately linked, and difficult to 
separate (Khokhlova, 2015). In order to look at the accuracy or bias of second language speakers in 
this context, the influence of race cannot be ignored. For this reason, race was accounted for in the 
measuring of deception detection, and this question is aimed at gaining a wider perspective of this 
field. 
3.  Is there a difference in judgments or confidence when the race of the receiver / sender is 
taken into account? 
 
Because the South African context has such a rich multi-cultural climate, it is also necessary to 
take into account the receiver’s linguistic ability. As previously stated, language and race are 
intimately linked within the South African context, in which English is treated as the lingua franca. 
It should be noted that first language English speakers come from a variety of backgrounds. 
Therefore, language status becomes a separate category for investigation, but remains to be tested. 
By taking into account the first, or second, language status of the receiver it becomes possible to 
justify or disregard this as a factor that may influence deception detection (Snelling, 2013).  
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4. Is there a difference in judgments or confidence when the first- / second language status of 
the receiver is taken into account? 
 
The purpose of the following question was to discover if participants in this study held similar 
beliefs about deception cues as were identified in previous studies (e.g. Castillo, 2011; Global 
Deception Research Team, 2006). This may have implications in the perception around the 
suitability of attempting cross-cultural, as well as cross-linguistic, deception detection.   
5. What are the perceived deceptive cues that receivers looked for to base their veracity 
judgments? 
 
1.4. Significance of the Study 
The results of this study can have a wide impact on multiple fields because the research implicates 
communicative contexts in which the trustworthiness of a message comes into question. These 
include, but are not limited to, a police interrogation, relationships, business negotiations, 
therapeutic contexts, and day to day communication where honesty may be vital. Cognisance of the 
various types of biases that people potentially face, as well as the factors that influence these biases 
can assist to improve communication and interactions. It may also improve the judgment results 
within the above listed situations.  
 
1.5. Research Design 
To investigate the possibility of a lie bias towards second language speakers, this study was 
conducted in two phases. The first phase entailed creating a research instrument. This consisted of a 
collection of video recordings that contained statements of second language (English) students 
purposively telling a lie or a truth. These second language students from the University of South 
Africa (Unisa) were asked to volunteer to be recorded while they narrated a truthful or deceptive 
message about a video they watched on a monitor. The recordings made from the second language 
speakers were collated to form the research instrument that was used during this study.  
 
The second phase consisted of creating an online version of the research instrument and a 
second sample of voluntary Unisa students viewed the research instrument via an online survey tool 
(Surveygizmo), and made veracity judgments on the recordings. The responses were analysed to see 
if they showed any bias towards the recorded volunteers. Descriptive and inferential statistics were 
used in order to compare the data, to see if any significant differences or correlation were found. 
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Content analysis was used to identify the characteristics that receivers took into consideration when 
making veracity judgments.  
 
By using an online survey method, this study attempted to gain access from a wider spread 
sample than could have been accessed by face to face sessions. Using students to participate in the 
online survey was considered logical as it was assumed that they had access to technology and the 
relevant knowledge to participate in an online study.  
 
1.6. Chapter Overview 
1.6.1. Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework. 
Chapter two provides the theoretical framework for the study. This study was viewed through the 
theoretical lens of Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT). IDT is supported by certain assumptions 
made about communication and deception that form its foundation. The predictions, which emanate 
from this foundation, consist of 17 propositions. Although this study did not make explicit use of all 
17 propositions, the theory is discussed in terms of the underlining constructs within the 
propositions.  
 
Chapter two begins by explaining the assumptions made by IDT. This is followed by a review 
on constructs derived from IDT, which are addressed in this dissertation. Thereafter, constructs 
which were not used in this study, but are inherent part of IDT, are briefly elaborated on. The 
chapter concludes with a critique of the theory as discussed by other authors, which was not 
mentioned within each construct. The constructs discussed within this chapter informed the writing 
of the literature review from which the variables, which are of interest in the current study, were 
derived. 
 
1.6.2. Chapter 3 Literature Review. 
Chapter three provides the literature review that is based upon some of the constructs introduced 
within the theoretical chapter. This chapter draws on multiple studies that investigated deception 
detection in a broad as well as focused sense. This assisted the writing of the literature review, in 
that the general findings on deception detection studies are discussed first. These include the 
investigations that have been conducted to discover possible deception cues as well as studies that 
examined the effects of emotional leakage and cognitive load on deception (introduced within the 
theoretical chapter). The discussion proceeds to include various factors that can affect deception, 
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including gender and race, which are later introduced as variables considered in the current study. 
The chapter further discusses the possible effects that speaking a second language can have on 
deception. This chapter concludes by presenting previous studies that have included second 
language speech within their work, as well as a description of the context in which the current study 
was conducted.  
 
1.6.3. Chapter 4 Research Method. 
Chapter four discusses the research design and method used in this study. As mentioned earlier, this 
study was conducted in two phases. The first phase describes how the research instrument was 
created. This includes the sampling method that was used, the pilot interviews, and the interviews 
that were conducted for the recordings that were used within the second phase. The second phase 
describes how the research instrument was assembled into an online survey by using the survey 
platform ‘Surveygizmo’. The sampling procedure and processes of the second phase are then 
described. Ethical considerations for this study are discussed in the description of each of the two 
phases. The final section of the method chapter describes the data analysis techniques that were 
used to analyse the data.   
 
1.6.4. Chapter 5 Results. 
Chapter five provides the results and the relevant tables and figures to summarise them. This 
chapter is organised according to the research questions and analytical techniques as introduced in 
chapter four. The chapter begins by describing the biographical information of the receivers who 
participated in this study. This includes various descriptive statistics of the participants as well as 
the research instrument, after which the answers to questions 1 to 4 are indicated according to the 
research questions and analytical approach. The chapter concludes with the Content Analysis that 
addresses the final research question.  
 
1.6.5. Chapter 6 Discussion. 
Chapter six discusses the results that are presented in chapter five. The research questions and their 
findings are presented in the order in which they appear in the results chapter. This chapter 
represents a synthesis of the preceding chapters in order to provide a coherent and meaningful 
answer to the research questions. These are explained in terms of the theoretical framework, as well 
as compared to previous research findings and literature. In conclusion, the limitations and 
recommendations of the study are discussed.  
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Chapter 2 – Theoretical Framework  
 
2.1. Introduction and Theory Background 
The purpose of the current chapter is to introduce the Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) that 
served as the theoretical framework for this dissertation. This study was viewed through the 
theoretical lens of Interpersonal Deception Theory in order to answer the five research questions 
highlighted in the previous chapter. According to Creswell (2009), a theory is a set of variables that 
are related to each other that consists of certain propositions. It is meant to explain observations 
about particular occurrences in a logical way (Babbie, 2008), with the dual purpose of organising 
the knowledge that exists, as well as predict future processes or events. The hypotheses of a study, 
which are derived from the theoretical view, are tested systematically (Baron et al., 2009). Within 
any study a theory is used because it specifies a relationship between variables, and it helps to 
predict or explain possible findings.  
 
Interpersonal Deception Theory is a post-positivistic theory (Burgoon & Buller, 2014). 
Proponents of the theory claim that there is a reality independent of us. We are able to make certain 
statements and predictions about this reality, because it is considered independent of us. However, 
researchers have their own subjective limitations in accessing the subject of their study, thus they do 
not have complete access to objective knowledge. This implies that research should be guided by 
the best available evidence (Robson, 2011).  
 
Interpersonal Deception Theory was developed by Buller and Burgoon (1996) in order to 
predict deception, as well as explain it, within interpersonal communication (Burgoon, 2015). To 
account for both credible and non-credible communication within interpersonal contexts, the 
notions within the theory consider deception as a communicative process that develops throughout 
an interaction between two or more persons (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). IDT is structured according 
to 17 propositions that make certain claims and predictions that relate to deception within the 
context of communication. It is based on various assumptions that inform the propositions, and 
provides a basis for the theory (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & Buller, 2014).  
 
The current study does however not make use of all the propositions. Rather it is based on a 
portion of the IDT propositions. For this reason, this chapter discusses IDT in terms of the relevant 
constructs upon which this study draws, instead of an over-complicated, exhaustive (and 
8 
 
unnecessary), discussion according to the propositions of the theory, as seen in other studies (Kirk, 
2015; Wagner, 2011).  
 
In order to provide such a relevant discussion of how IDT formed the theoretical framework of 
this study, this chapter is divided into several subsections. The first part of this chapter deals with 
the explicit assumptions made by IDT. This discussion begins with the assumptions regarding 
communication, cognitive load and interaction, norms and expectations, and finally the assumptions 
about deception. Thereafter, a discussion follows of several constructs that were adopted from IDT, 
which form the basis of the argument for this study. These constructs refer to interactivity, task 
demands, expectations of normality and bias. This chapter provides a short description of constructs 
not considered in this discussion, and concludes with previous critique on the theory and a summary 
of the chapter.  
 
2.2. Assumptions 
The assumptions considered in this theory form the foundation of the propositions of IDT. In order 
to accept the framework of this theory, it is necessary to accept the base assumptions (Buller & 
Burgoon, 1996). For this reason, this discussion begins with the theoretical assumptions. That is 
followed by an examination of the relevant constructs upon which this study draws. The 
assumptions that are discussed in this section are those related to communication, cognitive load 
and interaction, norms and expectations, and finally deception.   
 
2.2.1. Communication. 
The IDT assumptions regarding communication are used as a starting point for this discussion since 
IDT views deception as situated within the communication context. These assumptions, which 
underpin the entire theory, provide some explanation for the constructs that are explained later 
within this chapter (Burgoon & Buller, 2014). 
 
According to Interpersonal Deception Theory, communication is a complicated process that 
includes different participants, each with their own motivations and aims. The process can occur 
within various contexts and through different mediums, as well as involve a number of contextual 
or personal factors. This may include, but is not limited to: If the participants know one another, 
what their expectations are, as well as their level of social skills (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon 
& Buller, 2014). 
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One of the fundamental assumptions made by IDT is that deception is a form of communication 
(Patnaik et al., 2016), in that it is an active, dynamic and purpose driven process (Burgoon & Buller, 
2014). This dynamic process means that senders and receivers need to be actively involved, and 
therefore both have to encode and decode messages at the same time (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). 
The encoding and decoding processes happen simultaneously, thus it is not possible according to 
IDT, to divide communicators into receivers and senders during an interaction. This type of divide 
can only be made at an abstract level, as done in this study, because normally communicators 
simultaneously fill both those roles (Buller & Burgoon, 2008). 
 
Proponents of the Interpersonal Deception Theory argue that both these processes (encoding and 
decoding) increase a person’s cognitive load (e.g. the amount of mental effort needed to process 
information), which can distract them from interpreting, or projecting a credible message correctly 
(Buller & Burgoon, 1996). From the onset, it is assumed that there are no cues that are universally 
diagnostic of deception. This assumption is made because of the dynamic nature of communication 
and that interactions change and develop as both parties receive conversational feedback. With this 
developing and dynamic interaction the cues that could indicate that someone is telling the truth or 
lying would also change. Although there may not be universally diagnostic cues, the theory does 
hold the assumption that there is an observable behavioural difference between honest and 
deceptive speakers. This is because the behaviour of the speakers change observably when they are 
honest, compared to when they are deceptive (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & Buller, 2014). 
 
This observable difference occurs through the participant’s strategic behaviours (e.g. intended 
behaviours), as well as their nonstrategic behaviours (e.g. unintended behaviours) that result from 
the interaction. IDT assumes that people use both strategic and nonstrategic behaviours during the 
encoding and decoding process (Bond, Levine, & Hartwig, 2014; Buller & Burgoon, 2008). 
Strategic behaviours increase the credibility of the message, and are not necessarily a predominantly 
conscious act. This is because from an early age many communicative acts become habitual as a 
result of practice. But they are nonetheless sometimes intentionally performed to accomplish a 
specific goal (Buller & Burgoon, 2008). For example, gesturing during a conversation to show how 
big something was. In contrast nonstrategic behaviours are unintentional, and commonly entail an 
unconscious process that could make the emotional or cognitive process observable through 
behavioural leakage, for example, not being able to hide a smile after hearing a funny story. 
Nonstrategic behaviours are unintentional and result from the additional control required in order to 
engage in strategic behaviours (Buller & Burgoon, 1996).  
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Finally, advocates of the IDT assume that judgments are made on the basis of how credible the 
person appears. How the receiver perceives the sender’s character (i.e. if they seem honest or 
trustworthy), or competency (e.g. experience, intelligence, and knowledge) could affect receiver’s 
veracity judgments. The sender’s ability to hold her/his composure (e.g. appear to be calm and 
relaxed), seem sociable (e.g. warm, cheerful, and friendly), or dynamic (e.g. are talkative, energetic, 
assertive) could also affect the way in which they are perceived (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon 
& Buller, 2014). This would naturally include their physical appearance and other observable 
characteristics (e.g. gender and race), which may influence others’ perceptions due to stereotypical 
beliefs or social norms (Baron et al., 2009). The concept of social norms is discussed later in this 
chapter. 
 
2.2.2. Cognitive Load and Interaction. 
“Information management is fundamental to communication” (Burgoon & Buller, 2014, p. 350). 
The management of information refers to the strategic behaviours that actively change the meaning 
of the central message in order to increase the credibility and trustworthiness. This places emotional 
and cognitive strain on both the sender and receiver (Buller & Burgoon, 1996).  
 
When senders lie they have to control various aspects (e.g. the tone of their voice) of their 
message in order to make it convincing. They have to create the message, attempt to keep a credible 
identity, regulate their behaviour while sending the message, consider the feedback, and manage 
their perception of themselves based on their interpretation of the feedback. In addition observable 
manifestations of these behaviours should be hidden from the receiver in order for the message to 
be successful (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Fisher, 2012).  
 
Receivers, on the other hand, need to hear the message, interpret what is said, judge if it fits 
with their knowledge of the topic, observe the senders behaviours and suspected deception cues, 
and manage their behaviour to not signal their possible suspicion to the sender (Buller & Burgoon, 
1996).  
 
The effort to accomplish this can differ because of the complexity of the context of the 
conversation, the persons involved, and types of messages, etcetera. IDT assumes that people with 
better social skills are more successful in handling the additional demands (Buller & Burgoon, 
1996). However, evidence from Bond and DePaulo (2008) suggested that receivers’ abilities to 
detect deception were similar, regardless of their communicative skills. This contradicts the 
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assumption that detecting deception is a communication skill. This implies that detection ability 
should differ significantly between receivers. This notion led the authors to revise their assumption 
and to consider that it is only the sender’s communication ability that determines whether the 
deception was successfully concealed. Therefore, according to the revised version of IDT, the 
receiver’s communicative skills do not play a role in deception detection (Burgoon & Buller, 2014). 
This is not to say, however, that the emotional or cognitive strain on receivers does not influence 
their judgments.  
 
Interpersonal Deception Theory theorists, as a result, assume that receivers and senders are both 
influenced by cognitive and behavioural limitations. Because of these limitations both senders and 
receivers need to choose where to focus their attention (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). This could imply, 
as mentioned above, that the receiver’s own cognitive load influences their veracity judgments. 
 
2.2.3. Norms and Expectations. 
IDT theorists propose that people have expectations about the way in which others will behave. 
These expectations help to organise interpersonal communication as they provide a quick and 
efficient schema (a cognitive framework that helps classify and interpret information) (Buller & 
Burgoon, 1996). Two notable expectations that people bring into communication are honesty and 
reciprocity. People assume that others will be honest in their interactions, be friendly, positive, and 
worthy of trust. People also assume that others will not lie to them if they are being honest (Buller 
& Burgoon, 1996, 2008). The latter refers to the presumption that people are truthful rather than 
deceptive.  
 
If there is a violation of these expectations, proponents of IDT assume that it would be noticed. 
Violations cause the receiver’s attention to shift to the sender, as well as to the violation itself. In 
turn it leads the receiver to start evaluating the credibility of the message. Violations of expectations 
can occur irrespective of the actual truth of the message, however these violations do increase the 
receivers’ attention towards the message in question (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & Buller, 
2014). 
 
2.2.4. Deception. 
IDT supporters assume that deception usually consists of three components (Buller & Burgoon, 
1996):  
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- The deceptive message, that is usually verbal (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & Buller, 
2014).  
- Secondary behaviour, that is intended to increase the credibility of the message or the 
source. This may be verbal or nonverbal in nature (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & 
Buller, 2014). 
- Unintended behaviours, that give some indication that the person is lying. This is usually 
nonverbal and is sometimes referred to as ‘leakage’ (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & 
Buller, 2014).  
 
The deceptive message and secondary behaviour, which are known as strategic behaviours, are 
used to increase the credibility of the intended deception (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & 
Buller, 2014), or protect the person who delivers the message (Wagner, 2011). In turn the 
unintended behaviour, known as nonstrategic behaviours, can reduce the credibility, and provide an 
indication that the person may be lying. When people are deceptive, or suspect that someone is 
being deceptive, it increases their attention to the message and behaviour associated with the 
message. The senders may monitor the behaviour of the receivers in order to determine if their lie 
was successful. Receivers might, in turn, attempt to confirm or deny their suspicions about the 
sender. These additional actions would place more emotional and cognitive strain on both during 
this interaction (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & Buller, 2014).   
 
2.2.4.1. Cognitive and emotional responses. 
It is assumed that behaviour associated with deception and suspicion, are displayed because of the 
participant’s (receiver or sender) attempts to manage information that they present to others. The 
behavioural display could arise from the participant’s attempt to control her/his behaviour, or from 
the cognitive effort that is required to deceive or detect deception. The behaviour can also be 
displayed as a result from emotional or unconscious arousal, or from expectations being violated. 
This can include varying degrees of guilt feelings from disregarding social rules or fear of getting 
caught when deceiving. The subsequent behaviours that result from displaying cognitive and 
emotional reactions could be caused by either strategic or nonstrategic behaviours (Buller & 
Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & Buller, 2014). 
 
The theorists make the assumption that deceptions as well as deception detection are 
complicated processes that increases the demand of attention required by the participants within the 
interaction. Thus, a deceptive interaction is more demanding than interactions based on honesty, 
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because of this added complication of managing fabricated responses, either by being deceptive or 
by trying to hide suspicion (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & Buller, 2014). This is because 
those who create deceptive messages have to create a plausible deceptive message, as well as 
monitor the receiver’s feedback to make judgments on their success. Those who detect deception 
have to monitor their displays of suspicion while they search for potential cues that may indicate 
deception. In addition participants also have to manage the complexity of normal communication 
events elaborated on earlier (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & Buller, 2014). 
 
2.3. Relevant Constructs 
As discussed above IDT was intended to explain deceptive interactions as well as their resulting 
judgments over the course of interactions. The theory, which is based on the assumptions elaborated 
on above, makes specific predictable claims about deceptive interactions. IDT consists of 17 
propositions each of which addresses a particular aspect of interactions. The theorists claim that 
many of the propositions are not necessarily unique to the theory, although they do place emphasis 
on the role of the propositions in deception within communication (Buller & Burgoon, 1996).  
 
This study does not use of all the propositions made by IDT. For this reason, several constructs 
were adapted from the propositions. To simplify the discussion, this chapter presents the constructs 
relevant to this research. The full adapted version of the theory can be read in Engaging Theories in 
Interpersonal Communication: Multiple Perspectives (Burgoon & Buller, 2014). And a list of the 
17 propositions made by IDT is attached as Appendix A in this document. 
 
The following section includes a discussion of the constructs applicable to the current study. 
These include the role that ‘interactivity’ plays within IDT as well as within this study. A 
description of what the theory refers to as ‘task demands’, which include the perspective that is 
taken by IDT in terms of emotional leakage, and cognitive load are reviewed. The discussion also 
aims to indicate the influence that these two concepts have on detecting deception. After this an 
argument regarding participants’ communication expectations is presented, with specific reference 
to expectations of normal behaviour. This leads to a discussion on biases and expectations of 
truthfulness (truth bias). The chapter concludes with, an exposition of some concepts that are not 
addressed in this study, as well as a brief discussion on previous critiques on IDT. 
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2.3.1. Interactivity. 
IDT was originally developed from the belief that there is a difference between interactive and non-
interactive deception. This construct, which influence the way in which messages are formed and 
judged, is central to the theory (Burgoon, 2015). According to the theory, both interactive and non-
interactive contexts involve participants using strategic and nonstrategic behaviours in order to 
convey their messages. However, proponents of IDT argue that deception within interactive and 
non-interactive context present differently (Buller & Burgoon, 1996), as suggested by the findings 
of Dunbar et al. (2013). They further suggest that there is evidence to indicate that both emotional 
leakage and indications of cognitive load are present in non-interactive deception (Buller & 
Burgoon, 1996).  
 
According to IDT interactivity can be placed on a continuum, with relation to social cues, 
immediacy, relational engagement, finally spontaneity and adaptability (elaborated on below). 
These concepts are present to different degrees depending on the participants’ communication 
medium (e.g. if they are communicating via email, video recorded message or face to face). These 
concepts within interactivity also considers how the communication context can affect veracity 
displays (from senders) and judgments (from receivers) (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & 
Buller, 2014; Dunbar et al., 2013).  
 
Social cues refer to the visual, verbal, auditory, and environmental cues that are available during 
interpersonal communication. According to IDT there are a number of social cues that influence the 
behaviour and perceptions of participants in terms of attention or self-absorption. This influence 
depends on the amount of information that is available to the participants (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; 
Dunbar et al., 2013). The quantity of information possibly influences potential biases in terms of the 
visual or demeanour bias (e.g. what senders look like). However, there seems to be evidence to 
indicate that verbal and auditory information (e.g. how senders sound) are more influential in terms 
of the receiver’s judgment than visual information about a sender (Bond et al., 2014).This could in 
turn influence the participant’s truth bias, which is elaborated on later in this chapter.  
 
Immediacy, which has to do with both time and distance, refers to the present: ‘The here and 
now’. Interactions can have high temporal immediacy, which means that they are occurring in ‘real-
time’. Temporal immediacy is concerned with how the interaction is harmonised, or if the 
participants emphasise the present through linguistic features. Interactions can also have high 
spatial immediacy which means that the participants can interact socially as well as physically. 
Spatial immediacy is concerned with physical proximity (physical distance), nonverbal behaviours 
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(i.e. gazing, touching, gestures etc.), or linguistic constructions (i.e. speaking in the active voice, or 
by saying ‘we’ instead of ‘I’). Interactions that are highly immediate may foster closeness as well as 
personalisation. In contrast to non-immediacy that creates a sense of disassociation and distance 
(Buller & Burgoon, 1996). 
 
Relational engagement refers to an implied relationship that is established when participants 
interact. This is assumed to originate from engaging with someone in a highly temporal and spatial 
immediate context. Within this type of context participants are oriented towards each other as 
individuals. According to IDT theorists this relational interaction influences participant’s 
expectations, specifically their expectations for honesty and reciprocity. These expectations can 
increase participants’ truth bias, which has been found to be higher in face to face communication 
as compared to less interactive contexts (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). 
 
Spontaneity and adaptability are required during highly interactive communication as it is not 
possible to fully anticipate conversations. Participants in the interaction provide feedback to each 
other in the way that they communicate, as well as by what they say. Thus, as the conversation 
progresses it naturally changes and is accompanied by changes in behaviour. In contrast a situation 
that is non-interactive can provide participants with time to respond and construct their answers, 
although with the limitation of not having access to feedback on their communicated messages 
(Buller & Burgoon, 1996).  
 
This study draws on the construct of interactivity in terms of propositions 1, 8 and 9 of the IDT 
(Appendix A). Proposition 1 suggests that the level of interactivity systematically affects the 
participants’ behaviour as well as cognition. This is because participants are required to attend to 
both encoding and decoding tasks in a highly interactive context. These include intercepting, and 
interpreting, social cues, as well as constructing and conveying a relevant response within an 
appropriate time frame (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & Buller, 2014). In accordance with 
both proposition 8 and 9 respectively, higher interactivity can result in more truth judgments when 
considering proposition 8, whereas proposition 9 predicts that it would then lead to lower deception 
detection accuracy. This is because increased truth judgments increase the amount of deception 
messages that are mistakenly classified as the truth (Burgoon & Buller, 2014).  
 
The method chosen for this study to investigate a possible lie bias towards second language 
speakers entailed the use of isolated video recorded messages. Showing receivers only one recorded 
message meant that there would not have been a highly interactive and dynamic relationship 
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between the senders and receivers within this study. Although the senders and receivers were not in 
conversation, they were however required to attend to various aspects present in interpersonal 
communication. “IDT posits that deception performances, in both interpersonal and non-
interpersonal contexts, include strategic and non-strategic behaviour” (Buller & Burgoon, 1996, p. 
216). The senders within this study formed a message that was either truthful or deceptive. They 
were required to attend to various aspects of their message and performance by making use of 
strategic behaviours in order to seem credible. According to IDT this additional attention on 
creating a credible message results in the potential display of nonstrategic behaviours, which 
presents differently depending on the veracity of the message (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & 
Buller, 2014). The receivers were able to see the senders and hear the messages and were given the 
opportunity to state if they believed the messages or not. This required them to actively attend to 
various social cues (filtering by what they believed was relevant), and attend to the message. They 
then needed to compare the message to what they already knew (or suspected), in order to provide a 
veracity judgment. 
 
The communication demands to accomplish either of these tasks are assumed to increase during 
deceptive, as compared with honest, interactions. In addition, it is argued to involve behavioural 
leakage as well as increased cognitive load. This is assumed to occur because of a greater use of 
strategic behaviour, resulting in a higher occurrence of nonstrategic behaviours. In continuation of 
this discussion the construct that is presented next is concerned with the task demands associated 
with honesty and deception.  
 
2.3.2. Task Demands. 
“Task demands concern whether or not participants are engaged in a conversation that is mentally 
or emotionally difficult to conduct” (Burgoon & Buller, 2014, p. 352). In referring to the task 
demands of a conversation IDT draws on two concepts, namely emotional leakage and cognitive 
load. Both of these concepts have been considered in previous studies as separate theoretical 
frameworks, and therefore are discussed at length in this dissertation.  
 
The concept ‘emotional leakage’ has gained considerable attention within the last couple of 
decades in its own right (Darwin, 1873; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Sauter, Eisner, Ekman, & Scott, 
2010; Yan, Wu, Liang, Chen, & Fu, 2013). It focusses on the way that emotions and emotional 
expressions are controlled by senders during deception. It also argues that these expressions are at 
times unconscious, and that they are observable to others. The concept ‘cognitive load’ has been 
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gaining increased attention recently (Patterson, 2009; Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2015; 
Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011). Cognitive load refers to the idea that delivering a deceptive 
message uses more mental recourses than an honest one. Furthermore, increased cognitive load 
results in certain behaviours that can be indicative of deception.  
 
“These inadvertent behaviours, which we are calling nonstrategic, usually reflect perceptual, 
cognitive, and emotional processes accompanying message encoding and decoding or the 
communicative situation” (Buller & Burgoon, 1996, p. 207). Within IDT both approaches are 
considered to have influence on behaviours that could be considered as nonstrategic. Proponents of 
IDT make the assumption that senders with competent conversational skills are better equipped to 
manage their emotional behaviours and the additional cognitive load required during deception, 
than senders ill equipped with such skills (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & Buller, 2014). 
 
Therefore, if senders are skilled communicators it increases their ability to project a credible 
image. Being a skilled communicator assists the senders to cope with the demands of 
communication, and thus also be able to handle the additional demands of deception more 
effectively. This ability aids senders to encode their messages to seem more credible, and possibly 
give them increased control of unintentional behaviours (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & 
Buller, 2014). 
 
In considering the foundations of these two concepts (emotional leakage and cognitive load), the 
discussion begins with the underlying assumptions made by each. Followed by a comprehensive 
discussion of each view, from which IDT draws certain conclusions.   
 
2.3.2.1. Emotional leakage. 
Emotional leakage finds basis in an argument made by Darwin (1873) in his book; The Expression 
of Emotions in Man and Animals. He stated that people are not completely in control of their 
behaviours, with specific reference to their facial expressions. It therefore follows that there are 
certain emotional expressions that cannot be made unless the emotions are actually felt. In addition, 
when those emotions are felt, the emotional expressions cannot be completely concealed. 
 
In the past couple of decades’ research has found considerable evidence to suggest that there are 
several observable facial expressions of ‘basic emotions’ (e.g. happiness is symbolised by a smile 
and tightening of the eyelids) that are universally recognisable and displayed across cultures 
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(Ekman, 1992; Ekman & Friesen, 1971). Here the term ‘basic emotions’ is used to refer to emotions 
that are considered to be unique and distinctive, which also include distinctive recognisable 
expressions1 (Ekman, 1994; Tracy & Randles, 2011). The idea of universal facial expressions of 
emotions was proposed by Darwin (1873) but was largely rejected, in favour of theories that 
suggest that emotional expressions result from social learning. However, more recent studies found 
evidence that supports Darwin’s theory (Ekman & Friesen, 1971). 
 
These emotional facial expressions are considered to be involuntarily to a degree, and can occur 
at any point in response to stimuli that elicit the emotion (Darwin, 1873; Ekman, 1994, 2004). 
There are specific facial movements (e.g. tightening of the eyelids) that are not under conscious 
control, and cannot be expressed voluntarily (by most people), but which are however expressed 
when the emotion is actually felt (Porter & ten Brinke, 2008).  
 
Emotions in the context of deception can be manipulated in several ways in order to influence 
the credibility of the message. These manipulations include neutralising that refers to an attempt to 
conceal an emotion (e.g. keeping a ‘poker face’). Masking an emotion is an attempt to show one 
emotion (that is not felt), in order to hide a different emotion (that is felt), thus intentionally 
falsifying an emotional display. Finally, simulating an emotion refers to showing an emotional 
expression that one is not feeling (Porter & ten Brinke, 2008).  
 
A significant limitation of this approach is that emotional displays are not only part of deceptive 
encounters, but form part of normal communication in everyday life. There are no emotional 
indicators unique to deception, and thus it may be possible to correctly judge a sender as anxious, 
afraid, angry, or happy. However, these emotions can be present in someone who is truthful as well 
as lying. An honest person may feel as afraid as a guilty one, because there is a chance that she/he 
may not be believed, and wrongfully punished (Vrij et al., 2010). In order not to commit this error 
there must be enough information to judge if the emotion is reasonable within the sender’s position. 
Although this approach can still be prone to some error (Ekman, 2009).  
 
2.3.2.2. Cognitive load. 
More recent studies have looked at the possible effects that deception has on cognitive load. 
Cognitive load stems from the need to negotiate and focus limited cognitive resources in order to 
efficiently complete various tasks. If there are further tasks that require attention they will increase 
                                                          
1 note: a distinctive expression is not a characteristic of what constitutes as an emotion (Ekman, 1994; Tracy & Randles, 
2011). 
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the cognitive load, and it will be more difficult to negotiate the required cognitive resources. 
Deception is considered as an additional task that is placed on a person, along with the tasks 
normally associated with communication, and thus increases cognitive load. It has also been argued 
that an exception to this rule exists. This is most notable at times when it is easier to tell a short 
simple lie than telling a long complicated truthful story (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & 
Buller, 2014; Greene et al., 1985; Vrij et al., 2010). 
 
The assumption is thus that the additional mental effort increases behaviours that are indicative, 
or associated with, a high cognitive load. Implications of cognitive load include that the 
performance on another tasks can suffer, in that it could be susceptible to more errors or slower 
processing. Some of the behaviours normally associated with complex task processing include: 
Longer pauses, dilating pupils, as well as shorter messages and less eye contact (Greene et al., 
1985).  
 
It is believed that, in general, deception significantly increases cognitive load during 
conversations as it is more cognitively demanding than telling the truth (Vrij et al., 2008). This is 
because during deception senders have to control several verbal and nonverbal channels in order to 
seem convincing. This requires them to fabricate a plausible story that is believed by others. In 
doing so they need to remember what they told to whom, as well as the critical details of the story 
to maintain the ruse. In addition they must avoid losing track of what they have already said, as well 
as anticipating and steering clear of contradictory information (Greene et al., 1985; Porter et al., 
2012; Remland, 2009; Vrij et al., 2012; Warren, Schertler, & Bull, 2009). This process adds to the 
already complicated task of normal communication. These additional tasks thus increase the 
likelihood of mistakes, or behavioural indicators of cognitive load (e.g. logical errors in the story or 
blink-rate) (Greene et al., 1985; Vrij et al., 2012; Warren et al., 2009).  
 
As with emotional leakage some of the behaviours that are indications of cognitive load are also 
not completely under conscious control. Examples such as vocal cues, pupil dilation, vocal pitch or 
blink-rate can occur without conscious knowledge of the action, and with very limited control. 
Other behaviours related to cognitive load (e.g. errors in memory, lengthy pauses, or speech errors) 
can in addition potentially be reliable indicators of deception (Evans & Michael, 2014; Porter et al., 
2012; Remland, 2009; Vrij et al., 2008, 2012). 
 
A limitation of the cognitive load approach is similar to the limitation discussed above 
concerning emotional leakage. Specifically, that the presence of behaviour associated with 
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cognitive load in isolation cannot be used as an indication of deception. This is because senders, 
who can be seen as potential suspects, may attempt to remember what really happened at a specific 
time or place. Trying to recall events correctly and providing an accurate and honest description can 
place the sender under severe cognitive strain. However, to overcome this limitation, there are 
interview schedules that can be used to distinguish between guilty and innocent subjects, which are 
designed to increase the cognitive load significantly for deceptive speakers (Vrij et al., 2010). This 
is discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 
 
Furthermore, it is possible for the receiver to be influenced by their own cognitive load, which 
could lead to inaccurate or biased judgments. Burgoon, Blair, and Strom (2008) argue that cognitive 
load could also have an adverse effect on the judgments of the receivers. According to the authors; 
“The sheer amount of social information to be processed also can result in erroneous judgments” (p. 
593). This also makes it possible for increasingly biased or inaccurate responses if the receiver’s 
cognitive load is high. 
 
Results from a study by Biernat, Kobrynowicz, and Weber (2003) suggest that a high cognitive 
load can increase stereotypical beliefs. This may result in believing that someone is lying based on 
possible stereotyped beliefs, which can include: Certain behavioural cues, age, gender, culture or 
race. However, the authors do explicitly state that this may not be the result in every case. Instead 
the stereotype must be relevant in the context. For example, the belief that deceivers do not look 
you in the eyes, which has been found to be a popular, although inaccurate, view about deception, 
and is not a sure indication that someone is lying (Hurley, Griffin, & Stefanone, 2014). Stereotypes 
are cognitive structures that influence the way in which we perceive our social world. Some of these 
perceptions could be about characteristics or traits that are believed to be shared by a social group. 
Describing stereotypes as cognitive structures also assists in explaining why they are increased 
when cognitive load is higher (Baron et al., 2009). That is, when receivers have a great deal of 
information to process they tend to use heuristics to simplify the processing of the information. 
Heuristics, of which stereotypes are one, assist receivers to make judgments quickly and efficiently. 
However, they are prone to errors. They could also be explained as an extended form of the 
fundamental attribution error (Gilbert, 1989). The fundamental attribution error refers to the 
tendency of receivers to believe that the behaviour of a sender is due to their internal states (who 
they are as people) rather than possible external influences. For example, if a person looks nervous, 
it could be attributed to the belief that the person is afraid of being caught, and thus lying, rather 
than the context in which they are (i.e. accused of a crime they did not commit). It can also increase 
other stereotypical beliefs about visible characteristics of the sender (e.g. their gender or race), in 
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order to make veracity judgments (Baron et al., 2009). Gilbert (1989) further suggested that the 
fundamental attribution error is prone to increase under conditions of high cognitive load. 
 
The fundamental attribution error incurred by cognitive load, may lead receivers to judge 
senders as more honest or deceptive as a result of an increase in the receivers’ own cognitive load. 
If receivers are under higher cognitive load, they may be prone to stereotypical beliefs about 
deception cues (e.g. beliefs about eye contact or nervous behaviour), auditory indicators (e.g. 
accented or second language speech), or other visible characteristic of the sender (e.g. age or 
gender). This leads to making biased judgments and lowering deception detection accuracy. 
O’Sullivan (2003) found evidence for this argument in that receivers who attributed more positive 
qualities to a sender tended to be truth biased, and when they attributed negative qualities to a 
sender they tended to be lie biased.  
 
2.3.2.3. Propositions concerning task demands. 
The current study drew on the construct of ‘communication demands’ according to the 
Interpersonal Deception Theory’s propositions 1, 8, 9, and 16 (Appendix A). Proposition 1 
explicitly considers that the behaviours and cognitions of both senders and receivers are influenced 
by the conversational demands. These demands as discussed above include emotional leakage and 
cognitive load. According to the assumptions made by IDT the ability to manage one’s behavioural 
display of emotions as well as the cognitive load required by deception entails a certain amount of 
communication skill. Propositions 8 and 9 consider that the conversational skill of the senders 
(discussed above) could increase the receiver’s credibility judgments (proposition 8), and decrease 
the receiver’s detection accuracy (proposition 9). Finally, proposition 16 makes the prediction that 
the receivers’ judgments are influenced by what happens at the end of the interaction, specifically 
the last behavioural display of the sender. This could indicate that although receivers might be 
rightly suspicious of a sender at the beginning of an interaction, they could still judge senders as 
truthful based on their performance at the end of the interaction. Again, this refers to the 
communication skill of the sender to appear credible. Also considered are the effects that the 
cognitive load of the receivers could have on their deception detection ability, and the possible 
influence of the fundamental attribution error on accuracy (Burgoon & Buller, 2014).  
 
Results that support the arguments for the effects of emotional leakage and cognitive load on 
deceptive displays are considered in the next chapter. Although consistent with the assumptions of 
IDT it seems as if there is not a uniform display of deception. This could result in senders 
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attempting to control the behaviours that they associate with stereotypical displays of deception. 
This could in turn also influence receivers to look for these stereotypical behavioural displays, in 
order to base their judgments.  
 
Stereotypical beliefs are influenced by socialisation, and thus by proxy influenced by social and 
cultural norms. Thus, what senders and receivers believe to be normal behaviours, influence their 
performance in creating, or judging a credible message. The following construct deals with 
perceptions of normality, and its influence on the current study.  
 
2.3.3. ‘Expectation of Normality’. 
As discussed in the first part of this chapter, Interpersonal Deception Theory assumes that receivers 
have expectations about the way that senders will behave. These expectations find their bases in 
social norms, which claim that receivers expect senders to use ‘normal’ social behaviours (e.g. 
looking someone in the eye) during conversations. If senders do not use the social pattern that the 
receiver deems ‘normal’, the receiver could become suspicious or judge senders as deceptive. 
During the interaction itis not necessarily important for the senders to show a specific behaviour, 
but rather that their overall behaviour conforms to the receivers expectation of social norms (Buller 
& Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & Buller, 2014).  
 
One of the factors that affect what senders and receivers deem as ‘normal’ social behaviour is 
their own cultural background. This is specifically relevant in cross-cultural interactions, where 
specific behaviour might influence the participant’s expectations or perceptions of normality. 
Within this type of interaction gender norms and other stereotypes could also influence behaviours 
and judgments. Cultural norms are discussed more explicitly within this section because of the large 
influence that they have on this study. This is also because in previous deception detection studies, 
gender has not been consistently found to be an influential factor (Aamodt & Custer, 2006). In order 
to continue this discussion in terms of cultural norms, a description of norms is presented first, 
followed by a discussion on how cultural norms influence behavioural expectations.  
 
Norms can be viewed as social rules that dictate what is expected of someone in a specific 
situation. For example, to be polite to strangers. A group expects that members will behave, think or 
feel a specific way in different situations. This serves several functions in that it makes situations 
less ambiguous, and thus easier to preserve the expected conduct. It also increases the effectiveness 
of the group, making it more likely that the groups would continue to function well (Baron et al., 
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2009; Matsumoto, Seung Hee Yoo, & Fontaine, 2008). Norms are created in order to govern 
various social groups, and can include gender or cultural norms, each with a set of specific ‘rules’. 
This study discusses these norms within the topic of culture, because of the assumption of the 
penetrating influence that culture has on norms, and their creation (Baron et al., 2009).  
 
Culture is believed to influence people’s behaviours, as well as how they perceive the 
behaviours of others (Baron et al., 2009). This influence naturally translates into the context of 
deception and veracity judgments. In turn, this is responsible, to some extent, for potential biased 
judgments in a cross-cultural setting. Culture can be defined as a shared system of information and 
meaning, as well as the beliefs and perceptions of a specific group of people. This system is 
conveyed from one generation to another, and thus works to preserve order, and avoid social 
disorder. To accomplish this function, norms are created that help to direct the behaviour of group 
members (i.e. gender norms) (Baron et al., 2009; Matsumoto et al., 2008). 
 
Because of the way in which norms function, they also require behaviours to change. Emotions 
can be a source for behavioural change, thus norms could be associated with regulating emotions. 
The norms for emotions, as well as the expression of emotions, become one of the core objectives 
of a cultural system. The norms that centre around emotional expressions or behavioural displays 
are referred to as ‘display rules’ (Matsumoto et al., 2008). 
 
Display rules are culture specific norms that function to manage as well as change expression of 
emotions in different situations. As discussed earlier, certain facial movements are universally 
recognised, and not completely under conscious control, but rather become active when an emotion 
is felt. Participants with a certain culture would therefore need to simulate an unfelt emotion, or 
alternatively neutralise, or mask some of their felt emotions in order to conform to the display rules 
of their culture (Ekman, 2004; Hurley & Frank, 2011; Matsumoto et al., 2008). These rules have 
been investigated in Ekman’s (1972) study (as cited in Matsumoto et al., 2008), where Japanese and 
Americans were shown a stressful stimuli alone, or with an experimenter who had a higher social 
status. The findings of this study indicated no difference in emotional expression as a result of 
culture when participants were alone. Rather when participants viewed the stimuli with the 
experimenter, the Japanese participants were more likely to mask negative emotions with a smile, 
which was interpreted as evidence of display rules (Matsumoto et al., 2008).  
 
This indicates that culture can have a significant impact on deception as well as the recognition 
of deception. If one culture sanctions certain emotional or behavioural expressions, which are not 
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sanctioned by another, the discrepancy could create a misunderstanding of the reactions of 
participants. For example, certain groups stand closer in conversation, whereas others view this as 
an invasion of privacy. In addition, differences on what behaviours are perceived as indicative of 
deception can create similar misunderstandings. This could in turn significantly lower accuracy, as 
well as increase the bias of receivers (Al-Simadi, 2000; Ekman, 2004). 
 
Although it should also be noted that one of the, potentially, major cultural difference in 
deception detection studies could also be in the way that participants in different cultures define 
‘truth’. Results from previous studies suggest that there is a cultural difference in what is defined as 
the truth. Thus the actions or intentions of senders might be correctly classified, but interpreted 
differently within a cross-cultural sample (Fu, Lee, Cameron, & Xu, 2001; Park & Ahn, 2007). This 
distinction falls outside the scope of this study, but would make an interesting contribution within 
the South African context. 
 
This study looks at the construct of normality in terms of propositions 8, 9, and 16 of 
Interpersonal Deception Theory (Appendix A). As discussed during the previous two constructs 
propositions 8 and 9 are concerned with the likelihood that receivers make truthful, possibly biased 
judgments (proposition 8), as well as accurate deception detection judgments (proposition 9). 
According to these two propositions the receivers are more likely to be truth biased, as well as less 
likely to detect deception, if the sender’s behaviour adheres to their expectations of normal conduct. 
In accordance with proposition 16 these judgments are based on the last behavioural display of the 
sender. This creates the possibility that if senders deviate from the norm during the beginning of the 
message, they could be believed if their more recent displays adhere to the relevant norms (Burgoon 
& Buller, 2014).  
 
Proposition 9 further predicts that receivers who have background information about the 
senders, could be more accurate in their judgments than those without such knowledge (Burgoon & 
Buller, 2014). This information could include previous encounters or relationships, where the 
receivers are familiar with the sender’s normal behaviour. Access to truthful baseline behaviour 
may also assist receivers to make more relevant observations to base their judgments, than those not 
privy to such behaviour. If the receiver has knowledge about the conversation topic, they may be 
able to compare the message with their previous knowledge. Finally, if receivers have general 
knowledge about deception detection, it can provide them with an indication as to which of their 
observations are relevant within the context (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). The principles of 
proposition 9 can thus inform and influence what receivers perceive as ‘normal’ behaviour. For this 
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reason, the current study included a 20 second sample of baseline behaviour before every message. 
This is elaborated on within the method chapter of this dissertation.  
 
As discussed before, receivers enter into a conversation with additional expectations. One such 
expectation is that senders would be truthful. This expectation of truthfulness could bias receivers’ 
judgments towards senders, and make them less accurate in detecting deception. As previously 
discussed, several of the constructs look at the way that their respective topics influence judgment 
bias, this is discussed in the following section.  
 
2.3.4. Bias. 
This study views ‘judgment bias’ specifically from the perspective of IDT that is elaborated on 
within this section. The focus in this discussion is on the truth bias, which as discussed throughout 
this chapter, is influenced by various constructs. It also plays a distinct role within the propositions 
of IDT that are discussed at the end of this section.  
 
The term bias is used within this study to refer to errors in thinking that create a systematic 
tendency to make judgments in a specific way (Baron et al., 2009; Burgoon, 2015). According to 
Burgoon et al. (2008), there are four types of cognitive biases that are mostly responsible for errors 
in veracity judgments. These biases are: The ‘visual bias’, ‘demeanour bias’, ‘expectancy violation 
bias’, and the ‘truth bias’. The focus of this discussion is on the truth bias, although preceding this is 
a brief description of the remaining three biases.  
- The visual bias refers to the predisposition of people to rely more on the nonverbal 
behaviour of others than on other forms of information (e.g. the words they use) (Burgoon et 
al., 2008).  
- The demeanour bias stems from the inclination of receivers to emphasise the communication 
style used by the senders in order to base their credibility judgments (Burgoon et al., 2008). 
That is, they base their judgments on their perception of the senders’ character, competency 
or sociability, to name a few. (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & Buller, 2014). 
- The expectancy violation bias refers to the tendency of receivers to judge senders as 
deceptive if they do not display ‘normal’ behaviour (Burgoon et al., 2008). This bias, which 
was partly discussed above under normative expectations, has a strong connection with 
cultural (or social) normative behaviours (Buller & Burgoon, 1996, 2008).  
- The truth bias refers to the predisposition that people have to assume that others are mostly 
honest, which leads to an overestimation of truthful messages (Burgoon, 2015; Burgoon et 
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al., 2008). This means that receivers are more likely to judge senders as truthful (Levine, 
Park, & McCornack, 1999). 
 
The truth bias has found a strong basis in previous deception detection research. As will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter, it is a common finding that receivers are truth biased 
when making veracity judgments. This corresponds with the assumption made by IDT that receivers 
expect others to be truthful. Although accuracy levels are commonly found to be close to chance; 
the correct judgments on honest messages have been found to be significantly above chance, and 
correct judgments on deceptive messages have been found to be significantly below chance. This 
suggest that receivers tend to systematically prefer to make truthful judgments above deceptive 
judgments (Bond & DePaulo, 2006).  
 
This tendency towards making truthful judgments may result from several mechanisms. One 
such mechanism could be the fundamental attribution error described above. Another could involve 
people’s tendencies to use heuristic processing, which may result in biased judgments, when 
making various decisions (Baron et al., 2009). These biases naturally influence the accuracy levels 
attained by receivers.   
 
In contrast to biased judgments, accuracy, in this context, refers to the correct classification of 
both honest and deceptive messages. Bias differs from accuracy because it is a tendency to make 
judgments in a particular way, regardless of what the correct classification is. In this study, in order 
for receivers not to be biased, both their truthful and deceptive judgments needed to be correct the 
same amount of time. If receivers do tend to be truth biased, their classification of truthful messages 
would be correct more often, than their classification of deceptive messages. This means that they 
would be more likely to judge others as truthful, than judge others as deceptive, regardless of the 
actual veracity of the messages (Levine et al., 1999).  
 
IDT assumes that receivers are truth biased when they enter a conversation. The reason as to 
why senders are successful in creating deceptive messages is because receivers do not recognise 
leakage and deceptive cues when they are available (Burgoon & Buller, 2014). The complexity of 
communication requires senders and receivers to make use of heuristics, and are only able to 
concentrate on information selectively, as well as in such a way that it confirms their assumptions 
or first impression, and possibly their stereotypical beliefs as well (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). 
Therefore, when people assume that others are honest, they judge a conversation according to this 
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presumption. This may cause them to miss, or incorrectly judge, cues that are indicative of 
deception (Burgoon & Buller, 2014).  
 
According to the theoretical perspective of this study, there are multiple propositions that are 
concerned with the truth bias. This study is specifically concerned with the predictions made by 
propositions 1, 8, 9, and 16. With regards to proposition 1, it was argued that both the context 
interactivity, as well as the conversational demands may influence the amount of truthful judgments 
made. Propositions 8 and 9 predict that if the receivers are truth biased, then they tend to make more 
truth judgments (proposition 8), as well as that they would be less accurate (proposition 9). 
According to IDT propositions 8 and 9 are concerned with veracity judgments during conversation, 
where proposition 16 is concerned with the judgments after the interaction. Proposition 16 is thus 
concerned with similar factors to propositions 8 and 9, but is specifically concerned with the last 
behaviour of senders, as well as if the receivers are truth biased at the end of the interaction 
(Burgoon & Buller, 2014). 
 
There have been some recent discussions on the view that IDT takes with regards to the truth 
bias. In the section that follows the critique of this view is discussed in terms of the veracity effect 
(discussed directly below), and the truth / lie base rate (discussed later).    
 
2.3.4.1. Veracity effect. 
Stemming from the truth bias, Levine et al. (1999) identified that the veracity of the message is a 
crucial factor of how accurately veracity judgments are made. Their argument follows that because 
receivers tend to make more truthful judgments; judgment accuracy could be increased if receivers 
were shown more truthful messages. This was named the ‘veracity effect’, and it claims that the 
receivers’ accuracy would differ depending on the veracity of the sender’s message (Levine et al., 
1999; Park & Levine, 2015). The Park-Levine model is based on this veracity effect, and makes the 
prediction that the accuracy in deception judgments “is a positive linear function of truth-lie base-
rates” (Park & Levine, 2015, p. 350). Therefore, if people are shown more truthful messages they 
will be more accurate in their judgments than if they are shown more deceptive messages (Park & 
Levine, 2015).  
 
The Park-Levine model is aimed critically at IDT and previous studies that made use of 50/50% 
base-rates (discussed below) as part of their research design. Claiming that IDT is too complex, 
Levine, Clare, Green, Serota and Park (2014) maintains that the Park-Levine model is a more 
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accurate representation of detection accuracy. In terms of the truth-lie base-rate, Levine (2014b) is 
highly critical of previous deception research that used a 50/50% truth-lie base-rate. Levine (2014b) 
argued that deceptive messages are uncommon in naturally occurring communication. This means 
that the truth bias found in previous studies is an adaptive form of effective communication that 
resembles the way that judgments are usually made. The argument continues that truth accuracy is 
increased significantly if there are more truthful messages than deceptive messages. Thus, 
according to this approach previous studies that used a 50/50% base-rate were based on a biased 
methodological approach.  
 
Burgoon (2015) disagreed with the idea that there would be greater truth accuracy in conditions 
where there is a higher truthful base-rate. Stating that the truth bias does not reflect accuracy levels 
at all, but rather that it is an overestimation of the truthfulness of messages. The reasoning follows 
that higher levels of bias means that accuracy is lower, and that the ‘correct truth judgments’ are not 
because of correct classification, but rather because of a set tendency to make judgments in a certain 
way (Burgoon, 2015). This does however not mean that the truth bias does not allow for the 
increase of effective communication as Levine (2014b) suggested. But rather that this bias should 
not be mistakenly redefined as ‘accuracy’ (Burgoon, 2015), which would be like moving the goal 
post in order for the score to look better.  
 
Adaptive Lie Detection (ALIED) provides a different theoretical perspective on the truth bias. 
According to this account the truth bias is seen as a functional, adaptive and flexible process that 
increases the likelihood of making ‘correct guesses’. It proposes that when people make veracity 
judgments they use either individual cues (about the message itself or knowledge of that specific 
situation), or more general information about the context (what other say about the person, or 
similar situations). Neither of these necessarily make detection more accurate, but they do influence 
the bias itself (Street, 2015).  
 
The ALIED approach views both truth and lie biases as resulting from the same process that 
increases as the person uses more general information. When there is less diagnostic information 
(individual cues), then receivers need to base their judgments on more general information about 
the context. Previous research found that this usually resulted in an overestimation of honest 
judgments (Street, 2016). It is argued that this could make judgments relatively more accurate, but 
that it is a ‘best guess’ of what the context might look like. It could just as easily lead to inaccurate 
veracity judgments, where in reality more people might be truthful or deceptive, and the receivers 
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believe the opposite, their biased answering might lead to a very poor accuracy score and possibly 
detrimental decisions (Street, 2015).  
 
Therefore, ALIED argues that bias occurs when people are required to make a veracity decision 
when they have to rely on more general information. Bias thus decrease when more diagnostic 
information is accessible, and that more general information both increases the bias, as well as 
determines the valence (truth- or lie) of the bias (Street, 2015, 2016). This has already been shown 
to lead to inaccurate judgments within an experimental setting, but could possibly lead to more 
effective communication within everyday life (Street, 2015).  
 
The current study follows the definition of accuracy, and bias as put forth by Burgoon (2015) in 
that it needs to involve the correct classification of both honest and deceptive messages. One cannot 
say that classifying more truthful messages as the truth, at the expense of correct deception 
judgments is because of a type of ‘truth accuracy’. Detection ability will not be apparent from only 
correct truthful judgments or only correct deception judgments, because the resulting scores would 
be a product of biased judgments. IDT does not share ALIED’s more flexible view of judgment 
bias, but is not completely opposed to it. IDT does not give an explanation of the truth bias, beyond 
that certain factors influence the presentation of a truth bias, but rather includes it as something that 
has an effect on the receivers’ judgments. In looking at the way that receivers make their judgments 
this study uses the IDT approach to view the concept of bias (Burgoon, 2015). 
 
2.3.4.2. Truth and lie base-rate. 
To test for accuracy and bias, studies need to account for the total classification of both truthful and 
deceptive messages, as well as the classification honest and deceptive messages separately. To 
accomplish this, studies use a 50/50% base-rate. This base-rate refers to the number of truthful and 
deceptive messages that are used in the study (Burgoon, 2016). For example, the base-rate used in 
the current study (50/50%) ensures that half of the total messages are honest (50%), and the other 
half are deceptive (50%). 
 
This 50/50% base-rate is specifically useful for the purpose of looking at detection accuracy or 
bias, because it gives an equal chance for both classifications, and thus avoids an inherent truth or 
lie bias within the study’s method. This measurement works by comparing the likelihood of correct 
classification against chance. Given that only two choices are present within this study, the probable 
score that can be attained on average just by randomly guessing is around 50%. Therefore, 
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judgments need to significantly exceed 50% in order to make any claim to accuracy. This also 
allows researchers to look at veracity judgments made on honest and deceptive stimulus separately, 
which could give an indication if either was over- or underestimated by receivers (Burgoon, 2015). 
 
Therefore, if the total score is measured at 50%, it would mean that receivers are probably 
guessing. This total score is compiled by different scores on truthful and deceptive messages. If the 
score is made up of 60% correct honest judgments and 40% correct deception judgments, as 
typically found in deception research (Bond & DePaulo, 2006), it would indicate a truth bias in how 
the judgments are made (Burgoon, 2015). The total score could thus be said to give an indication of 
classification accuracy, in comparison to random (or focused) guesses, where scores on the truth 
and deception messages would give an indication of potential bias in veracity judgments. Thus by 
using a 50/50% base-rate a study could have a clearer distinction between accurate and biased 
judgments (Burgoon, 2015).  
 
Coupled with the methodological influence that a 50/50% base-rate would have on deception 
classification, is the amount of truthful and deceptive messages that the receivers believe form part 
of the study. Therefore, if the receivers are not told that some messages might be deceptive they 
could tend to rate every message as truthful. If, however receivers are told that half the messages 
are deceptive, they could attempt to engineer their answers based on the amount of previous 
judgments they have made. This could effectively distract the receivers from the research task. 
 
Results from a study by Street and Richardson (2015) indicated that the receivers’ expectation 
of how many honest and deceptive messages they were going to judge, made a difference in how 
they initially made judgments. The researchers designed a study to include 50% truthful and 50% 
deceptive videos. The receivers were able to make veracity judgments throughout the viewing of 
each video (time-series answers), and at the end of each were asked to make a final truth / lie 
judgment (final judgments). Included in the study were three receiver conditions based on the 
receiver’s base-rate expectations. The conditions consisted of high lie expectation, equal truth / lie 
expectation, and high truth expectation. Although in reality the true base-rates were kept constant 
across the conditions (i.e. 50/50%). The findings of the time-series answers suggested that the 
expectations of the truth and lie base-rates did have an initial effect on the direction of the receiver’s 
bias. Receivers who expected more lies had a lie bias towards the senders, and receivers who 
expected more truths, were truth biased. In addition, the receivers who were in the equal, and truth 
biased, conditions indicated that they were more confident when making truthful judgments. 
Another interesting finding was that it seemed as if receivers became more truth biased over time. 
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This was evident in the data where only the final judgments were considered. Therefore, if just the 
final judgments are considered it could reflect that base-rate expectations did not affect veracity 
judgments. But the analysis of the time-series decisions indicated that the expectations of receivers 
did have an initial effect on receiver bias (Street & Richardson, 2015). The results provided some 
evidence to the claim made by IDT that the receivers’ judgments were influenced more by what 
happened at the end of an interaction (Burgoon & Buller, 2014).  
 
2.3.5. Constructs Not Included. 
The purpose of this study was to determine if there is a lie bias against second language speakers. 
Video recordings of second language speakers were shown to a sample of receivers. Showing 
receivers only one recorded message means that there would not have been an interactive and 
dynamic relationship between the senders and receivers within this study (as discussed above). This 
lack in interactive relationship caused many of the propositions made by IDT to fall outside of the 
scope of this study, and therefore are not considered here. 
 
The most relevant constructs that were subsequently omitted from this discussion were the 
following: Concepts concerning the relationship between the senders and receivers, reciprocity 
within the interaction, receiver’s suspicions, as well as the behavioural displays of receivers. The 
main reasons for excluding these concepts from the discussion was because would have increased 
the complexity of the discussion, as well as distracted from the argument put forth throughout this 
dissertation, with minimal gain for the present argument. In this study the senders did not interact 
with the receivers, thus their relationship would not have directly affected their behaviour. 
Receivers would not have been able to expect senders to reciprocate their intentions as they viewed 
the veracity message well after the fact. Finally, receiver’s suspicion and behaviours would also not 
have affected the veracity messages within this study for the reason just stated. For a more 
comprehensive view of Interpersonal Deception Theory this study refers to Buller and Burgoon 
(1996, 2008), and Burgoon and Buller (2014) for the latest updated version of theory, as used 
within the current study.  
 
2.3.6. Critique. 
As indicated in the construct dealing with bias, IDT is not without criticism. Park and Levine (2015) 
were openly critical of IDT in the way that it views bias, and that the theory suggests a 50/50% 
base-rate (discussed above). This is because the authors assume that deception is uncommon in the 
32 
 
‘real world’, and therefore they argue that the base-rate within research should include more honest 
messages in order to reflect this. 
 
IDT was additionally faulted for being too complex in comparison to the less complicated 
predictive theory of the Park-Levine Model (discussed earlier). The Park-Levine Model claims to 
better account for accuracy in deception detection studies than IDT because it is only concerned 
with two variables (base-rates and the truth bias) (Levine, Clare, Green, et al., 2014). The position 
of the current study is that deception in cross-cultural, as well as in second language studies is 
influenced by emotional and cognitive factors (in addition to various other influences). Both are 
accounted for within the discussion of IDT, as well as further predictions that have specific 
relevance within this dissertation (discussed throughout this chapter). As the current study assumes 
that deception is a complex event that is influenced by multiple factors, it was deemed more 
appropriate to adopt the perspective of IDT during the course of this discussion.  
 
DePaulo, Ansfield, and Bell (1996) also questioned IDT for having too many interconnected 
processes, and that it does not seem to have a self-contained mechanism to manage the complexity. 
Burgoon and Buller (2014) replied to this critique by highlighting that IDT is meant to promote 
understanding at a macro-level. It thus incorporates multiple falsifiable propositions to assist in an 
overall understanding of deceptive interactions. The current study attempted to manage this 
complexity by discussing IDT according to the construct that was drawn on within the propositions. 
Although this attempt did not ease the complexity of the theory as mentioned above, it did provide a 
useful way of navigating the complexities to form a basis for interpretation within this study.  
 
According to their own account Burgoon and Buller (2014) discussed some propositions that 
were included in the original theory (Buller & Burgoon, 2008) that were too abstract, and not 
falsifiable. These positions were therefore reworded and updated in the more current document to 
reflect more falsifiable positions that could be tested (Burgoon & Buller, 2014). Through 
developing the theory Burgoon and Buller (2014) also considered evidence from previous research 
that suggested that the communication skill of receivers to decode messages did not increase their 
deception detection accuracy. In a meta-analysis conducted by Bond and DePaulo (2008) results 
indicated that receivers did not significantly vary in their ability to make accurate veracity 
judgments. This suggests that it is possible that only producing a deceptive message is a skilled 
activity, and not its detection. This led Burgoon and Buller (2014) to remove receiver skill from the 
assumptions and propositions of IDT as discussed earlier in this chapter.  
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Recently Bond et al. (2014) claimed that there is a lack of convincing support for IDT. Their 
results on deception cues, derived from the data used by DePaulo et al. (2003), indicated a weak 
relationship between behavioural displays and deception. Bond et al. (2014) Therefore argued that 
these findings indicated that deception is not linked to behavioural displays, which in their 
interpretation results in a lack of evidence for IDT. In the way that Bond et al. (2014) interpreted the 
assumptions of IDT, is however incongruent with their findings. This is because IDT makes the 
assumption that behavioural displays will differ between honest and deceptive performances, as 
well as that deception is not linked to any specific behaviour because there are no universal 
deceptive profiles, an aspect not covered by Bond et al. (2014). This was substantiated by the 
results of Burgoon et al. (2016), who found that there was a nonverbal behavioural difference 
between truthful and deceptive statements. 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
This study assumes that the propositions made by Interpersonal Deception Theory are true in order 
to test the effects that gender, race, and language status could have on veracity judgments. It is 
believed, in this study, that gender, race and language status are influenced in some way by the 
conversational tasks (emotional leakage, and cognitive load), expectations of normal behaviour, 
biases discussed throughout this chapter. The purpose of this study was to discern if there was a 
significant difference because of these factors when veracity judgments are made about second 
language speakers.  
 
IDT was used to inform the study’s design, and in order to look at deception detection 
performance when making judgments on second language speakers. Although this theory does not 
address second language speakers directly; it is argued that it does address certain aspects of 
behaviour that are more pronounced when speaking in a second language (elaborated on in the 
following chapter). This study therefore considered the characteristics of deception in 
communication that deals with truth bias, cognitive load, emotional leakage, expectations of 
normalcy as well as other differences between honest and deceptive interactions to discuss and 
explain findings within the context of South Africa.  
 
Chapter three discusses the findings from previous studies on deception detection that had a 
relevant impact on the current work. The chapter follows a specific pattern, in that the overall 
general findings of deception studies are presented first. This is followed by a discussion of some of 
the possible variables mentioned in this conclusion (e.g. gender and race). After which a more 
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comprehensive discussion follows in terms of second language speech, and its influence on 
deception studies. The chapter concludes with an overview of the context of the current study, this 
also functions as an introduction to the method chapter.   
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Chapter 3 – Literature Review  
 
3.1. Introduction 
The main purpose of the current chapter is to provide an overview of relevant literature and 
previous research findings concerning deception detection in general, and specifically in regards to 
second language speakers. The chapter begins with an overview of deception detection in terms of 
previous findings on accuracy and bias of deception judgments. The possible effects that emotional 
leakage and cognitive load have on deception detection are examined. This is followed by a 
discussion on the possible effects of age, gender, race, and culture. The influence of speaking a 
second language on cognitive load and emotional leakage are then addressed. The chapter 
concludes with a comprehensive discussion on deception detection studies that included second 
language speakers in their samples. Finally, a brief introduction to the context of the current study is 
provided.  
 
3.2. Deception 
Over the last four decades, a plethora of studies have examined a wide range of factors that 
influence deception as well as its detection. The focus of some studies was to discern the extent to 
which lay people as well as professionals were able to detecting deception. Other studies 
investigated the effects of biographical variables such as age and gender that may influence 
deception detection (discussed later in this chapter). Researchers have also attempted to increase the 
accuracy of detection through training, and interviewing styles (Aamodt & Custer, 2006; Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006; Burgoon & Buller, 2014; Vrij et al., 2010).  
 
In order to provide an overview of the literature on deception studies, the findings concerning 
observable behaviours that are indicative of deception are discussed first. The discussion intends to 
show that it is possible, although difficult, to detect deception from observable behaviours. In order 
to facilitate this discussion, these deceptive cues are mostly concerned with emotional leakage and 
cognitive load that were introduced in the previous chapter. An overview, which discusses previous 
findings relating to deception detection accuracies and bias, follows. 
 
3.2.1. Deception Cues.  
As introduced in the theoretical chapter, the current study accepted the assumption that 
communication is fluid and dynamic. Interactions change overtime (Dunbar et al., 2014), and 
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therefore behaviours that are indicative of honesty and deception also change constantly. It is thus 
assumed, as previous studies suggest, that there are no behaviours that are universally diagnostic of 
deception (Burgoon & Buller, 2014). 
  
Corroborating this assumption, previous research on deception cues has not found any reliable 
cues that are consistently diagnostic of deception. Although there is an indication that an observable 
difference between honest and deceptive behaviour does exist, it cannot be attributed to any specific 
behaviours (Castillo, 2011; DePaulo et al., 2003; ten Brinke, MacDonald, Porter, & O’Connor, 
2012). This may be because the act of lying can be a very stressful event for most people as it can 
be either emotionally or cognitively challenging. The stress of lying may produce various 
physiological and psychological reactions that imply that the person is not being honest (Burgoon & 
Buller, 2014; Ekman, 2003b; Matsumoto, Hwang, Skinner, & Frank, 2011; Remland, 2009; Vrij et 
al., 2010).  
 
Another area of deception research has focussed on attempting to increase the observable 
difference in behaviour between delivering honest and deceptive messages. Previous research 
provides some support for this approach in that asking participants to recall events in reverse order, 
which increases their cognitive load, has shown some improvement on deception detection (Vrij et 
al., 2012). It has also been suggested that requesting senders to constantly maintain eye contact will 
also result in an increase in cognitive load. This makes the act of deceiving more difficult and thus 
possibly easier to identify (Vrij et al., 2010). 
 
In terms of emotional leakage, a concept that has gained considerable attention is that of micro-
expressions. Micro-expressions are viewed, by some, to be reliable indicators of emotion, and thus 
could be reliable indicators of deception (Yan et al., 2013). Nonetheless, these expressions are be 
easily to missed as they are very brief (under 1/5 of a second) (Porter et al., 2012). 
 
However, the view that there are ‘any’ observable behavioural differences between deception 
and telling the truth is not uncontested. Masip and Herrero (2015a) stated that it is not surprising 
that people only judge deception at chance level, because they believe that there are no observable 
behaviours that are distinctive indicators of deception. The view of this paper, and theoretical 
assumption, is that although there may not be unique behaviours indicative of deception, behaviours 
are nonetheless influenced by the emotional tension and cognitive load of lying (Burgoon & Buller, 
2014). This is also the underlying assumption of more recent studies that investigated overall 
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behavioural patterns as potential indications of deception, instead of focussing on single or small 
clusters of behavioural cues (Diana et al., 2015).  
 
This behavioural change may originate from emotional or cognitive efforts that are assumed to 
be required in order to lie. This could be an indication of emotional leakage, or evidence of 
cognitive load. As mentioned in the previous chapter, both these concepts have been considered as 
the underpinned theoretical frameworks in previous studies, and are therefore elaborated on 
separately below. 
 
3.2.1.1. Emotional leakage. 
Emotional leakage stems from the idea that emotional expressions are not completely under 
conscious control. What follows is a short description of the results from studies that examined 
emotional leakage as a theory, or as a factor that influences detecting deception. This construct was 
explained more thoroughly in the previous chapter.  
 
Porter and ten Brinke (2008) conducted a study in which participants (senders) were asked to 
view various images intended to elicit different emotional responses (happiness, disgust, fear, and 
sadness). The senders were instructed to respond to images with a deceptive emotional expression 
(an emotion that they were not feeling at that moment), or an honest emotional expression (an 
emotion that they were feeling at that moment). The deceptive condition of the study included three 
types of responses. First, the participants were asked to fake an emotional expression, when they did 
not feel an emotion (simulating). The second asked them to display a neutral face, when they did 
feel an emotion (neutralising). The final condition asked the participants to show a fake emotion, 
when they were actually feeling a different emotion (masking). Results from the study indicated 
that emotional leakage occurred at least once in the deceptive condition of every participant. These 
inconsistencies occurred more when participants masked emotions with an unfelt emotional 
expression. Participants were more successful in keeping a neutral expression in order to hide their 
feelings. The findings were attributed to the possible complexity in creating a false (not felt) 
emotion (Porter & ten Brinke, 2008).  
 
Studies conducted on micro-expressions served to continue this stream of debate. It is assumed 
that micro-expressions, which are brief ‘snapshots’ of a person’s felt emotions, cannot be falsified. 
This makes it a useful channel for deception detection, in that it would reliably indicate the person’s 
true feelings. However, micro-expressions are believed to be difficult to observe without specialist 
38 
 
equipment, or training, because of the recorded speed with which the expression passes (1/25 to 1/5 
of a second) (Porter et al., 2012). In addition to the difficulty in observing these types of 
expressions, another problem in relying solely on micro-expressions is that they are rare. Ekman 
(2003a) discusses that, within a previous study, micro-expressions were only found in about ¼ 
participants who lied. Yan et al. (2013) found that from more than 1,000 recorded facial 
expressions, 245 facial expressions, which lasted less than 1 second, were leaked. From these 
expressions 109 were shorter than 500 milliseconds. In addition, Porter et al. (2012) only found 
partial facial expressions (in the upper or lower part of participants faces) that could be defined as 
micro-expressions within their database of 1711 analysed expressions. 
 
However, the findings around micro-expressions could also suggest that, emotions are not under 
complete conscious control, because the stronger they are felt, the more likely it is that the person 
will not be able to hide their emotional expression. In addition, people will not be able to 
completely fabricate an emotional expression (Porter et al., 2012). Support for this argument comes 
from other studies that have found that the more intense the participants (senders) experienced the 
emotions, the more instances of emotional leakage were found (Hurley & Frank, 2011; Porter, ten 
Brinke, Baker, & Wallace, 2011; Porter et al., 2012). To illustrate an example of this is referred to 
as ‘duping delight’ that suggests that the person telling the lie may be feeling happy or exited when 
they believe that they are getting away with a lie (Ekman, 2009). 
 
Warren et al. (2009) conducted a study that measured receivers’ accuracy in classifying truthful 
and deceptive messages when the messages that the senders constructed where either emotional or 
unemotional. This manipulation was achieved by asking senders to either describe a mildly pleasant 
promotional landscape video (unemotional condition), or a video depicting a surgical operation 
(emotional condition). The overall level of accuracy (both emotional and unemotional messages) 
attained by the receivers, was measured at close to chance (50%). When looking at only the 
judgments made on the truth or deceptive messages, with regards to the unemotional condition, the 
receivers’ accuracies were on average significantly below chance (36%). Meanwhile considering 
the accuracy attained in the emotional condition, receivers were able to accurately classify truthful 
and deceptive messages, on average, significantly above chance (64%). This provides some 
indication that emotional leakage could result because of higher emotional strain, as well as that 
these expressions could not completely be suppressed. This is consistent with the theoretic 
assumptions made in this study: That the demands of the conversational task influence the ability to 
create a deceptive message. In turn this could also possibly be influenced by cognitive load, which 
is elaborated on below.    
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3.2.1.2. Cognitive load. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, this study set out from the assumption that creating deceptive 
messages increases the sender’s cognitive load. This assumption is based on the idea that creating 
deceptive messages is an additional task that needs to be managed by the sender. This may not be 
the case with every deceptive message, it is however assumed to be the norm. In addition, this 
increase in cognitive load may in turn either increase behaviours associated with the need for more 
cognitive resources (blinking, etc.), or ‘weaken’ the sender’s performance on other tasks (e.g. 
remembering a false story, alternatively inhibiting, or fabricating emotional displays). This increase 
in cognitive load is thus assumed to manifest in observable behaviours, and could make behavioural 
displays of truthful or deceptive messages distinguishable.  
 
Research conducted on the effects of cognitive load in deception has found some evidence to 
indicate that deception does increase the display of behaviours that are indicative of cognitive load. 
Previous studies have shown that lies told under higher cognitive demand are detected more often 
than lies with lower cognitive demands (van’t Veer, Stel, & van Beest, 2013; Vrij et al., 2015). 
Several studies have investigated different ways of increasing the observable differences between 
honest and deceptive behaviours. These studies attempted to make deceptive tasks even more 
difficult for deceivers, because it is assumed that deception increases cognitive load. This includes 
methods, such as asking unexpected questions that would be answerable by honest interviewees, but 
that deceivers would struggle to think of a plausible answer (Vrij et al., 2015; Warmelink, Vrij, 
Mann, Leal, & Poletiek, 2013). Studies have considered when and how to use evidence, in an 
investigative interview. Findings suggested that revealing evidence, gradually improves the 
detectability of senders, because they constantly need to revise their story (Dando, Bull, Ormerod, 
& Sandham, 2013). Another method is that the sender could be requested to repeat their story in 
reverse order, starting from the last event and explain towards the beginning. In order for an honest 
sender to tell this type of story they only need to remember what happened, and should be able to 
tell the story with relatively few errors. However, it is assumed that deceivers would not think to 
practice a lie backwards, and therefore their stories should contain more errors than their first 
descriptions. This could also include a number of behavioural indications of cognitive load (Vrij et 
al., 2012). Requesting senders to constantly keep eye contact seems to increase the cognitive load of 
deceivers as compared to honest senders. In needing to keep eye contact, and not have the freedom 
to look around, senders need to use more cognitive resources, which impairs their ability to focus on 
other tasks. This should, as with the previous method, increase the cognitive load of honest senders, 
but it would significantly impair the ability of deceivers to construct a credible lie while controlling 
their own behaviours. This may again result in deceivers displaying excessive behavioural 
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indicators of cognitive load, as well as increase the possibility of significant inconsistencies in the 
messages (Vrij et al., 2010).  
 
From the evidence above it could be argued that if cognitive load influences the performance on 
certain tasks, it could, in turn, also influence the performance of receivers. This may also influence 
their potential for making biased judgments. This view is consistent with IDT in that both senders 
and receivers can be influenced by their own cognitive load (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). An 
argument made by Lev-Ari and Keysar (2010) gave an indication of this effect, where results 
revealed that senders were perceived as less credible when they spoke with a heavy accent 
compared to when they spoke with a mild accent. This was attributed to the increase in cognitive 
load experienced by the receivers. This interpretation was made because when receivers knew about 
the experimental conditions (measures of the credibility of accented speech) receivers ‘corrected’ 
their judgments for low and mildly accented speech. But they were unable to do the same in 
instances where speakers spoke in heavy accents. In an article by Vrij and Winkel (1994) results 
also indicated that speech fluency and style affected veracity judgments in cross-cultural 
interrogations. However, the authors focused their discussion on other aspects relevant to their 
study, which are discussed thoroughly under the heading of ‘race’ (see page 44). 
 
3.2.2. Deception Detection. 
Research that focused on the accuracy of deception detection ability found that most people were 
not able to classify honesty and deception with more accuracy than a random guess (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006; Porter et al., 2012; Vrij & Mann, 2001). These studies suggest that people are not 
able to accurately detect deception from the nonverbal behaviour of others. This was found despite 
the fact that the participants overestimated their ability to detect deception (Ekman, 1996, 2003b, 
2009; Remland, 2009; Vrij & Mann, 2001). 
 
Within previous studies receivers’ performance in distinguishing between honesty and 
deception were measured at slightly above chance level (50%), between 51%-54.1% (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006; Morgan, Rabinowitz, Hilts, Weller, & Coric, 2013; O’Sullivan, 2003; Wright, 
Berry, & Bird, 2012). Receivers made correct judgments about honest messages significantly above 
chance level, between 60%-75%. But they made correct judgments about deceptive messages 
significantly below chance level, between 33%-47% (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Morgan et al., 2013; 
O’Sullivan, 2003). These scores suggest that the participants were truth biased, in that they tended 
to make truth judgments more often than deception judgments.  
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According to a meta-study conducted by Bond and DePaulo (2006), there are some research 
methods that affect accuracy scores to some degree. Their analysis indicated that receivers made 
more correct judgments from audio or audio-visual material compared to video only (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006). This was also found in previous research where both audio or audio-visual stimuli 
significantly increased correct judgments compared to only visual stimuli (Sweeney & Ceci, 2014). 
Receivers, in addition, made more correct judgments when they were motivated, if the sender’s lies 
were unprepared, or if the receivers were shown a sample of baseline behaviours before making 
their judgments (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). 
 
Consistent with these findings Bond et al. (2014) found that hearing veracity messages (audio 
stimuli) influenced the judgments made by receivers more than seeing the senders’ behaviour 
(video stimuli). The authors interpreted this as evidence that receivers rely more heavily on the 
words and the vocal features of a message rather than the behavioural aspects.  
 
The findings described above influenced the current study in several ways. This study opted to 
show receivers’ audio-video recorded messages, specifically because it was concerned with 
investigating second language speech. This assisted the researcher to potentially reach a wider pool 
of potential participants, through online surveys. As well as that this provided receivers with more 
social information. For this reason, receivers were also shown a sample of baseline behaviour of the 
senders. This is discussed more thoroughly in the following chapter. Baseline recordings provided 
more information for receivers on which to base their judgments, as required by both IDT (Burgoon 
& Buller, 2014) as well as ALIED (Street, 2016).  
 
In contrast to the above results Whelan, Wagstaff, and Wheatcroft (2015) found that when 
senders were under significant stress the accuracy of receivers was much higher. The stimulus 
within this context were truthful or deceptive videos of people who made public appeals for 
assistance in cases that involved relatives who were missing or murdered. These videos are 
considered ecologically valid, as they were true accounts of public appeals. In addition, they found 
that there was a relationship between the confidence ratings that receivers provided to their 
judgments and their judgment accuracy. The argument followed that previous inaccurate findings 
could possibly have been a methodological artefact from less ecologically valid samples. These 
findings provide possible evidence to support the emotional leakage approach to deception 
detection as described above. As such, it can be seen as a possible methodological critique against 
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the current study. As Hartwig and Bond (2014) did not find evidence to support this argument 
within their meta-analysis, it remains a limitation of the current study. 
 
3.3. Possible Variables 
In addition to measuring the ability of receivers to detect deception from second language speakers, 
this study aimed to investigate the influence that several other biographical factors could have on 
deception detection. These included the gender and race of both senders and receivers (described 
below), as well as the linguistic status of the receivers (if they were first or second language 
speakers). This is discussed in greater depth later in this chapter. In order for the current study to 
discuss these measures in context, appropriate previous research findings were examined. The 
following discussion introduces the results that were found on the influence of specific biographical 
information of senders and receivers in deception detection research. The factors that are discussed 
include age, gender, race, and culture, as the language status of receivers is discussed later. The 
main reason for discussing age in this section is to provide an argument as to why it was excluded 
as a variable within the analysis of the current study. In turn gender socialisation could affect 
participant’s performances, and was included to show what previous studies found. Racial 
stereotypes and explicit biases could have resulted in biased findings in other studies. And because 
race cannot universally be considered in cross-cultural interactions, this was separated into another 
category for discussion. Following this discussion is an overview of the effect that second language 
speech may have on general behaviour and conversational tasks. After this second language speech 
in deception studies are discussed.   
 
3.3.1. Age. 
It is arguable that older participants could be more accurate in reading nonverbal behaviour because 
of the experience that comes with age. However, age related differences have received mixed 
findings from previous research. A meta-study by Aamondt and Custer (2006) did not find any 
significant correlation between age and deception detection accuracy. In contrast Sweeney and Ceci 
(2014) found that there was a difference in performance from older receivers (aged 60-93) 
compared with college students (aged 18-23). The performance of older receivers was poorer than 
that of college students when making judgments from audio or audio-visual recordings, but both 
performed at chance level with only video recordings. The students (receivers) performed the best 
overall, and specifically made more correct judgments about other students (senders). This could 
indicate that a large difference in age might have an effect on deception detection. However, the 
difference may be due to other factors that are involved with aging, for example, facial appearance, 
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cognitive ability, working memory and concentration (Louw & Louw, 2009). For this reason, age 
differences were accounted for in the current study for documentation, but did not form part of the 
analysis. Instead the focus of the study remained on second language speakers, as well as the factors 
discussed below.  
 
3.3.2. Gender. 
With regards to the gender of participants there could be several interrelated influences on the 
creation as well as detection of deception. These influences could originate with the 
conceptualisation of gender roles, and the normative behaviour discussed in the previous chapter. 
From an early age people are socialised into certain gender roles, and taught how to behave and 
conduct themselves. Gender normative behaviours could differ depending on the age, race as well 
as cultural backgrounds of the participants (Baron et al., 2009). Although these are not the focus of 
the current study, it is necessary to be aware of the broader influence of certain combinations of 
factors.  
 
When considering the effects of the receiver’s gender, there is some evidence that women make 
slightly more accurate interpretations of nonverbal behaviour, than men, when they are motivated to 
do so. This motivation refers to the desire to excel at a certain task, such as being able to read 
nonverbal behaviour (Hodges et al., 2011). However, this only seems to occur when the emotions 
are displayed intentionally by others. This implies, as other research suggests, that women are no 
better than men in reading deception (Hall, 2011; Remland, 2009). 
 
As with age differences, previous findings regarding the effect that gender has on deception 
judgments also seem to be mixed. The meta-study by Aamondt and Custer (2006) showed that 
women and men performed similarly on deception detection tasks. This was also found in a study 
conducted by Solodukhin (2015), who’s results indicated that the receiver’s gender was not 
significantly related to their ability to detect deception. Similar results were found by Levitan, An, 
et al. (2015) and Levitan, Levine, et al. (2015). In these studies, receivers made veracity judgments 
without being able to see their conversational partner. The results indicated that the gender of the 
receiver did not have a significant impact on their detection accuracy. Furthermore, Heijboer (n.d.) 
found that the gender of the receivers did not test as significant when making veracity judgments on 
recordings (video only) of the senders. In contrast Tilley, George, and Marett (2005) found that 
women were more accurate than men when detecting deception across various electronic media 
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platforms. This suggests that interacting across electronic media could give different indications of 
deception to which women are more attuned.   
 
When considering the effects of the sender’s gender in deception success, the findings also 
seems to be mixed. In the same study by Tilley et al. (2005) the authors did not find a significant 
effect for gender (of senders) in deception success. This indicates that senders were not more 
transparent because of their gender. Levitan, An, et al. (2015) and Levitan, Levine, et al. (2015) also 
found that there was no difference because of the senders’ gender when considering their deception 
success. In contrast the study conducted by Heijboer (n.d.) indicated that receivers tended to judge 
men as lying more often than women (lie bias towards men), as well as that women were judged as 
honest more often than men (truth bias towards women). 
 
The above findings suggest a strong tendency to not find a gender difference in deception 
detection studies. This provided the rationale for the current research to investigate the effects of 
gender with a South African sample. This could provide relevant findings to this context which 
would elaborate on the literature within this subject, as well as the South African context.  
 
3.3.3. Race. 
Because this study was conducted within the South African context, it was deemed necessary to 
examine the influence of race on deception detection. This is because of the possible influence that 
racial stereotypes may have on deception judgments. In terms of the role that race plays within 
deception detection studies, findings likewise seem to be mixed. When considering racial 
background, there is some evidence that showed a distinct racial difference in nonverbal behaviour. 
In their study, conducted in Amsterdam, Vrij and Winkel (1991) found that black participants’ 
behaviours resembled cues that were popularly believed to be associated with deception. According 
to the authors, this could lead to inaccurate veracity judgments. 
 
In a later study by Vrij and Winkel (1994), the researchers found evidence that suggested that 
the nonverbal behaviour commonly associated with black participants (discussed above) was judged 
as more deceptive than the nonverbal behaviour commonly associated with white participants 
(regardless of skin colour or accent). The study involved 173 patrol officers who watched a series of 
slides that showed a citizen whose race could be identified as either black or white. Along with the 
slides, the receivers listened to parts of the conducted interviews. The authors manipulated the skin 
colour of the participant (sender) in the slide series, as well as the accents within the spoken 
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interviews. The senders were instructed to make a certain amount of speech errors in order to 
simulate the spoken fluency, and speech style that is ‘normally’ displayed by each race (either black 
or white) in that country. The results from this study did not find that race or racial accent had an 
effect on judgment bias. Although the results did find evidence that suggested that the nonverbal 
behaviour of black participants (more speech disturbances, and answering indirectly) were judged 
as more negative than nonverbal behaviour of white participants (less speech disturbances, and 
more direct answers). In contrast the authors found that the accent and skin colour of black senders 
were judged more positively by receivers. The authors did concede that in a country with clearer 
racial prejudice, the results could be different.  
 
Solodukhin (2015) studied the effects that speaking a second language had on deception 
detection (discussed below). In part of the study, the author needed to test for potential racial bias 
within the data. The author found that race of the receivers did not have a significant effect on their 
veracity judgments. The findings on the effects of second language speech are discussed later in this 
chapter.  
 
In contrast however, Lloyd (2015) found a racial-based bias in relation to deception detection. 
The study looked at the ability, and possible bias, that black and white receivers had when 
considering the veracity of black and white senders. The findings indicated that the receivers (black 
and white) were more accurate when making judgments on white senders, as compared with 
judgments on black senders. The results indicated that although receivers were more accurate 
towards white senders, they had a bias towards making more truth judgments towards black 
senders. This seemed to be true for both black and white receivers. The author attributed these 
findings to a racial advantage in making more accurate judgments towards white senders, because 
they are the majority racial group in North America, as compared with the black senders. This 
advantage was argued to be because receivers were better able to discriminate between truths and 
lies. The author concluded that because of these findings, it is possible that interrogations involving 
a minority (racial) group could be compromised. These findings may be specifically interesting in 
the current study, because within the South African context the group sizes of these specific racial 
groups (black and white) are reversed. That is, the population that identified itself as black is by far 
the majority group, whereas the population that identified itself as white is in the minority 
(Statistics South Africa, 2012). 
 
With the mixed findings above, the question of a racial difference seems to be mediated by 
other factors such as speech patterns and habitual behaviours, and suggest an ambiguous view of 
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bias in deception detection studies as a result of race. Racial differences within the South African 
context may also lead to a potential investigation of cultural differences. This is because differences 
in culture do not exclusively cross perceived racial lines within South Africa, but rather there are 
many distinctive cultural differences between people who identify themselves within the same 
racial categories. 
 
3.3.4. Culture. 
Culture is believed to influence people’s behaviours, as well as how they perceive the behaviours of 
others (Baron et al., 2009). This influence could naturally translate into the context of deception and 
veracity judgments. And in turn could, to some extent, be responsible for potential biased 
judgments in a cross-cultural setting. Culture can be defined as a shared system of information and 
meaning, as well as the beliefs and perceptions of a specific group of people. This system is 
conveyed from one generation to another, and thus works to preserve order, and avoid social 
disorder. To accomplish this function, norms are created to guide the behaviour of group members, 
as discussed in the previous chapter (Baron et al., 2009; Matsumoto et al., 2008). 
 
When considering previous cross-cultural studies on nonverbal behaviour it has been found that 
different cultures are able to recognise emotional displays of other cultures (Ekman & Friesen, 
1971). In one such study conducted by Sauter et al. (2010), the authors investigated the ability of 
participants, from two distinctly different cultures, to recognise the emotional vocalisations 
(emotionally distinctive sounds) from their own and others’ culture. The vocalisations included 
laughing and screaming, as well as pleasure, relief, etcetera. The first group was native English 
speaking European participants, and the second group was from a cultural group called Himba, that 
originate from northern Namibia. The Himba group was culturally isolated, living with no running 
water, electricity, or formal education, with little or no contact with other cultures. Overall the 
participants were more accurate concerning their own culture’s expressions, but their judgments 
were significantly above chance for both. The European participants were more accurate in total, 
and it can be argued that this is because of their experience, knowledge about various groups of 
people, as well as cross-cultural contact (Sauter et al., 2010). The results from this study give an 
indication that recognising the nonverbal behaviours of others is possible in cross-cultural 
communication. It also suggests that there could be slight culture specific biases due to different 
cultural normative behaviours. 
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In cross-cultural deception studies, findings were similar, in that cross-cultural deception 
detection was possible but with some cultural influence. A study by Lewis (2009) investigated the 
ability of American and Spanish receivers to detect deception across culture as well as within their 
own. The findings indicated that the overall ability of receivers was in line with previous studies 
suggesting that judgments were made slightly higher than chance (54%). The ability of the 
American receivers to detect deception was higher across the two cultures, whereas the Spanish 
receivers were more accurate in detecting deception from Spanish senders. These findings thus 
show that culture seems to influence deception detection to some extent, as well as some evidence 
that suggests the possibility of detecting deception across cultures that do not share the same 
language (Lewis, 2009). These findings are complemented by an earlier study conducted by Bond 
and Atoum (2000). The participants’ ability to correctly classify between truth and lies was found to 
be significantly, although barely, above chance (51.66%). The results from their study also 
indicated that it was possible to detect deception across different cultures that share a language, as 
well as those that do not. In addition, the participant’s level of education did not seem to be an 
influencing factor in their results. The authors concluded that the preliminary findings suggested the 
possibility of cross-cultural deception detection, but that culture, as well as language, could 
introduce bias in veracity judgments (Bond & Atoum, 2000). 
 
Within a recent study, Castillo (2011) also found a cultural bias between Columbian and 
Australian students. Her analysis indicated that there was a difference in the way that students from 
different cultures were judged, as well as that this effect was mediated by a language bias, discussed 
later in this chapter.  
 
The influence that culture has on deception studies is assumed to be part the norms that are 
developed by certain groups of people. This includes the display rules that are developed in order 
for the norms to function (elaborated on in the previous chapter) (Matsumoto et al., 2008). Another 
influence that develops, from what was mentioned, are the beliefs that people have about deception 
and how to detect it.  
  
3.3.4.1. Beliefs about deception. 
As previously discussed, there seems to be both universal and cultural indicators of behaviour and 
their interpretations. A part of this aspect of deception detection would be the different beliefs held 
by participants about deceptive cues, and their relevance to deception detection. One study, which 
attempted to determine people’s beliefs about deceptive cues, was conducted by the Global 
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Deception Research Team (2006). The authors conducted two studies, which spanned across 75 
countries and 43 different languages, probed participant’s beliefs of how liars behave.  
 
Within their first study they asked the open ended question: “How can you tell when people are 
lying?” (Global Deception Research Team, 2006, p. 62). Across 58 countries 2320 participants (20 
women and 20 men from each country) answered with 11,157 responses that were coded into 103 
beliefs. The most dominant belief was that liars avert their gaze, with 63.66% of the participants 
mentioning this as characteristic of liars. Nervousness was agreed upon by 28.15%, and incoherent 
stories were stated by 25.3% of the sample. Of the characteristics mentioned the most were verbal 
inconsistencies, speech fillers (e.g. uhms) and pauses, which were all mentioned by more than 15% 
of participants (Global Deception Research Team, 2006). 
 
The second study consisted of asking 40 participants, 20 women and 20 men, in 63 countries 
(46 of the countries that were included in the first study) to complete a questionnaire that contained 
10 items. The questionnaire was based on the most prevalent responses of the first study. From their 
answers 71.5% believed that avoiding eye contact was indicative of liars. Beliefs that liars shift 
their posture more often, use more self-touching behaviour and tell longer stories each made up 
60% of the total answers. Also included were that liars stutter more, use longer pauses, as well as 
seem more nervous (Global Deception Research Team, 2006).  
 
The belief that had the highest prevalence across both studies was that liars avoid looking one in 
the eye (Global Deception Research Team, 2006). This finding was consistent with Hurley et al. 
(2014) who found that 72% of receivers believed that deceptive senders avoid eye contact. These 
results show that various countries share similar beliefs on how to detect deception. However, the 
mentioned behaviours do not seem to be related to actual deception, and using these indications 
would make one less accurate in detecting deception (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). This could suggest 
that there are some ‘universal norms’ to which people need to ‘conform’ in addition to cultural 
norms that are followed. Or, as likely, that people’s beliefs about deception could be strongly 
influenced by the media, as most of these participants were university students (Global Deception 
Research Team, 2006), and could thus have had access to similar media material (movies, books 
etc.). 
 
Castillo (2011) also examined the beliefs people have about deception cues, in order to 
determine if there were cultural differences about these beliefs. The author asked 234 Australian 
and Colombian students to indicate which of the 17 listed behaviours would occur more, less, or the 
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same amount of time when someone, from the own culture and the other culture, was lying or being 
honest, in addition to their stereotypical beliefs about deception. This method shared some 
similarities to the study by the Global Deception Research Team (2006). Castillo’s (2011) results 
indicated that there were some shared beliefs about deceptive cues between the two cultures. Both 
Colombians and Australians believed that liars’ blinking, smiling, and scratching would increase, 
that they would have more errors in speech and more hesitations, as well as that they would take 
longer to respond with more pauses compared to truth tellers. The two cultures additionally held 
similar beliefs about eye contact. 
 
Results from Al-Simandi (2000) indicated that there were similarities and differences in cultural 
beliefs about deception. Behavioural beliefs that were similar referred to postural shift, hesitations, 
and speech rates. Beliefs that differed between cultures referred to subject change in conversations, 
stuttering, making use of negative statements, blinking, and hand postures. Castillo (2011) also 
found some culture-specific cues, which was according to the author, provided evidence contrary to 
the findings of the Global Deception Research Team (2006). The two cultures (Columbian and 
Australian) differed in their beliefs of upper-body movements, vocal pitch, and gestures (Castillo, 
2011). It should be noted that the study by the Global Deception Research Team (2006) aimed to 
explore the pan-cultural beliefs that were held across the world about lying. As well as that they did 
concede that some behaviours (specifically discussed: gaze direction) would be “subject to a variety 
of culture-specific interpretations” (Global Deception Research Team, 2006, p. 70). As literature 
suggests, in addition to the findings from Castillo (2011), these cues are not reliably diagnostic of 
deception, and might not be practically useful in deception detection (DePaulo et al., 2003). 
 
The studies conducted by Castillo (2011), the Global Deception Research Team (2006), and Al-
Simadi (2000), thus indicate that there seem to be beliefs about deception that stretch across 
cultures and countries, most notably about eye contact. As well as that some behaviours seem to be 
interpreted in a culturally specific way that indicates a possible confirmation about the 
interpretation of results in cross-cultural deception detection as discussed above. 
 
3.4. Second Language 
When considering the effect that speaking in a second language could have on perceptions of 
nonverbal behaviour, the beliefs discussed by the Global Deception Research Team (2006) could 
indicate why there might be a lie bias. This could be because of the additional cognitive load, or 
emotional strain, which is related to speaking in a second language. Each could in turn result in 
50 
 
behavioural displays commonly associated with deception (Fehringer & Fry, 2007; Gregersen, 
2005; Perani & Abutalebi, 2005). 
 
Liu, Hu, Guo, and Peng (2010) found that a similar mental process was used when participants 
were asked to name pictures in their first and second languages. Brain activity, which was 
monitored via a Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (FMRI) scanner, determined that when 
the speaker spoke in their first language the process was more automatic, but that the process was 
similar to the one used for second language speech. This finding supports the idea that speaking in a 
second language is more cognitively demanding, than when speaking in one’s mother tongue. This 
was also found in the work of Perani and Abutalebi (2005). Their results furthermore suggested that 
speakers with lower second language proficiency would require more cognitive resources than those 
with higher second language proficiency. This could influence their behaviour and the way in which 
they are perceived by others.  
 
Gregersen (2005) found that the nonverbal behaviour of second language senders, which 
involved an anxiety provoking situation, differed depending on their anxiety level. Within this study 
the senders were students involved in a foreign language oral examination, where the behaviour of 
anxious or non-anxious senders was compared. The study reported that senders who described 
higher anxiety levels showed markedly different behaviour compared to senders who described 
lower levels of anxiety. Although they did not measure the senders’ behaviour during deceptive 
situations, they found that behaviour during second language communication was affected by 
anxiety.  
 
Both the cognitive load and emotional leakage processes described previously could result in 
various behaviours that are associated with nervousness, or cognitive load, as well as deception, at 
times. This is evident in that second language speakers used more speech fillers (e.g. uhms), pauses 
and made more speech mistakes (verbal inconsistencies), possibly because of their level of 
proficiency. They may also have seemed more nervous because they were self-conscious, or looked 
away often because of the cognitive effort of thinking about what to say next (Fehringer & Fry, 
2007; Gregersen, 2005; Perani & Abutalebi, 2005). 
 
According to Fehringer and Fry (2007) pausing tactics were more pronounced in participant’s 
second languages compared to their first. Their findings suggest that speaking in second language 
requires more working memory, supporting the findings that speaking in a second language is less 
automatic (Liu et al., 2010). It also implies that speech fluency in a second language may not be a 
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function of proficiency. This could be inferred as the authors tested highly proficient bilingual 
speakers. One additional point of interest is that the authors mentioned that stressful or complex 
situations could increase these ‘hesitant’ behaviours. This means that the speaker’s context could be 
another mediating variable when making inferences about behaviour (Fehringer & Fry, 2007). 
Consistent with these findings, Castillo (2011) found that the baseline nonverbal behaviour of 
Columbian participants changed depending on whether they were speaking in their first or second 
language. 
 
Lev-Ari and Keysar (2010) found some evidence for the notion that speaking in a second 
language also affects the speaker’s credibility. This was suggested from the results of two 
experiments (mentioned earlier). That is accented speech may be deemed as less credible because it 
is more difficult to understand than non-accented speech. In order to test this, the authors asked first 
language and second language speakers (with mild and heavy accents) to recite trivial information 
while being recorded. Receivers were asked to make veracity judgments, and the answers of first 
and second language speakers were compared. The results indicated that accented speech was 
considered to be less credible than native speech. In the second experiment the receivers were made 
aware of the intention to measure judgments based on the speakers’ accents. In this experiment the 
results indicated that there was no difference between judgments made on messages by first 
language speakers and second language speakers with mild accents. Receivers were able to correct 
their judgment bias between these two groups, but were unable to do the same when considering 
heavy accented speech. The researchers attributed this tendency to the idea that accented / second 
language speech is believed to be less credible because it is more difficult to understand. This is 
apparent as the receivers were able to correct their biases for the mildly accented speakers, but not 
when considering the veracity of heavy accented messages (Lev-Ari & Keysar, 2010). As discussed 
previously, findings from Bond et al. (2014) indicated that hearing messages has a stronger 
influence on the judgments of receivers than seeing the sender. This suggests that the findings from 
Lev-Ari and Keysar (2010), would persist despite differences in nonverbal behaviour. 
 
This could translate to studies that consider receiver’s judgments on truthful and deceptive 
messages. As this study assumes that deception increases conversational demands, speaking in a 
second language could potentially assist detectors in correctly classifying truthful and deceptive 
speech. Although from the findings discussed above, the biographical information, or the baseline 
effort required to speak in a second language could still result in senders being judged as deceptive 
more often than not.   
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3.5. Second Language Deception 
The studies discussed below, which included second language speakers, examined a unique aspect 
of deception detection. These are discussed individually in order to provide a cleared picture of 
what has been achieved in this field, what the possible limitations were, as well as the possible 
findings that the current study attempted to view within the South African context.  
 
In a pilot study conducted by Caldwell-Harris and Ayçiçeği-Dinn (2009), students were asked if 
they would prefer to lie in their first or second language and why. Some students stated that they 
would prefer to lie in their first language (Turkish) because they would be more fluent. Others 
stated that they would prefer lying in their second language (English) because of a numbing effect 
and distancing themselves from their lies. Data from the study suggests that Turkish students do 
have different reactions when lying in their first and second languages. When they lied in their first 
language they reported that they experienced strong emotions, whereas students who lied in their 
second language experienced a numbing effect on their emotions. Oddly, an additional finding 
indicated that the students who lied in their second language experienced higher physiological or 
psychological arousal. This was evident in that the participants showed a higher Skin Conductance 
Response (SCR), taken at the same time, when they lied in their second, compared to their first 
language. A higher SRC suggests that the person is experiencing higher physiological or 
psychological arousal as measured by the moisture content on their skin.  
 
One of the earlier studies that assessed the effects of second language speech in deception 
detection was conducted by Cheng and Broadhurst (2005). The authors of this study tested the 
ability of students (receivers) to detect deception in first language (Cantonese) and second language 
(English) speakers (senders). Within this study the findings suggested that second language 
speakers were more likely to display behaviours that were attributed to lying. The findings also 
suggested that second language speakers were more likely to be judged as deceptive in comparison 
to first language speakers. The overall judgments were found to be correct above chance level. 
Judgments on truthful statements were measured at a mean correct score of 63.84% (second 
language), and 70.78% (first language) respectively. Correct scores on deceptive messages were 
73.08% (second language) and 66.94% (first language) (Cheng & Broadhurst, 2005). Two 
limitations of this study were that some senders were allowed to alternate between their first and 
second languages, as well as that this study asked the senders to lie about their opinions on a social 
issue, making it difficult to measure how strongly they actually believed in the issue (Da Silva & 
Leach, 2013). An additional aspect of the study by Cheng and Broadhurst (2005) that has not yet 
received attention is that all the receivers in this study were second language English speakers (R. 
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Broadhurst, personal communication, April 21, 2016). That is, the senders were speaking in their 
second language (English) and the receivers were listening in their second language (English). This 
denotes that this study was potentially comparable with the current study, and is further drawn on 
within the discussion chapter.   
 
Castillo (2011) who, as described earlier, found a culture bias between Australian and 
Columbian students, also found a lie bias directed to the Columbian students speaking in their 
second language (English). Columbians who spoke in their second language were more likely to be 
judged as deceptive compared to Columbians who spoke in their first language (Spanish). The 
author also found that there was a tendency to judge the first language Columbian speakers as more 
honest. A finding that was particularly interesting in this study was that the author did not find a 
difference in the behaviour of participants when they lied in their first or second language. That is, 
there did not seem to be a significant behavioural change of participants when lying in their first or 
second language (Castillo, 2011). This suggests, as argued earlier, that the difference in the 
receiver’s judgments could have occurred because of the increased cognitive load associated with 
listening to accented speech (Lev-Ari & Keysar, 2010), instead of behavioural differences 
associated with the higher cognitive load of the senders.  
 
In a study by Da Silva and Leach (2013), the authors tested Canadian students’ accuracy in 
making deception judgments. The students’ performances were consistent with previous research 
when making judgments on first language senders. The researchers found that the Canadian 
students did have a lie bias towards senders who spoke in their second language, and a truth bias 
towards senders who spoke in their first language. They were in addition not able to discriminate 
between truthful or deceptive messages from second language senders. The confidence levels of the 
students were higher when making judgments on first language senders, compared to second 
language senders. The authors theorised that one limitation of their study was that the students were 
not necessarily familiar with listening to second language speakers, and that this may have 
influenced their perception of deceptive behaviours (Da Silva & Leach, 2013). Another limitation 
was that the receivers viewed the video content of first and second language senders in the same 
session where, according to the authors, the receivers may have been able to distinguish that the 
study was about language proficiency (Da Silva & Leach, 2013; Leach & Da Silva, 2013). An 
alternative explanation could be that the judges were affected by the Halo Effect, and attributed 
more positive qualities to more fluent speakers when they were able to compare the performance of 
both first and second language speakers (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Or, that the receiver’s cognitive 
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load was less while listening to the first language speakers compared to the second language 
speakers.    
 
The latter limitation was accounted for by a follow up study conducted with Canadian students 
and Canadian police officers (Leach & Da Silva, 2013). The deception detection ability of both 
police officers and students were tested. The study made use of four research groups [student / 
officer (receiver) * first / second language (sender)]. Within each group the receivers either saw the 
second language senders, or the first language senders. Both the officers’ and students’ performance 
were equally accurate in making judgments on the first language senders, as well as that both 
groups were truth biased. They performed at chance level when judging second language senders. 
Although this study failed to find a lie bias towards second language senders, there was an inability 
to distinguish between second language honesty and lies. The authors theorised that it is possible 
that people who interact with second language speakers for longer on a daily basis might show 
different results (Leach & Da Silva, 2013). 
 
Solodukhin (2015) considered the language proficiency of the senders as a factor that could 
influence receiver judgment bias. The author tested the ability of receivers to make correct veracity 
judgments on senders classified as ‘native’ (first language speakers), ‘advanced’, ‘intermediate’, 
and ‘basic’ second language speakers. The findings were consistent with previous research, in that 
receivers were found, overall, to be truth biased, as well as accurate only slightly above chance. The 
results also suggest that the proficiency of the senders may have an effect on receiver’s judgment 
bias as the receivers were the least accurate when making judgments on ‘basic’ second language 
English speakers. Furthermore, the receivers’ ability to distinguish between truthful and deceptive 
messages was lower when considering the veracity of ‘basic’ English speakers.  
 
Snelling’s (2013) findings supported these results, in that receivers showed higher levels of 
correct judgments regarding first language speakers compared with second language speakers. 
Although the study found a truth bias towards both first and second language speakers, the results 
showed that the receiver’s own language proficiency did not influence their judgment significantly. 
Overall receivers who were less proficient showed a truth bias towards everyone. According to the 
researcher this could be an indication that familiarity with second language speakers’ nonverbal 
behaviours was not advantageous. Or, because of their familiarity they relied more on insufficient 
verbal content, instead of nonverbal cues. The researcher considered a second explanation that 
suggested that speaking a second language might not make one aware of the behaviours of second 
language speakers, because they would not be aware of their own nonverbal conduct. This could 
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indicate that interacting with others regularly may affect detection results. The researcher indicated 
that it might be valuable to look at the receivers' experience in listening to certain accents or speech 
patterns, and to examine the interaction between language proficiency, race and specific accents 
with regards to deception detection (Snelling, 2013). 
 
A more recent article by Evans and Michael (2014) addressed some of these issues. The authors 
used a sample of first and second language Hispanic participants (senders) in North America. They 
conducted two studies. The first study was with a student population in an area with very few 
Hispanic residences. The second was conducted in an area that was familiar with the population. 
The results from the two studies were largely similar. They found that there was a lie bias towards 
second language senders, regardless of familiarity. This again provides an indication that the 
receiver bias might not completely occur because of sender behaviour, but could also be influenced 
by the cognitive load experienced by the receivers (Lev-Ari & Keysar, 2010). One limitation of this 
study was that the second language senders were older and less educated than the first language 
senders with mean ages of 21 for first language senders, and 32 for second language senders. A 
second point was that the two studies were not statistically compared. Finally, as raised by the 
authors, because only Hispanic samples were used it is still unknown if this would be generalisable 
to other cultures (Evans & Michael, 2014).  
 
Levitan, An, et al. (2015) and Levitan, Levine, et al. (2015) conducted a study that tested the 
ability of first language (American English), and second language (Mandarin Chinese) English 
speakers to both deceive as well as detect deception. Within this study, participants were not able to 
see one another, but were able to hear as well as question each other. In contrast to the previous 
findings the results of this study did not find an effect for language in the ability to deceive as well 
as detect deception. 
 
3.6. Conclusion of Literature 
This chapter was based on the discussion of the theoretical framework discussed in the previous 
chapter. It aims to provide an overview of the results found in deception detection studies, with a 
specific focus on second language speakers. To accomplish this, the current chapter starts with a 
general discussion of deception cues, as well as the influence of emotional leakage and cognitive 
load. Here it is argued that there is not a universally diagnostic cue for deception. But because of the 
emotional and cognitive strain of lying, there should be an observable difference between honest 
and deceptive behaviour. In addition, previous results of studies that measured deception detection 
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accuracy and biases are discussed. As mentioned above previous findings indicate that people are 
not very accurate in detecting deception, and that they have a tendency to be truth biased. From this 
foundation, the discussion moves on to include the influences of other biographical information. 
Within this section the possible influences of age, gender, race and culture (including beliefs about 
deception) are discussed, where age is argued to not provide a relevant variable for the current 
study. The argument made by this study up to this point was that these factors could possibly 
influence deceptive messages or judgments, but that it should not influence the results as much as 
participants’ language status. The chapter continues to describe the effects that speaking in a second 
language could have on participants, and finally discusses deception studies that included second 
language speakers. Before completely concluding, the discussion that follows addresses the 
background of the current study that was conducted within the context of South Africa. 
 
3.7. The Current Study  
To date, as far as the researcher could find, there are few studies conducted on deception with 
participants speaking in their second language. The researcher was also not able to find South 
African relevant published literature and statistics with regard to deception detection. Colonel 
Weber of the South African Police Services replied to an email, saying that they did not have any 
available statistics. This is because observations of nonverbal behaviour are not accepted by the 
South African Court, and therefore not provided during their structured training (S.-J. Weber, 
personal communication, May 06, 2014). Studies that made use of polygraphs were purposefully 
not considered, as the current study explored the ability of unaided receivers to detect deception. 
This study was conducted because this area of research could benefit from results gathered within 
the South African context and cultural setting. This study aimed to add to the current research by 
using a South African population for the sample. This is advantageous because of the rich cultural 
and linguistic context of South Africa.  
 
According to Statistics South Africa (2012) only 9.6% of South Africa’s population identified 
their home language as English. The other languages that form part of this statistic are: IsiZulu 
22.7%, IsiXhosa 16.0%, and Afrikaans 13.5%, Sepedi 9.1%, Setswana 8.0%, Sesotho 7.6%, and the 
remaining 4 languages were represented by under 5% each. However, English is the lingua franca 
of the country (Khokhlova, 2015): It is the language used during business, politics, or education, 
and it is very widely used in the media (“About SA - South Africa’s people,” n.d.; Statistics South 
Africa, 2012). Most South Africans need to speak in their second language (English) daily, to some 
extent, for any form of common understanding of each other, be it with varied proficiency. 
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Khokhlova (2015) argues that because of the racial isolation of the apartheid era, it is possible to 
distinguish English accents according to racial identification:  
 
White, Black, Coloured, and Indian South Africans use English, with varying 
degrees of sophistication, but as a result of their isolation from one another [during 
the apartheid era], native English, Afrikaans English, Black English, Coloured 
English, and Indian English are distinguishable from one another, each containing 
lexical items unknown to people of other groups[…] and each exhibiting 
characteristic pronunciations and even grammatical structures (Khokhlova, 2015, p. 
202).  
 
This study was conducted with students attending the University of South Africa (Unisa). Unisa 
is the largest university in Africa, as well as the only dedicated Open Distance Learning institution 
(ODL) in the country (Unisa at a glance, 2013).  
 
In 2013 the student population amounted to 400,000 students, 62.3% of whom identified as 
female. In terms of to racial identification; 5.6% identified as Coloured, 7.5% as Indian, 18.6% as 
White, 68.1% as African, and 0.2% had no information. The university’s age composition, in terms 
of students, consisted of: 24 or younger (26.2%), 25-39 (58%), 40-49 (12.8%), and 50 or older 
(3%). Full-time students comprised 13.1% of the population and 86.9% were part-time (Unisa at a 
glance, 2013). In 2010, 91.7% of Unisa students were South African (van Zyl & Barnes, 2012). 
 
The context of South Africa is advantageous in comparison to previous research in three major 
ways. The population of receivers have daily contact with others in their second language, and 
although their proficiency might vary, this evades the limitation as found by previous research (Da 
Silva & Leach, 2013; Snelling, 2013). The second advantage is that it is a different population as 
used by Evans and Michael (2014) and thus may help to add to the current field of research. Finally, 
the sample of the current study had more experience in communicating in their second language, in 
that most people who speak their first language are not understood by the majority of the 
population. 
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Another advantage is that this study was conducted in a rich cultural setting, with a focus on 
cross-cultural deception detection. Some behaviours, which are considered to be culture specific, 
could in turn influence cross-cultural deception detection (Williams, n.d.). Researchers have found 
that gaining specific information about the normal behaviour of a specific cultural group could help 
to moderate any potential lie bias. Although only knowing that there are behavioural differences 
could make people even less accurate. The researcher argued that the receivers within this study 
might, because of their experience, implicitly know what those behavioural differences are, and this 
could moderate any potential cross-cultural bias (Castillo & Mallard, 2012). Although it is more 
likely that, when there are differences in fluency, the receivers might be more influenced by their 
own additional cognitive load and results would be similar as previous studies reported (Lev-Ari & 
Keysar, 2010). 
 
3.7.1. Hypotheses. 
There are several hypotheses that are drawn from the literature discussed above. This study made 
several in terms of the overall data, as well as about the participants’ (senders and receivers), 
gender, race, and linguistic status. These are organised according to the research questions, and 
provide a suggestion of what the researcher believed the data would show.  
- Receivers are not able to judge veracity with more accuracy than chance. And receivers are 
less confident when making judgments on deception messages.  
- The gender of the senders and receivers does not have a significant effect on veracity 
judgments. 
- The race of the senders and receivers does not have a significant effect on veracity 
judgments 
- Receivers who are first language English speakers have a higher accuracy than receivers 
who are second language English speakers. 
- Deception cues that receivers claim to use in their judgments conform to reported 
stereotypical beliefs about deception.  
 
3.8. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide an overview of the literature within deception detection 
studies. This was intended to provide the main findings within this topic specifically when 
considering second language speakers. To provide this overview, the discussion needed to first 
describe deception detection studies as a broad foundation. This introduced previous findings in 
terms of the accuracy and biases that have been commonly found in deception research. In 
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considering this, both emotional leakage and cognitive load warranted discussion because of their 
relevance to IDT, in addition to their uses within previous deception studies as separate theoretical 
foundations. Other factors that were discussed were age, gender, race, cross-cultural studies, and 
second language speech. These were highlighted to have special importance within the current 
study, as the research questions looked at the possible influences of gender, race and speaking in a 
second language. The chapter thus broadly discusses the previous studies that have included second 
language speech, and concludes with a brief introduction to the context of the study.  
 
The following chapter provides an overview of the research method that was followed during 
this study. It accomplishes this by discussing the study within two distinct phases. The first phase 
was concerned with creating the research instrument. Therefore, the discussion of this phase 
concerns the sampling, and video recorded interviews of participants who volunteered as senders. 
The second phase was concerned with the creation of the research instrument in the form of an 
online survey. Likewise, the sampling and measuring of the deception detection accuracies of a 
second sample of participants who acted as the receivers, via the online platform, are detailed. The 
ethical considerations for each phase are discussed separately where relevant. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion on the analytical processes used in order to reduce the raw data into an 
interpretable answer.  
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Chapter 4 – Research Method 
 
4.1. Introduction  
This chapter discusses the research design that was used within this study. The current study made 
use of several phases in order to coherently organise the research activities. This chapter is divided 
into three distinct sections. These sections are concerned with the first and second phases of the 
study, as well as the data analytical approaches and techniques that were employed in order to 
answer the research questions. This chapter begins with an overview of the design and chapter 
outline, after which the first phase is described. This is followed by discussions on the second 
phase, and the methods of data analysis used. To ease the reading of this chapter the diagram below 
(Figure 4.1) shows a broad visual map of how the study was divided into the various activities.  
 
4.2. Research Design 
This study explored accuracies and biases of deception detection within a South African context. 
Exploratory studies are usually undertaken to either orientate the researcher to a new topic of 
interest, or when the issue is relatively new (Babbie, 2008; Terre Blanche et al., 2006). An 
exploratory approach, which used a quasi-experimental design, was undertaken in this study, as this 
is a relatively new topic in the South African context. Furthermore, as noted in the literature review, 
there are, universally, limited studies on deception detection that address second language speakers. 
As used within this study; quasi-experimental designs includes studies where there are no control 
group for comparison (Babbie, 2008; Terre Blanche et al., 2006), although attempts are made to 
keep conditions equivalent, as well as that the independent variables are manipulated (Terre 
Blanche et al., 2006).  
 
During the first phase of the study the research instrument was created. The purpose of the 
instrument was to measure accuracy and bias in deception judgments from a sample of students 
(receivers). The research instrument took the form of a survey that consisted of 24 videos as stimuli. 
The videos were recordings of second language English speakers (senders), who lied or told the 
truth about two separate video clips that they had watched (Ekman & Friesen, 1974). During the 
second phase of the study, the research instrument was transformed into an online survey, using the 
online platform Surveygizmo. The survey platform was used to send secure website links, for the 
survey, to the sample of students (receivers). After the receivers completed the survey, the data 
from the second phase were examined to determine the deception detection accuracies and potential 
biases of the receivers.  
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4.5.2.1.3. Dependent T Tests (Research 
Questions 2-3) - Senders (12) 
       Women (12)   Truth (6) 
Gender (24 Videos)          Lie (6) 
Research Question 2 Men (12)        Truth (6) 
        Lie (6) 
    Black (12)      Truth (6) 
Race (24 Videos)                         Lie (6) 
Research Question 3  White (12)     Truth (6) 
                    Lie (6) 
4.5.2.1.1. One Sample T Test (Research Question 1) - 
All Receivers (64) 
4.5.2.1.4. Pearson Correlation Coefficient (Research 
Questions 1-4) - Correlate veracity judgments and 
Confidence scores 
4.2. Research Questions 4.3. Phase 1 4.4. Phase 2 4.5. Data Analysis 
4.4.3. 10,000 Email Addresses 
4.4.1. Online Survey 
4.4. Phase 2 (Receivers) 
4.3. Phase 1 (Senders) 
4.3.2. Pilot Interviews: 
(7 Senders) 
Revised Interview 
Schedule 
4.3.3.1. Excluded (4 Senders) 
1- Example Video 
2- Video Length 
1- Video Content 
4.3.1. Non-Probability Sampling 
(23 Participants interviewed) 
4.3.3.2. Interviews (12 Senders) 
Women  (6)       Men (6) 
Black (3)   White (3)   Black (3)   White (3) 
Truth Message (12)           Lie Message (12) 
4.3.4.1. Research Instrument 
(24 Video Recordings) 
4.5.1.1. Dependent Variables 
- Veracity Judgments 
o Truth / Lie 
- Judgment Confidence 
- Observed Deception Cues 
o What did you look at to 
make your decision? 
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4.4.2. Stratified Random 
Sampling (10,000) Participants 
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4.5.3. Content Analysis (Frequency) (Research 
Question 5) - All Receivers (64) 
4.5.2. Data Analysis (Veracity Judgments & Veracity 
Confidence) 
4.5.2.1.2. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) (Research 
Questions 2-4) 
   Gender (Q2)     Race (Q3)   Language Status (Eng) (Q4) 
Women Men Excluded   1st Language  2nd Language 
Figure 4.1 Visual overview of the research design 
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Responses to research questions 1-4 were analysed by using inferential statistics to compare the 
mean scores of the receivers. Inferential statistics are used to make inferences from data (Gerber & 
Hall, 2015). The group of statistical techniques that were employed are known as parametric 
statistics. Parametric statistics assume that the data is normally distributed, as well as that the 
variance is the same across the data. The data should also be independent, in that the scores of one 
participant do not influence the scores of another (Field, 2009). The answers to Research question 5 
were analysed using Content Analysis, where the number of nonverbal cues mentioned was counted 
and subsequently discussed according to their relative importance (see Table 4.1). 
  
Table 4.1 Statistical Techniques According to Research Question 
Research Question(s) Sample Independent Variable Statistical test 
Question 1 Receivers – All One Sample t-test. 
Questions 2-4 
Receivers – Gender * Race * 
Language status 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)  
Question 2 Senders – Gender Dependent Sample t-test 
Question 3 Senders – Race Dependent Sample t-test  
Questions 1-4 
Receivers – Confidence Levels * 
Veracity Judgments 
Pearson correlation coefficient 
Question 5 Receivers – Deception Cues Content Analysis  
 
Ethical considerations for the study are discussed within each of the two phases to improve ease 
of reading.   
 
4.3. Phase 1 – Research Instrument 
In the first phase the research instrument, which consisted of 24 video recordings of participants 
(senders) who provided truthful and deceptive messages, was developed. A structured interview 
schedule was constructed and piloted in order to elicit responses. After the pilot interviews, the 
interview schedule was revised and used to interview the participants again. The video recordings 
of truthful and deceptive messages elicited from the revised interview schedule were included in the 
research instrument. All the interviews were video recorded and the relevant recordings were edited 
for research instrument.  
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In order to provide a description of the method followed during the first phase, the researcher 
first discusses the sampling and pilot interviews that were conducted. This is followed by a 
description of the recordings of senders that were included in the research instrument, as well as 
those that were excluded. The procedure that was taken to create the recordings is then discussed, 
followed by the ethical considerations of the first phase.  
 
4.3.1. Sampling. 
During the first phase of the study non-probability sampling was used to obtain participants. Non-
probability sampling refers to sampling procedures that are not governed by statistical random 
selection (Babbie, 2008; Terre Blanche et al., 2006). This phase of the study required sampling 
enough participants to create video recordings for the research instrument. To accomplish this, 
quota sampling was used. Quota sampling is a form of non-probability sampling that intends to 
increase the representativeness of a sample (Babbie, 2008). This study aimed to use 12, voluntary 
second language English speaking students, in order to create the video recordings for the research 
instrument. This study was also interested in potential gender and racial differences that could also 
influence veracity judgments. Therefore, the sample size of 12 was divided equally into 4 categories 
(gender * race). 
 
Participants were accessed by advertisements posted on notice boards at one of the University of 
South Africa’s (Unisa) satellite campuses in Pretoria. Therefore, the study depended on volunteers 
who were willing to participate. In addition, snowball sampling was used. Snowball sampling refers 
to the sampling method where one participant refers the researcher to another possible participant 
(Terre Blanche et al., 2006). In this study, participants and students were asked to refer, or bring 
along, a friend. One-hundred-rand monetary compensation was offered as motivation to participate. 
They were also told that they would be informed of the results from the study.  
 
In order to participate in this phase of the study the participants needed to comply with four 
criteria: 
- A South African 
o Living in South Africa 
This was because this study focused specifically on the South African context. It was assumed 
that in order for the stimuli recordings to be consistent with the everyday experience of the 
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receivers, the videos had to involve participants who were South African and who were living in 
South Africa.   
 
- A student at the University of South Africa (Unisa) 
Although a previous meta-study found that education does not seem to play a role in deception 
detection (Hartwig & Bond, 2014), students were purposefully chosen for this study. The first 
reason for this was the assumption that students share similarities in the way that they speak, in that 
education might have a mediating effect on behaviour. The second reason was that the participants 
had to be second language speakers (elaborated on below). It was assumed that student’s linguistic 
ability would vary, but that they would have some ability with the English language that is 
necessary to participate in tertiary education.  
 
- A second language English speaker 
In South Africa English is treated as the lingua franca (Khokhlova, 2015), even though it is only 
spoken by 9.6% of the population as a first language. In South Africa there are 11 officially 
recognised languages (Statistics South Africa, 2012), thus, because English is treated as the lingua 
franca, it has become the most spoken language. The majority of the population could be argued to 
have daily interactions that likely included speaking or hearing English at some point. Therefore, 
the focus of this study was to look at the veracity judgments of receivers when viewing second 
language speakers.  
 
- A first language speaker of either Afrikaans or IsiZulu (criteria removed after pilot 
interviews). 
The study originally focused on controlling for the first language of the participants in the first 
phase of the study, because race and language are intertwined in South Africa (Khokhlova, 2015). 
The researcher used the country’s demographics in order to sample appropriately. The sample 
originally included only black Zulu speaking individuals and white Afrikaans speaking individuals, 
whose second language was English.  
 
This requirement became problematic when considering the socio-political climate of the 
country, and the xenophobic outbreak in South Africa during the beginning of 2015. During this 
time there were incidents of violence against foreigners, which was exacerbated by high ethnic 
tensions (linked to spoken language), within South Africa (this occurred around the time of the pilot 
interviews) (“I had to intervene - Zwelithini,” 2015). Although this study was not directly affected 
by the violence or resulting tension, the language related requirement for the study was halted when 
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the interview schedule was revised. As a result, black participants spoke a wide variety of 
languages, and white participants spoke only Afrikaans.  
 
4.3.2. Interview schedule and pilot interviews. 
To create the research instrument, a structured interview schedule was developed, to elicit specific 
information from the participants. A structured interview schedule has clearly defined questions 
with a specific question order and content. This type of interview was conducted for the interviews 
to be similar (Foxcroft & Roodt, 2005). This assisted in developing the research instrument 
recordings to follow a similar trend.  
 
The pilot interview schedule, as well as the revised interview schedule, consisted of four 
questions. The first two questions were designed to help the participants to become comfortable 
during the interview. The answers gained from the third and fourth questions were intended to be 
used in the research instrument. Answers gained from the third question were used as a baseline to 
show the receivers a sample of honest behaviour before viewing the veracity messages (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1974). This also helped to provide some ecological validity to the judgments, as it showed 
the receivers what the senders looked like while being honest (Matsumoto et al., 2011; Remland, 
2009). The final question was intended to elicit the veracity description which the receivers were 
asked to judge.   
 
During the pilot interviews; the first question asked the participants about their favourite ice-
cream. This was assumed to be an unexpected question within this interview context, and was 
intended to break the ice for the interview. The second question asked about their hobbies. This 
question, upon which they could elaborate, concerned a personal activity. It was assumed that this 
would encourage them to give longer responses while being filmed. The third question asked what 
movies they enjoyed watching. This question was chosen as the baseline as it was about a similar 
activity that was required in the veracity question (i.e. watching a ‘performance’ on a screen and 
describing it afterwards). This could have helped them frame the structure of the answers for the 
following questions. The final question asked the participants to describe the video that they had 
watched the moment before. This question was asked twice, once after each of the two videos that 
they had watched. Before asking this question, the participants were instructed to either tell the 
truth, or lie about the video. This question was thus designed to elicit the veracity message that 
would be judged by the receivers (see Appendix B).  
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The pilot interviews were conducted with seven students from the University of South Africa, 
who participated voluntarily. During the interviews the participants consistently gave very short 
responses. A specific problem was the length of the answers on the third question that was intended 
to be used as the baseline. All, except for two senders’ messages, were less than 13 seconds. This 
was problematic because the baseline video clips for the study intended to use the first 20 seconds 
of each participant’s answer to this question. For this reason, the interview schedule was 
subsequently revised to include questions more relevant to the sample. This was to gain longer 
descriptions from the participants.  
 
The revised interview schedule took the same format as described above, however, the content 
of the questions changed. The first question asked about the student’s worst exam experience. The 
assumption was that because of the amount of stress placed on students during examinations, that 
students would likely have a memorable negative experience. As well as that, even if they did not 
have a negative experience with examinations, they would also be able to discuss the absence of it 
during the interview. The second question asked the participants about their favourite subject. 
Again because of a shared academic experience it was assumed that the participants would be able 
to provide a long description. Both these questions were designed so that participants could also 
discuss their high school experiences. This would have helped, especially if the students were in 
their first year of studies, and had limited experience in tertiary education. The third question was 
changed slightly, in that it still asked about the movies that the participants enjoyed, but asked them 
to rather describe their favourite movie. This question thus asks specifically for a description, where 
the participants would not merely provide a movie title or genre, as found in the pilot interviews. 
The final question remained focused on the description of the video that they were watching, only 
the wording was changed slightly (see Appendix C). 
 
The revised interview schedule resulted in considerably longer descriptions from the 
participants than the original schedule. The total interview length of the pilot interviews was on 
average seven minutes and 36 seconds, whereas the interviews with the revised schedule were on 
average 10 minutes and 47 seconds. Using the new schedule, the answers on the baseline question 
were consistently longer than 30 seconds, with only two videos that were recorded to below 30 
seconds. 
 
67 
 
4.3.3. Senders. 
During this phase of the study 16 students from the University of South Africa participated 
voluntarily. The truth and deceptive messages from 12 of the 16 participants were selected to be 
included in the research instrument, as described in the quota above. The truthful message from 
another participant was used as an example video for the online survey, and was, therefore, not 
included in the analysis. The final three were excluded from the instrument.  
 
4.3.3.1. Senders that were excluded. 
Of the three participants that were excluded from the study, two gave descriptions that were again 
too short. The third participant was excluded from the research instrument as her deceptive story 
was considered too violent for the purpose of this study. 
 
4.3.3.2. Senders included in the research instrument. 
In terms of the demographics of the senders that were included, the instrument was purposefully 
designed to include an equal number of participants across gender and race. This was so that 
comparisons could be made across the gender and race of the senders. A total of 12 senders were 
selected because of time considerations (length of the videos), as well as the number of senders who 
fell into each category. Considering diversity, three participants, who fell into each gender (Female 
/ Male) * race (Black / White) category (Table 4.2) were included.  
 
Both the truthful and deceptive messages from each sender were included, resulting in a total of 
24 recorded messages. This was because it was assumed that some senders could appear more 
honest / deceptive than others. This also helped to keep the balance of the number of messages that 
fell into each category in order for the scores on the messages to remain comparable (Table 4.2). 
This, however, resulted in the research instrument taking approximately 40 minutes to complete 
because of the length of the veracity videos.  
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Table 4.2 Senders by Gender and Race 
 Race   
 Black White Total Senders Messages (Truth/ Lie) 
Women 3 3 6 12 
Men 3 3 6 12 
Total Senders 6 6 12 24 
Messages (Truth/ Lie) 12 12 24  
 
 
Senders were all second language English speakers, thus complying with the third sampling 
criterion. As the fourth sampling criterion was removed the black senders spoke a variety of first 
languages. The six senders, who self-identified as black, spoke the following as a first language: 
Tswana/Setshwana=2, IsiXhosa=2, Xitonga=1 and Sesotho=1. The six senders, who self-identified 
as white, spoke Afrikaans as a first Language. The ages of the participants ranged between 18 and 
34, with the average age of 25.  
 
The purpose of the example video was to ensure that receivers understood the instructions of the 
online survey by providing a practical example, before they commenced with the survey questions. 
As the majority of South Africans, as well as Unisa students, can be identified as black (Statistics 
South Africa, 2012; Unisa at a glance, 2013), the example video was that of a black participant. 
Only one example message was selected in order not to make the research instrument overly 
complex. The truthful message was purposefully selected because the purpose of this study was to 
discover if there was a lie bias towards second language speakers, and not to determine the effects 
of the initial viewing order of veracity messages. 
 
4.3.4. Procedure. 
Participants (senders) were greeted by the researcher and given a short briefing about the study and 
its purpose. They were given an opportunity for questions, after which they began completing the 
biographical information and informed consent forms (Appendix D), as well as the video release 
form (see Appendix E). They were then asked to sit in front of a Sony vx430HD camera.  
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The researcher asked the participants if the recording could begin. With their permission, the 
video camera was switched on, and the interview began using the above described interview 
schedule (see Appendixes B and C). The first three interview questions were asked as described 
above. The participants were not limited according to time, in order not to break the flow of their 
message, and were thus allowed to answer the question until they were satisfied (Warren et al., 
2009).  
 
After the baseline question (third question) the participants were shown a video clip that was 
between one and two minutes long. Each participant saw a different video that contained unique 
details. This was to prevent their stories from being predictably similar. The videos were about 
various topic, and are freely available on YouTube.  
 
After they viewed the video clip they were asked to describe what they had watched (question 
4) (see Appendixes B and C). The participants were allowed to finish their description in their own 
time, in order to not break the flow of their message (Warren et al., 2009). The first description of 
every participant was answered honestly. This was because the honest / lie description order could 
have affected the way in which participants recalled the videos. Investigating the possibility of this 
was not the purpose of this study, and thus kept similar across the senders.  
 
After the honest descriptions the second video clip was shown to the participants. Before they 
were asked to describe the second video, the participants were instructed that they should lie during 
their next answer. They were told that the previous question would be asked again, and that they 
should provide a deceptive answer. The only limitation that was placed on the lie was that it must 
not include any information of the two videos that they had watched. They were given a moment to 
think of a lie, and then asked to describe the video (question four again) (see Appendixes B and C). 
 
Finally, the participants were debriefed in terms of the procedure of the study. They were told 
that the recordings would be checked to see which would be included. The selected videos were 
edited to create the research instrument. The research instrument would then be shown to a second 
sample of participants (receivers) online. After which the answers from the receivers were analysed 
to discover if any biases influenced their judgments. Finally, the participants were asked if they had 
any questions. They were paid R100, and asked to sign a proof of receipt (see Appendix D).  
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During the interviews the senders’ full bodies were filmed. The researcher was seated in front of 
the participants. The camera was pointed towards the participants at all times, and positioned in 
front and just to the right of the researcher. The sessions were completed within 30 minutes.  
 
The camera angles for the senders varied slightly between senders as the recordings were made 
during weekends over the course of a couple of months (Feb 2015 - June 2015). It was thus not 
possible to keep the equipment stationary in order to show every sender in the exact same way. 
However, the recordings are all of the full front view of senders; but a difference in angle is 
noticeable. This variation was not considered to have a significant effect on the way in which the 
senders were perceived. In their study, Dominic, Jarman, and Lytle (2015) found that camera angles 
did not affect the credibility of the person being recorded. Sean Brand Multimedia was contracted to 
assist with the recording and editing of the video material. A confidentiality agreement was 
included in the contract. 
  
4.3.4.1. Research instrument. 
The research instrument comprised of 24 videos, 2 video recordings (one honest and one deceptive) 
for each of the 12 senders. In turn each recording consisted of two parts. The first part was a 
baseline segment that showed the first 20 seconds of the participants’ answers to the third question, 
which required them to describe their favourite movie. This question was intended to show what the 
participants looked like while being honest. The second segment was one of the answers to the 
fourth question, that is, the honest or deceptive message. The two segments were edited to play 
consecutively but were separated by a fade effect. “A fade is a transition of gradual decrease (fade-
out) or increase (fade-in) of visual intensity” (Cernekova, Pitas, & Nikou, 2006, p. 82). This was in 
the form of a short fade out (from the baseline video), and fade in effect (to the veracity video), 
meant to indicate the end and the beginning of the video segments.  
 
The average video lengths, including the baselines, were 84.1 seconds (Longest: 213s, Shortest: 
37s). The time of the honest recordings (without baseline) averaged 74 seconds (1Min, 14Sec) and 
ranged between 17 seconds (0Min, 17Sec) and 148 seconds (2Min, 28Sec). The deceptive 
recordings (without baseline) averaged 54 seconds (0Min, 54Sec) and ranged between 22 seconds 
(0Min, 22Sec) and 193 seconds (3Min, 13Sec).  
 
As promised in the advertisement, senders, whose recordings were included, were informed of 
the overall study results after the analyses were done. They were also provided with a description of 
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what the score indicated within the context of deception detection (see Appendix F). The senders 
whose recordings were not included were informed as soon as that decision not to include the 
videos was finalised. 
 
4.3.5. Ethical considerations for the first phase. 
The major ethical consideration for this phase of the study was that the participants (senders) were 
recorded and that the recordings would be shown to another sample of participants (receivers) over 
the internet. The researcher asked voluntary students to participate in this part of the study. They 
were informed about the content of the study and they were informed that they would be filmed 
beforehand (Ekman & Friesen, 1974). The students had to give written consent, sign a video release 
form, and could stop the study at any time. Their identities were kept separate from the created 
video material to protect their anonymity. Access to the documents was limited to the researcher, 
and access to the video material was exclusive to the researcher and supervisor (excluding the 
instances where they were used in the survey).  
 
Ethical clearance to conduct video recorded interviews with the sample of Unisa students was 
gained from Unisa’s Department of Psychology Ethics Committee, as well as the Senate Research 
and Innovation and Higher Degrees Committee (Ref: 2015_RPSC_006). This included showing the 
recordings to the second sample of students (see Appendixes G1 and G2). 
 
4.4. Phase 2 – Veracity Judgments 
During the second phase the online survey, which was created on the online platform Surveygizmo, 
the video recordings (created in the first phase) were used (see Appendix H). The video recordings 
acted as stimuli in order for the second sample of participants (receivers) to make veracity 
judgments. These judgments were scored, and the correct judgments were analysed in order to 
answer the research questions. In this study, correct judgments refer to receivers correctly 
classifying deceptive messages as deception, and honest messages as honest.  
 
The description of the second phase of this study begins with a discussion of the methodological 
considerations in creating the online survey. After which the sampling procedure, as well as the 
survey administration for the second phase is described. Finally, the ethical considerations for the 
second phase are discussed.  
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4.4.1. Online survey. 
The research instrument was transformed into an online survey using Surveygizmo. An online 
survey method was chosen for this study mainly because of accessibility (Cohen & Swerdlik, 
2009). Since the population of Unisa students are dispersed in terms of geography (Unisa at a 
glance, 2013), it was considered more efficient to contact students via online methods, instead of 
face to face contact sessions. This also allowed participants to participate in their own time. The 
format and additional considerations of the survey are discussed below.  
 
The survey began with an informed consent page that gave a generic description of the study. In 
the description as much information as possible about the study was provided. However, in order to 
protect the integrity of the data some information was omitted: It was not indicated that the survey 
assessed bias based on gender, race or language proficiency. This was to ensure that the receivers 
did not change the way in which they answered questions based on this knowledge (Babbie, 2008; 
Baron et al., 2009). Information that was included related to the format of the survey, as well as the 
amount of time and internet data that were needed to complete the survey. The receivers were 
informed that the study was voluntary, as well as that they were able to withdraw at any time before 
submitting the final answers. Receivers were asked to consent to participate in the study by clicking 
an “I Agree” button (see Appendix H).  
 
The following pages consisted of the video and question pages, beginning with the example 
question. Each video and subsequent question page were created separately, but formed a page pair 
so that each answer would correspond to each message that was viewed. This was done so that the 
pages could be presented neatly (see Appendix H). The survey was created to be ‘forward only’, 
and thus the receivers were not able to go back to change their answers. This ensured that only their 
first answers were recorded. 
 
Each question’s video page was shown first, and only included the embedded video. Embedding 
refers to “any type of multimedia file that you can insert… into the Web page” (ITBusinessEdge, 
n.d.). As discussed in the first phase, the first 20 seconds of every video showed the sender 
describing their favourite movie. In order to avoid confusion, the word “Baseline” was inserted next 
to this segment. After the fade effect (discussed earlier) the senders answered the fourth (veracity) 
question. In the example video the word “Baseline” was replaced with the words ‘Truth/Lie?’. The 
‘Truth/Lie?’ text was only included in the example video to ensure that the receivers understood the 
instructions. For the subsequent 24 recordings no description was provided after the fade effect. 
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This was to ensure that the receivers would not be influenced by word use or order (see Appendix 
H).  
 
The videos themselves were embedded on the page at a height of 480 pixels, and width 853 
pixels (this is somewhat wider than a horizontal A5 paper). The video controls were removed from 
the videos. These included the play/pause button (video control buttons), progress bar, sound 
controls, and settings. This was done so that the receivers would not be able to jump back and forth 
through the videos, but rather had to watch it in its entirety. However, with more advanced 
knowledge the receivers could have controlled the videos using keyboard keys, which could not be 
disabled. It was assumed that very few of the receivers would have this technical knowledge. The 
videos were also prevented from playing in full screen as this would have influenced the quality of 
the videos, and possibly the amount of data that the survey would have needed.  
 
At the bottom of every video page was a “Next” button that needed to be clicked in order to 
proceed to the question page. The receivers could replay the recordings as many times as they 
wished as long as they remained on that page. It was possible for a video to play automatically, and 
change the page when it was finished, but this was deliberately not set because of the slow and 
occasional unreliable internet speed in South Africa (Vermeulen, 2015). This would have been 
problematic because participants needed to actually view the recordings on which their judgments 
were based (see Appendix H). 
 
Each question page included two questions that required an answer before the receivers could 
continue. The first was a dichotomous question that asked the receivers if they believed that the 
sender was honest or deceptive. This was a binary choice that required the receivers to commit to 
the option that most closely resembled their view. Although this type of question does not record 
their more subtle beliefs (Terre Blanche et al., 2006), it was the dichotomous response in which this 
study was interested. The second question was scaled, and asked the receivers how confident they 
were in the first answer. The question was placed on a slider bar which scored out of 100, in 
increments of 10 (see Appendix H). Scaled questions measure more subtle opinions, which can be 
useful to see if there are minor variations in the beliefs of the receivers (Terre Blanche et al., 2006).  
 
For every participant who completed the survey, the video - question page pairs started with the 
example question pages. After which each of the subsequent 24 page pairs where shown in a 
randomised order that was generated by the survey platform. This was to reduce bias that could 
arise from the video-question pair page order (Babbie, 2008). The question numbering was set so 
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that each receiver saw consecutive numbers (1, 2, 3, 4 etc.) on the randomly ordered pages (e.g. 3, 
1, 4, 2). The page order of each receiver’s survey was recorded, but due to limited responses was 
not pursued as an avenue for analysis in the current study (see Appendix H). 
 
After answering the final video question page, receivers were asked to provide a short 
description regarding the behaviour(s) / evidence upon which they based their judgments. A short 
open-ended question was used to gather this information. Open-ended questions allow participants 
to answer unrestrictedly in their own words (Foxcroft & Roodt, 2005). This question was asked 
after all the veracity questions were answered. Thus, the answers only included the cues that the 
participants claimed they had noticed. As the participants were trying to detect deception for a 
period of time before answering this question, their answers gave valuable insight into the 
behaviours that they believed were important. This allowed for an analysis to be conducted on the 
textual information that the participants provided.  
 
Finally, receivers were asked certain biographical questions. They were asked to indicate their 
gender, race and age in years. As well as the languages they regarded as their first, second, or third 
language (if applicable). Three scale questions asked receivers to indicate their proficiency in 
English with regards to ‘Reading and Writing’, ‘Speaking’ and ‘Understanding’. The self-reported 
scales had an inherent bias, in that the receivers could have over- or under-estimated their linguistic 
ability. These questions assumed that the receivers had some insight as to their abilities. It was also 
assumed that they would present themselves accurately, instead of trying to make themselves 
appear more positive (Baron et al., 2009). The answers from these questions were thus not 
considered in the data analysis and discussion. 
 
In order to determine how receivers accessed the survey, they were asked on what device they 
completed the survey (computer, tablet or mobile), and if they encountered any problems that may 
have been of interest to the study (e.g. problems with the survey, sound, video). However, because 
of a limited response-rate this question could not be utilised and was not considered within the data 
analysis and discussion of the results.  
 
Finally, the participants were directed to a ‘Thank You Page’, which gave a short debriefing of 
the study. It stated that the purpose of the study was to see how judgments are made on second 
language speakers. It also stated that the study was interested in gender and race as potential sources 
of bias. The participants were able to see what percentage of their judgments were correct in terms 
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of the total, the truthful messages, and the deception messages. These scores were also briefly 
explained within the larger context of deception detection (see Appendix H).  
 
4.4.2. Sampling. 
The total sample size, as granted by the ethical application was 10,000. The main reason for such a 
large sample was due to the response-rate of online surveys. The average response-rate on online 
surveys is typically lower (approximately 11%) than other methods (Manfreda et al., 2008). This 
response-rate involves the number of participants who make an active choice to participate or not. 
Within the context of the current study, an added consideration needed to be given to the number of 
students who had seen the emails in order to be able to make this choice. In Mbatha and Naidoo 
(2010) the researchers asked 110 Unisa communication students how much they interacted with 
their myLife student email accounts. Of the students, 50.9% replied that they had ‘no’ or ‘low’ 
interaction with the account, 12.7% replied ‘satisfactory’ interaction, whereas 36.3% replied ‘high’ 
to ‘very high’ interaction with the account. This supports findings by Roberts (2011) (as cited in 
Molepo & Mothudi, 2014); that the majority of students at Unisa do not have access to their myLife 
accounts, or that they are unable to open these accounts. In consideration of these previous findings, 
a sample of 10,000 was considered so that, even with a lower response-rate, there would be enough 
participants in the study.  
 
In this phase probability sampling was employed by conducting a two tiered sampling method 
that combined stratified sampling and simple random sampling methods. Probability sampling 
refers to sampling methods that depend on some form of random selection of participants. With 
stratified sampling, the population is divided into homogeneous groups (strata) in advance, after 
which a sample database is drawn (Babbie, 2008; Terre Blanche et al., 2006). This  combination 
was to ensure that the sample has a greater chance of being representative of the population when 
the population consists of relevant subgroups (Terre Blanche et al., 2006). Simple random sampling 
refers to the method of sampling where each potential participant in the population (in this study, in 
each stratum) is assigned a random number, which assists in drawing a sample from the population 
(Babbie, 2008; Terre Blanche et al., 2006). The second phase of the study made use of the Unisa 
student email database, and a stratified random sample was drawn to select potential participants.   
 
The sampling criteria that were used during this phase of the study were: 
- Participants needed to be South African 
o Living in South Africa 
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This was because this study focused specifically on the South African context. It followed that 
the videos had to have been shown to South Africans who were currently living in South Africa. It 
was thus required to make sure that the receivers were living in South Africa: Because Unisa is an 
ODL institution the students could have been living anywhere in the world (Unisa at a glance, 
2013).  
 
- Students from the University of South Africa 
Unisa is an open distance learning institution, which means that the majority of its educational 
programs are studied by students who are not able to go to contact universities (because of work or 
financial reasons), or who prefer to study according to their own pace. 
 
Unisa has had a drive to have a stronger online presence, by trying to increase students’ access 
to the internet, electronic media, and the online learning environment (“Our future,” 2012). The 
participants needed to be students as it was assumed that they would have the basic computer skills 
and access, required to complete the online survey. Although no advanced skills were necessary, it 
was required that participants had some basic experience with how a computer and the internet 
function, and thus be able to access the survey. 
 
The second reason was that it was assumed that student’s linguistic ability would vary, but that, 
both first and second (English) language speakers would have some ability with the English 
language as it is required to participate in tertiary education. 
 
- Aged between 18 and 45 
Although age was not found to be a significant determinant of deception judgments accuracy 
(Aamodt & Custer, 2006), the age limit of 45 was introduced because findings have suggested that 
older participants may introduce other mediating factors (Sweeney & Ceci, 2014).  
 
Therefore, access to the complete database, only consisted of students who were registered for 
2015, who were South African and between the ages 18-45. The database was then divided into four 
strata, according to the race of the students, thus creating four databases, one for each of the racial 
categories (black, coloured, indian, and white). Each of the four categories was subdivided 
according to gender. This created eight categories: Race * gender. Since Unisa only provides 
captured data for preferred tuition language between Afrikaans (Afr) and English (Eng), the data set 
could merely be subdivided according to those two languages. The only category that consisted of a 
large enough number of students within each was the white racial category. Therefore, only this 
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category was further subdivided (Table 4.3). As the language chosen was the ‘preferred language’, 
it was assumed that the majority of the white students, who indicated English as their preferred 
language, were English students. It is therefore possible that this stratification may not have 
reflected an accurate representation of the student’s first languages.  
 
A simple random sampling technique was used to select random samples of student from each 
stratum. Simple random sampling ensures that each student (within each stratification), has an 
independent, and equal chance of being selected (Babbie, 2008; Terre Blanche et al., 2006). The 
random number generator, which was included in Microsoft Excel 2013, was used to create a 
random number for each student. This was completed separately within each of the ten 
stratifications: Race * gender * language. The students’ emails were then sorted numerically 
according to the random numbers allocated. The first 1,250 emails were selected (625 emails for 
both Afrikaans and English white students). These emails were then combined into a single 
database that included the entire sample of 10,000 emails (Table 4.3).  
 
Table 4.3 Sampling of Receivers by Gender and Race 
 Gender  
 Women Men Total 
Black 1,250 1,250 2,500 
Coloured 1,250 1,250 2,500 
Indian 1,250 1,250 2,500 
White    
Afrikaans 625 625 1250 
English 625 625 1250 
Total 5,000 5,000 10,000 
 
The sample database was checked to make sure that it did not include any students who 
volunteered during the first phase. One such name did appear, and it was subsequently removed 
from the sample list, and replaced with the following student’s email address from the same 
category.   
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4.4.3. Administering the research instrument. 
After the online survey was completed and checked, the online survey platform was used to email a 
secure website link to the sample of potential receivers. The email briefly described the study and 
its purpose, and included a secure link to the survey (see Appendix I). After the receivers clicked 
the link they were shown the information and consent page that provided details of the survey. It 
briefly explained the nature of the study and provided them with the expected time that participation 
would take (approximately 40min) (see Appendix I).  
 
Email messages were sent on two occasions, the first was an introduction, and the second was 
sent as a reminder. Reminder emails are intended to increase the number of responses that one 
receives, and could significantly increase the response-rates (Babbie, 2008). The first email, which 
was sent on 29 July 2015, included a broad introduction and invitation to participate in the study. 
The closing date for the survey was 31 August 2015 (see Appendix I). A total of 10,000 emails 
were sent to the selected email addresses, and no emails were rejected by the email server, 
suggesting that they were delivered. The emails were sent as ‘HTML only’. ‘HTML only’ means 
that the email contained some elements of computer programing, similar to those of websites. This 
allows the email text to be bold, italics, or in different fonts, it can even include pictures or other 
media. The limitation of these emails is that the email server may misinterpret the messages, or send 
it to the ‘junk’ folder (Notenboom, 2006). 
 
Because of the poor response-rate the closing date for the survey was extended to 28 September 
2015, which was within the two-month limit as set by the Senate ethical application. A reminder 
email was sent on 1 September 2015, to elicit more responses. A total of 9,943 reminder emails 
were sent out to potential participants who had not previously completed the survey (49 had 
completed the survey and 8 people had unsubscribed from the email list). No emails were rejected 
by the email server, suggesting that they were delivered. The information of the second email was 
almost identical to the first. An additional request, which was aimed at students who had seen the 
survey but not completed it, asked the students to consider completing the survey when they had the 
time (see Appendix J). No compensation was offered for completing the survey. The email was sent 
as ‘text only’ because of the concern that the email may be sent to the ‘junk file’. A ‘text only’ 
email refers to an email that does not have the option of changing the font or colour of the text, 
because it does not include the necessary programing language in such emails (Notenboom, 2006). 
 
Surveygizmo is not capable of scheduling the sending of the total amount of emails in segments 
over a period of time. This created the possibility that some of the introduction emails could have 
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been labelled as spam, due to the large number of emails sent out at the same time. There was no 
indication of this as the participants who clicked the link or completed the survey were widely 
spread across the database. However, as there were no markers to indicate if any of the emails were 
labelled as spam, this may have occurred. Using email distribution software such as MailChimp 
could have provided a solution, but due to budget considerations this option was not possible.    
 
4.4.4. Ethical considerations for the second phase. 
The ethical considerations for this phase of the study included that the researcher deliberately 
omitted some information concerning the purpose of the study. In communicating with the 
receivers, the researcher was deliberately vague about the purpose of the study. Receivers were told 
that their ability to detect deception would be tested. But there was no mention of second language 
bias, or that the effects of gender or race would be considered. This was to ensure that the receivers 
did not focus more on these aspects of the senders than they would have otherwise. This is 
sometimes known as the Social Desirability bias that refers to a tendency to answer questions in a 
socially acceptable or desirable way (Baron et al., 2009; Foxcroft & Roodt, 2005). These omissions 
were not considered harmful to the participants, as it was intended to encourage participants to 
focus more on detecting deception than on other aspects such as race or gender.   
 
This study used a 50/50 division of truth-and-lie tellers, as well as that the same senders were 
shown twice. Since the receivers might have attempted to anticipate the answers, the researcher 
needed to give false background information to keep receivers from attempting to anticipate 
answers. Therefore, the receivers were told that some senders did not lie and that some did not tell 
the truth and that the senders could choose the type of message that they delivered. This was 
intended to introduce a bit of doubt to their veracity choices. Although the question option was 
binary, this information was intended to make the participants think about every choice, and not 
rely on their previous answers to influence what they chose.  
 
Ethical clearance was gained from Unisa’s Department of Psychology Ethics Committee, as 
well as Senate Research and Innovation and Higher Degrees Committee (Ref: 2015_RPSC_006), in 
order to gain access to students’ email addresses (see Appendix G1, G2). This was for the purpose 
of sending the secure survey link to be opened by the students. The original application only 
included access to the email addresses of up to 120 students. The response-rates of online surveys 
are notoriously quite low (Manfreda et al., 2008), and therefore, a second application, to increase 
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the total sample size to 10,000, was made before the data collection for the second phase. This 
application was granted on 19 June 2015, before the collection commenced. 
 
4.5. Data Analysis 
The purpose of analysing data is to reduce the raw information into a specific answer (Terre 
Blanche et al., 2006). The data analysis was conducted in order to answer each of the five research 
questions in this study. Inferential statistics were used to analyse the answers to questions one to 
four. The group of techniques, which were used to compare the mean scores on the survey, are 
referred to as parametric statistics. The answers to research question 5 were analysed by means of 
Content Analysis. The number of times that certain coded terms were used were totalled and 
discussed according to their relative importance.  
 
This discussion begins by discussing the dependent and independent variables that were 
considered in this analysis. The characteristics of both senders and receivers were examined and are 
described. An account of every test used to answer the research questions follows. The discussion 
of the tests used within this study is organised according to the research questions. However, to 
avoid repeating information, the research questions that used the same techniques are grouped 
together in this discussion.  
 
4.5.1. Variables. 
Variables can be viewed as attributes that have been grouped in a logical way (Babbie, 2008). These 
attributes need to comprise two or more values (e.g. gender or age) (Terre Blanche et al., 2006). 
There are several types of variables, but this study was specifically interested in dependent and 
independent variables. Many variables can be treated as dependent or independent variables, those 
considered in this study are discussed below. 
 
Variables that are measured are referred to as dependent variables (DVs). The DV’s value is 
dependent on the specific value of the Independent Variables (Babbie, 2008; Baron et al., 2009; 
Terre Blanche et al., 2006). Independent variables (IVs) are seen to causes different results in the 
dependent variables (Babbie, 2008; Terre Blanche et al., 2006). IVs are assumed to be a given when 
conducting the analysis, and are manipulated in experiments / quasi-experiments in order to view if 
they do have an effect on the DV, and what that effect entails (Babbie, 2008; Baron et al., 2009; 
Terre Blanche et al., 2006). 
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4.5.1.1. Dependent variables. 
The Dependent Variables that were considered for the analysis of the research questions were: The 
veracity judgments (Truth / Lie), the confidence level that was reported for each veracity judgment, 
as well as the perceived deceptive cues as reported by the receivers.  
 
The senders in this study were all selected based on the criteria that they were second language 
English speakers. The main aim of the analysis was to explore the possibility of a lie bias towards 
second language speakers, as well as if gender, race, or language status affected the receivers’ 
judgments. In order to accomplish this in the analysis several constructs were created by averaging 
specific scores across the dataset. This was to see if there were differences in accuracy, or if there 
were biases in the responses. The comparisons made across the receivers’ responses are discussed 
in each of the Independent variables. The constructs created to make comparisons across senders 
are focussed on below. 
 
- The veracity judgments 
In the survey receivers made judgments by deciding if a video portrayed a truthful or deceptive 
message. If they chose correctly it was scored as 1, if they chose incorrectly it was scored as 0. In 
this study, there was a 50 / 50 base-rate for truth and deceptive messages (12 truthful messages, and 
12 deceptive messages). Therefore, in total, the receivers should score close to 0.5 (50%) just by 
guessing. This suggests that, if the receivers scored 50% for all the messages, they could have been 
guessing. If they scored around 0.6 (60%) for truth messages, and 0.4 (40%) for deceptive messages 
(averaging to a total of 50%), it would suggest that they were truth biased. This trend was found in 
previous deception detection studies (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). If the opposite occurred, that is if 
receivers scored 40% for correct judgments for the truthful messages and 60% for correct 
judgments of the deceptive messages it would suggest that they were lie biased. This was suggested 
by previous studies that considered second language speakers (Da Silva & Leach, 2013). 
 
In order to measure the receiver’s performance with regard to the veracity judgments three 
overarching constructs were created (i.e. Total, Truth, Lie). This was accomplished by averaging 
the scores of each receiver; that is, the judgments across all the messages (Total), all the judgments 
of messages that were truthful (Truth), and all the judgments of messages that were deceptive (Lie). 
The same logic was followed in creating constructs that would measure the effects of the sender’s 
gender or race on the judgments made by receivers (Table 4.4).  
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Table 4.4 Compilation of Constructs According to the Gender and Race of Senders 
Additional Construct Description: These constructs were created by averaging 
receiver’s judgments. 
Total * Gender (Female / Male) Across all the messages according to the sender’s gender. 
Thus, a construct was created for all the messages by Females 
(Female Total) and a construct for all the messages created by 
Males (Male Total).  
Truth * Gender (Female / Male) Across all the truthful messages according to the sender’s 
gender. The same logic was followed as the first gender 
construct above.  
Lie * Gender (Female / Male) Across all the deceptive messages according to the sender’s 
gender. The same logic was followed as the first gender 
construct above. 
Total * Race (Black / White) Across all the all messages according to the sender’s race. 
Thus, a construct was created for all the messages by black 
senders (Black Total) and a construct for all the messages 
created by white senders (White Total). 
Truth * Race (Black / White) Across all the truthful messages according to the sender’s 
race. The same logic was followed as the first racial construct 
above. 
Lie * Race (Black / White) Across all the deceptive messages according to the sender’s 
race. The same logic was followed as the first racial construct 
above. 
 
Making the distinction between veracity (Total, Truth, Lie), and biographic information of the 
senders (gender, race) is useful for several reasons. The veracity constructs provided two distinct 
indications. The constructs of the Total scores provided an indication of judgment accuracy (the 
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correct classification of both truthful and deceptive messages). Thus, the higher the Total, the more 
accurate the receivers were (as described above). Considering the correct Truth or Lie constructs 
provided insight into a possible truth or lie bias (also discussed above). In combining these 
constructs with the sender’s gender or race could provide valuable insight into the effects of each. 
Both of these corresponding constructs could then be used to test for differences in judgment scores. 
These differences could in turn serve as indications of biases because of the biographical 
information of the sender, or the veracity of their message.  
 
For example, a comparison of the Total scores for the messages from female and male senders 
would provide an indication about the effects of the gender of senders on the ability of receivers to 
make correct classifications. But these scores can also be influenced by extreme or even moderate 
biases. Therefore, if female and male senders are judged more truthful or deceptive than the other it 
could aggregate to a similar or drastically different Total scores, but with an underlying veracity 
bias because of the gender of senders. 
 
- Veracity Confidence 
The receivers were also asked how confident they were about the veracity judgments they made. 
This was asked in order to find out if there were more nuanced beliefs about the veracity of the 
messages, as well as how strongly receivers were committed to their choice. Greater confidence 
could indicate stronger biases. Confidence scores were compared across the gender, race and 
language status of the participants.  
 
Receivers’ confidence levels were measured on a self-reported scale question. This question 
was scored out of a 100 (in increments of 10). The means of the answers were used to conduct the 
analyses. This variable could also be used to indicate if the receivers’ confidence scores were 
correlated with the accuracy of their beliefs. Previous studies have suggested that accuracy and 
confidence are not related (Colwell et al., 2012; Vrij et al., 2010). This, however, can also give an 
indication of different deception stereotypes that could be relevant for future research.  
 
Similar to the veracity judgments, the means of the confidence scores were calculated in order 
to create several constructs that could be used in the analyses. These constructs followed a similar 
pattern as the veracity judgments, so that the correlations between the two types of scores could be 
calculated (discussed later). Therefore, overall constructs were created for confidence ratings on all 
the messages (Confidence Total), only ratings on truthful messages (Confidence Truth), or only 
ratings on deceptive messages (Confidence Lie). In addition, constructs were created with the 
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confidence scores according to the veracity of the message and biographical information about the 
sender.  
 
- Perceived Deception Cues 
The deceptive cues that receivers claim to notice could suggest a tentative view as to why there 
are certain tendencies within veracity judgments on second language speakers. If the cues 
mentioned are similar to those reported by previous studies (Castillo, 2011; Global Deception 
Research Team, 2006), then it may be feasible for future research to concentrate on other aspects of 
veracity judgments.  
 
4.5.1.2. Independent variables. 
To determine if there was an overall bias; the overall veracity construct (Total, Truth, Lie) scores of 
the receivers, were examined to see if there was a general towards second language speakers. Other 
independent variables that were scrutinised related to the biographical information of the receivers. 
As discussed in the sampling sections, participants were sampled according to certain biographical 
criteria that were used in the analyses.  
 
The independent variables that were considered included the receivers’ gender, race, and 
language status (first or second language speakers). Thus, comparisons could be made between 
female and male receivers, as well as comparisons between first and second language English 
speakers. Such comparisons were also made according to the receivers’ self-reported race.  
 
4.5.2. Statistical techniques. 
The statistical techniques used within this study can be described in broad terms as descriptive 
statistics and inferential statistics. The descriptive statistics made use of frequencies, averages and 
standard deviations to provide a description of the biographical information and veracity constructs. 
This furnishes a background picture of the information that is used within this study. The inferential 
statistics made use of a group of techniques referred to as parametric tests, as described earlier. The 
parametric tests that were used to analyse the data are elaborated on in the discussions relating to 
the various research questions.  
 
During the data analyses a nonparametric test was also used to compare the means between 
variables. Nonparametric tests refer to statistical techniques that do not assume that the data are 
normally distributed, in addition to being useful should other assumptions be violated. This group 
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of techniques lose some information as they require the data to be changed so as to adhere to the 
assumptions of normality to conduct the analysis. However, they have the advantage of being useful 
when groups are small (Field, 2009). It was necessary to make use of a nonparametric technique 
when analysing the variable ‘race’ of the senders. This is more thoroughly discussed within the 
section concerned with answering the third research question. 
 
4.5.2.1. Parametric techniques (research questions 1-4). 
Parametric statistics were used during this study because they assume that the data are normally 
distributed, as well as that the variance is the same (homogeneous) across the data. They further 
assume that the data are independent, in that the scores of one participant did not influence the 
scores of another. The assumption of independence is true for all the techniques used in this study, 
except for the dependent t-test discussed below (Field, 2009). 
 
The specific tests that were used to address the research questions were: One sample t-test, 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), Dependent Sample t-test (along with the non-parametric 
counterpart: Wilcoxon sign-rank), and Pearson correlation coefficient. Effect size of significant 
results was measured by making use of Cohen’s d. Below follows a short description of the function 
of each test with reference to the research question they were meant to answer.  
 
4.5.2.1.1. Question 1: One Sample t-test. 
In this study a One Sample t-test was conducted to see if the overall scores differed from chance. 
This technique is used when the mean scores, that are compared, are known, but the standard 
deviation for one of the means is not (Terre Blanche et al., 2006). In this study the mean of the 
sample was the mean score that was obtained from the sample of receivers, and the second mean, 
used in the equation was the score that could be attained by chance alone (50%). The standard 
deviation of the receivers was calculated from their scores. The second mean was calculated from 
the probability of getting a correct answer from only two choices, which amounts to 50%. 
Therefore, the second standard deviation could not be calculated.  
 
The One Sample t-test assumes that the standard deviations are the same even if the samples are 
from different populations (one sample that volunteered in this study, the second is a hypothetical 
mean calculated from chance). This assumption sacrifices some of the accuracy of the calculation, 
because it cannot be assured that the standard deviations are truly the same. However, makes it 
possible to measure the scores against chance (Terre Blanche et al., 2006). 
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The hypothesis, relating to the first question, was that receivers would not be able to detect 
deception with more accuracy than dictated by chance. According to Burgoon (2015), as biases 
become stronger, accuracy becomes weaker. The overall scores form the receivers would give an 
indication of the accuracy levels in this study. Testing the judgments on the truthful and deceptive 
messages separately can give an indication of possible bias.  
 
This test was conducted on the veracity constructs’ scores of all the receivers, in terms of how 
accurate they were in Total (all 24 the veracity messages), in terms of the number of correct truthful 
messages (12 Truth messages), as well as the number of correct deceptive messages (12 Lie 
messages). To accept the null hypothesis (that accuracy is measured at chance level); an ‘ideal’ 
result would reflect that the accuracy was not measured significantly above or below chance level 
(50%). This result leaves ‘room’ for a truth or lie bias in that the truth judgments are correct 
significantly below chance level (i.e. 40%), and deceptive messages are correct significantly above 
chance level (i.e. 60%), in the case of a lie bias, or vice versa, in the case of a truth bias.  
 
4.5.2.1.2. Questions 2-4: Analysis of variance (ANOVA).  
An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted in this study to investigate the effects of the 
receiver’s gender, race, and language status on veracity judgment accuracy or bias in addition to the 
effect on the receivers’ confidence scores. An ANOVA can be used to compare the means of two or 
more variables to determine if the independent variables have an effect on the dependent variables 
(Gerber & Hall, 2015). In this study an ANOVA was used to see the effects of the interaction 
between all three independent variables: (gender {Female / Male} * race * language status {First / 
Second Language}), on the veracity constructs (Total, Truth, Lie) and confidence constructs 
(Confidence Total, Confidence Truth, Confidence Lie) described above. However, due to the 
limited response-rate the variable concerned with receivers’ race was removed from the analysis. 
This is discussed in more depth later in the dissertation. 
 
Similar to a t-test, an ANOVA tests if the means of the samples are different. This helps to 
indicate if the independent variables had an effect on the dependent variable constructs. Therefore, 
the analysis was performed to determine whether there were any statistically significant differences 
between the means of the variables. This analysis was able to indicate if any of the variables, or an 
interaction between the variables, had a significant effect on the accuracy, bias, or confidence of the 
receivers. The ANOVA is robust against violations of normality, meaning that the test is still 
accurate if the assumption of normality is violated (Field, 2009). Therefore, even with the weak 
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response-rate in this study, this meant that the measure could still be said to accurately reflect the 
results. However, with a more representative sample, it is possible that a different trend would 
become evident.   
 
This study hypothesised that the gender (question 2) as well as race (question 3) of the receivers 
would not have a significant effect on receivers’ judgments. In order for the hypotheses, relating to 
these questions, to be true the ANOVA’s for gender and race would not show significant 
differences between the means. 
 
With regards to the receiver’s language status (question 4), the hypothesis stated that first 
language English speaking receivers would be more accurate in their judgments than second 
language speakers. To accept the hypothesis, the ANOVA on the language status should detect a 
significant difference between the first and second language mean scores. As stated above the 
variable for receivers’ race was removed, the implications of which are discussed more extensively 
within the discussion on the research question and limitations.  
 
4.5.2.1.3. Questions 2-3: Dependent Sample t-test. 
To investigate the possible effects of the sender’s gender and race on veracity judgments, a 
Dependent Sample t-test was used to analyse the data in terms of the constructs that were described 
before. A Dependent Sample t-test was used in this study when the questions (senders’ veracity 
messages) were judged by the same participants (receivers) (Field, 2009). The means of the two 
scores (i.e. those relating to receivers’ veracity statements) were compared to see if the receiver’s 
judgments differed significantly because of the senders’ gender or race.  
 
The hypotheses, with regards to the second and third questions, were that there would be no 
significant difference between the veracity mean scores relating to sender’s gender and race. To test 
this, the Total, Truth, or Lie mean scores were calculated according to gender and race. The Total 
score provides an indication as to whether accuracy differs because of the sender’s gender and race, 
and the Truth and Lie mean scores provide an indication of potential judgment bias.  
 
The first test was conducted on the mean scores from all the receivers on the constructs Female 
Total and Male Total. This was followed by comparisons between the means concerned with 
Female Truth and Male Truth, as well as Female Lie and Male Lie. The second set of comparisons 
followed the same logic by comparing the means of the racial groups (black and white senders).  
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However, due to limitations in the response-rate, as alluded to thus far, a Wilcoxon sign-rank 
test was performed in relation to the variable concerned with the receivers’ race, in order to support 
findings from the Dependent T-test. The Wilcoxon sign-rank test is a non-parametric test that can 
be used on smaller datasets, or if the data from a variable violates one or more assumptions required 
by the parametric counterparts. This test transforms the data into a ranked dataset that is used during 
the analysis. Because of this transformation some information is lost and thus possibly makes the 
measure less accurate, but with the advantage that the analysis could provide a possible answer 
(Field, 2009). 
 
In order for the null hypothesis to be accepted the analysis should reveal no difference between 
the mean scores. This would indicate that the receivers did not differ in the way that they judged the 
senders across gender or race. Since this test assesses the differences between only two means, the 
interaction between the gender and race of the senders was not investigated. This would have 
required multivariate statistics, as well as a larger sample of data than that of the current study.  
 
4.5.2.1.4. Questions 1-4: Pearson correlation coefficient. 
To test the effect of the receivers’ confidence level on the judgment accuracy or bias, it was 
necessary to use a Pearson correlation coefficient. The Pearson correlation coefficient is a bivariate 
correlation, meaning that it measures the strength between two variables (Field, 2009). 
 
The Pearson correlation coefficient is used when one is interested to find out the strength of a 
linear association between two variables. The question, in which this study was interested was: If 
the mean of the confidence variable increases is there a corresponding increase in the correct 
veracity judgments? The test results may show a positive relationship (i.e. as one score increases, 
the second increases), no relationship (i.e. no association between scores), or a negative relationship 
(i.e. as one score increases, the second decreases). The result of this type of measure is an ‘r’ score 
that ranges between 0 (no correlation) and 1 (perfect correlation). The symbol of the ‘r’ score (-1 or 
+1) indicates the strength of a negative or positive relationship (Field, 2009). 
 
The correlations were conducted with the interest of determining, whether there was a relation 
between how confident receivers were about their choices (first variable) and how accurate their 
judgments were (second variable). As well as if there was an interaction based on truthful or 
deceptive messages. Therefore, the Confidence Total construct mean score was correlated with the 
Total mean scores, to determine whether there was a relationship between the two. In addition, the 
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test was used to determine if there was a correlation between veracity judgment mean scores (Truth 
and Lie) and Confidence mean scores (Truth and Lie).  
 
This study hypothesised that receivers would be less confident when making veracity judgments 
on deceptive messages. For this to be correct the Confidence Lie construct mean score should be 
lower than the Confidence Truth mean score, in order to reflect this reaction.  
 
4.5.3. Content analysis (research question 5). 
To answer the final research question, content analysis was done to find out which cues receivers 
believed were diagnostic of deception. Content analysis is used to ascertain the number of times that 
codes are used within textual data (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007). This was implemented to infer 
the (assumed) relative importance of the mentioned cues that were seen as diagnostic of deception 
by the receivers. The importance of certain terms is assumed because important concepts are not 
always mentioned and therefore would not appear often in a frequency analysis. The terms are 
relative in importance in that certain codes are used more relative to others. Thus, when conducting 
the content analysis, the textual data in this study was analysed to detect the relative importance of 
the various terms, as well as their possible combinations.  
 
Within this analysis each behaviour or possible behavioural cue was coded individually with 
only one term (with some exceptions). In addition, each code was used only once per receiver (if 
the relevant term was present present). Most of the codes used were thus mutually exclusive, 
meaning that the same data was not coded twice. There were codes that were used on the same data, 
which are described in the analysis. 
 
After the coding was finalised, a frequency distribution for each code was compiled. This type 
of analysis assists one to infer the relative importance of certain codes, based on the number of 
times they were used (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007). In the current study, this did not, however, 
show the relative importance that the concept had for any specific receiver, except that it was 
mentioned – this was due to, the coding convention used during this study. It nevertheless gave an 
indication of the assumed relative importance that the concept had for the total sample of receivers. 
For this reason, the frequency counts were not used, because they would provide a false certainty 
about the importance of the codes that would not necessarily be found within this study. Rather the 
relative importance of the codes was reported by means of a bar chart. The focus of this analysis 
thus provides the reader with an overview of what the receivers claimed to have influenced their 
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judgments, in addition to the importance of the codes relative to the other codes. After which the 
codes were then grouped together to provide an overview of what the receivers considered to be 
important. 
  
In conducting this analysis this study attempted to find similar trends as found in previous 
studies (Al-Simadi, 2000; Castillo, 2011; Global Deception Research Team, 2006). However, the 
results could not be ‘directly’ compared, due to different coding conventions used. However, it 
could show that certain types of cues were similarly mentioned. If more stereotyped behaviours 
were mentioned it could indicate that more specific research is needed into this matter, and their 
effects on judgment accuracy in a variety of conditions.  
 
4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter provided an overview of the study in terms of the research design and method used. 
The study was described in two phases, each phase comprised a section of the data collection 
process. The first phase described how truthful and deceptive videos were created by recording 
truthful and deceptive messages from the first group of participants who acted as the senders within 
this study. The second phase described the process of creating the online survey, and collecting the 
veracity judgments from the second group of participants who were the receivers for this study. The 
third section of this chapter explained the data analytical process that was followed in order to make 
sense of the data that were collected. Within this section the data analytical techniques were 
described as to how the answers to each research question were analysed. The chapter concluded 
with a description of the content analysis that was conducted on the textual data collected in the 
online survey. In this way, the method chapter provided an overview of the design of the study, how 
the study was conducted, and how the raw information was analysed to answer research questions. 
This is furthermore visually depicted in the diagram used in the beginning of this chapter (Figure 
4.1). 
 
The following chapter provides the results of the data analysis. For this reason, the chapter 
begins by describing the receivers within this study by means of descriptive statistics. The study 
response-rate and demographical information of the receivers are reviewed. The distribution of the 
constructs that were used in the current study to describe the accuracy, and bias judgments, 
alongside the scores indicating receiver’s confidence levels in making these choices, are addressed. 
To ease the reading of the chapter the constructs are not described in terms of gender and language 
status distribution as their discussions find more relevance within the answers to each research 
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question. Inferential statistics were used to summarise the answers to the research questions (one to 
four). The chapter concludes with the results of the content analysis of the answers to the final 
research question. 
  
92 
 
Chapter 5 – Results 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter describes the process and results from the data analyses of this study. In order to 
accomplish this task, the data were downloaded (in the form of an excel spread sheet), and cleaned. 
After which the data was combined by creating the relevant constructs introduced in the method 
chapter, and analysed according to the approach described in the method chapter. From the analyses 
the current chapter provides an answer to each of the research questions. The chapter begins by 
describing the sample of receivers who participated in the study. Specific concerns about the 
receivers include the survey response-rate and the demographic information of those who 
completed the survey. This is followed by the descriptive statistics that relate to the veracity (Total, 
Truth, Lie) and confidence (Confidence Total, Confidence Truth, Confidence Lie) constructs 
described in the previous chapter. In addition, the constructs were organised according to the gender 
and race of the senders, in order to explore the possible effects of those variables (the descriptive 
statistics of these combinations are not elaborated on below).  
 
After the description of the constructs, the chapter continues with the results obtained from the 
inferential statistics. To simplify the discussion, the analyses are described in terms of the research 
questions. Therefore, the answers gained from the analysis for the first research question are 
discussed first. After which the answers for questions two to four, in terms of the ANOVA, are 
expounded. This is followed by the other analytical approaches used for questions two to four. This 
chapter concludes with the answer to the final research question that was analysed by means of 
content analysis.  
 
5.2. Descriptive Statistics  
5.2.1. Demographical data.   
As described above the data were downloaded, cleaned, and constructs were created before they 
were analysed. The downloaded data contained the entire data base, of collected data from the 
receivers, including answer from the surveys that were partially completed. From this database it 
could be seen that 389 of the sample who were emailed clicked a link within the email (either the 
link to the survey or unsubscribe link), of those 296 participants started with the survey. Ultimately 
11 of the students who were emailed unsubscribed from the email list, 232 of the students who had 
started, withdrew before completing the survey and finally, 64 participants completed the survey 
within the allowed timeframe. This resulted in a response-rate of 0.64%.   
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Receivers (N = 64) were between the ages of 18 and 44, with a mean age of 28.36 (SD=7.004) 
(Table 5.1).  
 
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics Concerned with the Age of Receivers  
Variable n Minimum Maximum M SD 
Age 64 18 44 28.36 7.004 
 
Of the total receivers, 31 female (48.4%) and 33 males (51.6%) (Table 5.2). Participants 
identified their race as: Black = 6 (9.4%), Coloured = 11 (17.2%), Indian = 11 (17.2%), White = 33 
(51.6%), Asian (included within the ‘Other’ category) = 1 (1.6%) and Other = 2 (3.1%). First 
language English speakers were N = 38 (59.4%) and N = 26 (40.6%) claimed to be second language 
English speakers (Table 5.2). The majority, N = 22 of the second language English speakers 
identified Afrikaans as their first language. Other languages that were identified were: Tswana = 1, 
Zulu = 1, Swati = 1, and North Sotho = 1. 
 
Table 5.2 Frequency Scores of the Demographics of Receivers 
Variable n Label Count % 
Gender 64 
Female 31 48.4% 
Male 33 51.6% 
Race 
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Black 6 9.4% 
Coloured 11 17.2% 
Indian 11 17.2% 
White 33 51.2% 
Other 3 4.7% 
Language Status 64 
First Language 38 59.4% 
Second Language 26 40.6% 
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5.2.2. Constructs. 
In creating the relevant constructs, the scores of receivers on the specific messages were aggregated 
according to several predetermined combinations. Each veracity judgment had only the possibility 
of being scored as zero (0) or one (1), thus the aggregated scores all ranged between 0 and 1. As 
described above, this aggregation included the judgments on all 24 message; ‘Total’, judgments on 
the 12 ‘Truth’ messages, and judgments on the 12 ‘Lie’ messages. The same method of aggregation 
was followed in order to create the constructs for the Confidence scores. This created a mean score 
for the Confidence Total construct (the mean confidence score indicated by the receivers over all of 
the messages). Thus in aggregate the confidence scores ranged between 0 and 100. Combinations of 
the Confidence scores followed the same logic as the above, additionally creating a Confidence 
Truth and a Confidence Lie construct.  
 
The constructs are described separately below. The average scores on the constructs concerned 
with the veracity judgments are described first. After which the constructs concerned with the 
confidence scores are described. The constructs that were created regarding the senders’ gender and 
race are not considered here as they would add nothing to the current description except for adding 
an unnecessary layer of complexity. 
 
5.2.2.1. Veracity construct.   
The mean of the receivers’ Total score on the veracity message was 0.525 (SD = 0.104). A high 
Total score implies that the receivers were more accurate in making veracity judgments, a low score 
implies that the receivers were less accurate. The mean of the receivers’ Truth scores was 0.552 (SD 
= 0.192). A high Truth score implies that the receivers were more correct in making truthful 
judgments, a low score implies that the receivers made less correct judgments. Finally, in terms of 
the Lie construct, the mean score was 0.499 (SD = 0.17). A high Lie score implies that the receivers 
were more correct in making deception judgments, a low score implies that the receivers made less 
correct judgments (Table 5.3). This is also indicated visually in Figure 5.1. 
 
The mean of the receivers’ correct scores for the truthful example video was 0.359 (SD = 
0.484). 
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Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Veracity Constructs as Scored by the Receivers 
Construct M SD n Minimum Maximum Median Mode Range 
Total 0.5254 0.1036 64 0.25 0.75 0.5208 0.5833 0.5 
Truth 0.5521 0.1916 64 0.0833 0.9167 0.5833 0.5833 0.8333 
Lie 0.4987 0.1703 64 0.0833 1 0.5 0.4167 0.9167 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Average frequency of receivers making correct veracity judgments 
 
5.2.2.2. Confidence construct. 
The mean of the receivers’ ‘Confidence Total’ score was 67.891 (SD = 19.183). The mean of the 
receivers’ ‘Confidence Truth’ score was 67.565 (SD = 18.547). The mean of the receivers’ 
‘Confidence Lie’ scores was 68.216 (SD = 20.435) (Table 5.4). High ‘Confidence’ scores indicate 
that receivers were more confident in their ability to correctly judge the senders’ messages, whereas 
low ‘Confidence’ scores indicate less confidence. This is also indicated visually in Figure 5.2. 
 
The mean of the receivers’ ‘Confidence’ score relating to their veracity answers concerning the 
truthful example video was 67.66 (SD = 24.35). 
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Table 5.4 Descriptive Statistics of the Confidence Constructs as Scored by the Receivers 
Construct M SD n Minimum Maximum Median Mode Range 
Confidence 
Total 67.8906 19.183 64 23.75 100 68.3333 45.8333 76.25 
Confidence 
Truth 67.5651 18.5469 64 20.8333 100 69.1667 51.6667 79.1667 
Confidence 
Lie 68.2162 20.435 64 21.6667 100 70 78.3333 78.3333 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Average confidence on deception judgments as reported by the receivers 
 
5.3. Inferential Statistics  
As described in the method chapter, the analytical approach in this study used inferential statistics 
to compare and correlate the variables. The results are described according to the research 
questions. This eases the effort of reading this chapter, as well as provides a clear indication of the 
argument followed throughout this study.  
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The data were analysed at a 5% level of significance. Normality of the distribution of means 
were tested with a Shapiro Wilk’s test. According to Gerber and Hall (2015) data distributions that 
fall below a significance value of 0.01 should not be considered as normal. This assumption was 
only violated during one instance, which was mentioned and discussed during the relevant analysis. 
Homogeneity of variance is tested by making use of Levene’s test. If Levene’s test fell below a 
significance value of 0.01 the variance is considered not to be homogeneous (Field, 2009). 
 
5.3.1. Research Question 1: Are second language speakers more likely than chance to 
be judged as deceptive? 
5.3.1.1. One sample t-test. 
A One sample t-test was conducted to see if the average scores of the three constructs (Total, Truth, 
Lie) deviated significantly from chance (0.5). The Total mean score did not deviate significantly 
from the hypothetical chance mean, t (63) = 1.961; p = 0.054, d = 0.494. However, the construct did 
measure just above the 0.05 significance cut off used within the current study. The Truth mean 
score (0.552) deviated significantly from the hypothetical chance mean (0.5), t (63) = 2.175; p = 
0.033, d = 0.548. The Lie mean score (0.499), did not deviate significantly from the hypothetical 
chance mean (0.5), t (63) = -0.061; p = 0.951 (Table 5.5). In sum, these results suggest that 
receivers were generally truth biased.  
 
Table 5.5 One-Sample T-Test Comparing the Veracity Constructs to Chance 
Construct t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Total 1.961 63 .054 .025391 -.00048 .051261 
Truth 2.175* 63 .033 .052083 .004226 .099941 
Lie -.061 63 .951 -.001302 -.043832 .041228 
Note: * = p ≤ .05  
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5.3.1.2. Pearson correlations. 
There was no significant correlation between the receivers’ Total and Confidence Total mean 
scores, r = 0.008, N = 64, p = 0.953. There was no significant correlation between the receivers’ 
Truth, and the Confidence Truth mean scores, r = -0.158, N = 64, p = 0.213. There was no 
significant correlation between the receivers’ Lie, and the Confidence Lie mean scores, r = 0.206, N 
= 64, p = 0.103. In sum, these results suggest that the receivers’ veracity judgments and confidence 
in their judgments were not related.  
 
5.3.2. Research Questions 2 and 4 (Gender and language status of receivers). 
5.3.2.1. ANOVAS. 
An ANOVA was used to test for the possible differences between the means of receivers’ veracity 
judgments (Total, Truth, Lie), in addition to confidence scores (Confidence Total, Confidence 
Truth, Confidence Lie), as influenced by their gender and language status. Due to the limited 
response-rate described earlier, the receiver’s race was removed as a variable from this analysis.  
 
- Veracity Judgments 
The results indicate that there were no significant differences as a result of the gender and language 
status of receivers with regards to their Total mean scores, F (1,63) = 3.236, p = 0.077. There were 
no significant differences as a result of the interaction between the receivers’ gender and language 
status in terms of their Truth mean scores, F (1,63) = 0.609, p = 0.438. When considering the 
gender and language status variables separately, only the receiver’s language status tested as 
significant in this measure F (1,63) = 8.067, p = 0.006, d = 0.7075 (Table 5.6). This indicates that 
there was a difference in the way that first language speakers judged the truthful messages (M = 
0.605), and how the second language receivers judged the truthful messages (M = 0.474) (Figure 
5.3).  
 
There were no significant differences as a result of the interaction between the receiver’s gender 
and language status in terms of their Lie mean scores, F (1,63) = 1.826, p = 0.182. When 
considering the gender and language status variables separately, a significant difference was found 
as a result of the receivers’ language status, F (1,63) = 4.052, p = 0.049, d = -0.5185, just below the 
significance threshold (0.05) (Table 5.7). This indicates that there was a difference in the way that 
first language speakers judged the deceptive messages (M = 0.46), and how the second language 
receivers judged the deceptive messages (M = 0.55) (Figure 5.3).  
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The implication of these results are that the gender of the receivers did not seem to influence 
their accuracy or bias of their veracity judgments. The receivers’ language status did not seem to 
influence their level of accuracy in terms of their veracity judgments. However, first language 
English speakers had a tendency to correctly judge truthful messages as truthful, more often than 
correctly judging deceptive messages, suggesting that they were truth biased. Whereas second 
language English speakers had a tendency to correctly judge deceptive messages as deceptive, more 
often than correctly judging truthful messages, suggesting that they were lie biased.  
 
 
Figure 5.3 Average correct veracity judgments by receivers according to their language status 
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Table 5.6 ANOVA Measuring the Difference between Gender and Language Status on the Truth 
Construct 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model .287 3 .096 2.838 .045* .124 
Intercept 17.859 1 17.859 529.143 .000 .898 
Gender .006 1 .006 .165 .686 .003 
Language Status .272 1 .272 8.067 .006* .119 
Gender * Language 
Status 
.021 1 .021 .609 .438 .010 
Error 2.025 60 .034    
Total 21.819 64     
Corrected Total 2.313 63     
Note: * = p ≤ .05 
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Table 5.7 ANOVA Measuring the Difference between Gender and Language Status on the Lie 
Construct 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model .242 3 .081 3.048 .035* .132 
Intercept 15.657 1 15.657 592.781 .000 .908 
Gender .093 1 .093 3.537 .065 .056 
Language Status .107 1 .107 4.052 .049* .063 
Gender * Language 
Status 
.048 1 .048 1.826 .182 .030 
Error 1.585 60 .026    
Total 17.743 64     
Corrected Total 1.826 63     
Note: * = p ≤ .05 
 
- Confidence scores 
The results indicate that there were no significant differences as a result of the gender and language 
status of receivers with regards to their Confidence Total mean scores, F (1,63) = 0.0144, p = 0.905. 
There were no significant differences as a result of the receivers’ gender and language status in 
terms of their Confidence Truth mean scores, F (1,63) = 0.000, p = 0.995. There were no significant 
differences as a result of the receiver’s gender and language status in terms of their Confidence Lie 
mean scores, F (1,63) = 0.048, p = 0.828. The implications of these results are that neither the 
gender, nor the language status, of the receivers seemed to influence their confidence in their 
veracity judgments. 
 
5.3.3. Research Question 2: Is there a difference in judgments or confidence when the 
gender of the sender is taken into account? 
This section is concerned with the influence of senders’ gender on the receivers’ mean veracity 
judgments, and confidence scores. As measuring the effect that the gender of receivers had on their 
veracity judgments, and confidence scores, was answered by the results of the ANOVAS described 
above.  
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5.3.3.1. Dependent t-tests. 
A Dependent t-test was conducted to test if there was a significant difference between the receivers’ 
mean scores as a result of the gender of the senders in the recorded videos. This test was conducted 
because the difference in mean scores in relation to the two groups of senders (Female and Male) 
would depend on judgments from each of the receivers.   
 
There was no significant difference between the Female and Male Total mean scores, t (63) = 
0.434; p = 0.666. There was no significant difference between the Female and Male Truth mean 
scores, t (63) = -1.332; p = 0.188. There was no significant difference between the Female and Male 
Lie mean scores, t (63) = 1.834; p = 0.071. In sum, these results suggest that the gender of the 
senders did not influence the veracity judgments of the receivers.  
 
5.3.3.2. Pearson correlations. 
There was no significant correlation between the Females’ Total and Confidence Total mean scores, 
r = -0.004, N = 64, p = 0.977. There was no significant correlation between the Males’ Total and 
Confidence Total mean scores, r = -0.25, N = 64, p = 0.845. In sum, these results suggest that the 
gender of the senders did not influence the confidence that receivers placed on their accuracy.  
 
5.3.4. Research Question 3: Is there a difference in judgments or confidence when the 
race of the sender is taken into account? 
The effect that the race of receivers had on their veracity judgments, and confidence scores, could 
not be investigated due to sampling limitations. This would have formed part of the ANOVAS 
described above. This section is concerned with the influence of senders’ race on the receivers’ 
mean veracity judgments, and confidence scores. 
 
5.3.4.1. Dependent t-tests. 
A Dependent t-test was conducted to test if there was a significant difference between the receivers’ 
mean scores as a result of the race of the senders in the recorded videos. This test was conducted 
because the difference in mean scores in relation to the two groups of senders (Black and White) 
would depend on judgments from each of the receivers.    
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There was no significant difference between the Black and White Total mean scores, t (63) = 
0.286; p = 0.776. There was no significant difference between the Black and White Truth mean 
scores, t (63) = -1.68; p = 0.098. There was a significant difference between the Black and White 
Lie mean scores, t (63) = 2.851; p = 0.006, d = 0.3766 (Table 5.8). This indicated that there as a 
difference between means scores of the judgments made on deceptive messages of black senders (M 
= 0.536) and the deceptive messages of white senders (M = 0.461). However, this test violated the 
assumption of normality as indicated by the Shapiro-Wilk test that was found to be significant p = 
0.003 (Table 5.9). Consequently, a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test was performed on these results and 
again found a significant relationship, z = -2.845, p = 0.004. In sum, these results suggest that the 
race of the senders for the most part did not influence the veracity judgments of the receivers. 
However, there was a tendency to judge black senders as more deceptive (lie bias).  
 
Table 5.8 Paired Sample t-Test by Sender Race 
Pair Constructs t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Pair 1 Black Total - White Total .286 63 .776 
Pair 2 Black Truth - White Truth -1.680 63 .098 
Pair 3 Black Lie - White Lie 2.851 63 .006* 
Note: * = p ≤ .05 
 
Table 5.9 Shapiro-Wilk Test for the Paired t-Test by Sender Race (Table 5.8) 
Pair Constructs W P 
Pair 3 Black Lie - White Lie 0.939 0.003* 
Note: * = p ≤ .01 
 
5.3.4.2. Pearson correlations. 
There was no significant correlation between the Black Total and Black Confidence Total mean 
scores, r = -0.052, N = 64, p = 0.684. There was no significant correlation between the White Total 
and White Confidence Total mean scores, r = 0.083, N = 64, p = 0.515. In sum, these results 
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suggest that the race of the senders did not influence the confidence that receivers placed on their 
accuracy.  
 
5.4. Content Analysis   
5.4.1. Research Question 5: What are the perceived deceptive cues that receivers 
looked for to base their veracity judgments?   
As described in the method chapter, a Content Analysis was conducted in order to discover which 
nonverbal cues influenced the veracity judgments of receivers. The cues that were reported by the 
receivers were coded according to the behaviours that were described. A total of 41 codes were 
used to describe various aspects of nonverbal displays that were observed. Each code was used only 
once per relevant description. Therefore, even if receivers mentioned the same display more than 
once, the code was only used for the instance as a whole. The codes were mutually exclusive, 
meaning that each code only described one aspect that was of concern, with some exceptions 
described below. In addition, several categories of codes were also created. These categories are 
referred to as ‘Nonverbal behaviours’, ‘Strategic observations’, and ‘Vocal indicators’. Within this 
analysis only the codes that were used most often are considered in the description, after which each 
of the categories is described.  
 
From the responses, almost all of the receivers claimed to look at more than one behavioural 
cue. These instances were coded as ‘multiple cues’. However, this code does not form part of the 
discussion, because it was not mentioned directly by receivers. Instead it is used to supplement the 
argument around the other coded behaviours later in the discussions.  
 
An examination of the specific codes that were assigned revealed that four codes made up the 
bulk of the reported cues. The terms that were mentioned the most was in relation to the code ‘Body 
language’. This code was assigned where receivers made direct use of the terms ‘body language’, 
‘body movement’, ‘mannerisms’, ‘behaviour’ or ‘body gestures’. The second most frequently coded 
terms referred to the senders’ eyes. Receivers made references to ‘eye movements’, ‘eyes’, ‘looking 
around a lot’, in addition to references to where the senders’ looked, or the amount of movements 
the senders’ eyes made. Of these receivers, a small portion specifically referred to looking at the 
senders’ ‘Eye contact’. The third code focussed on terms referring to the senders’ ‘Facial 
expression’, and were coded for terms referring to the senders’ ‘faces’, ‘facial expressions’, ‘facial 
features’, and ‘focus on the lips’. Form the receivers, who mentioned that they looked at facial 
expressions, or the face of receivers, some specifically mentioned ‘smiling’, ‘smirk’, ‘looking 
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serious’, ‘feigning emotions’, or that they looked at the senders’ ‘eyebrows’. Finally, the action 
referred to frequently by receivers were in relation to the senders’ ‘hands’. These references were 
coded for ‘hands’, ‘hand movements’, amount of ‘hand movements’, ‘fingers’. From the codes on 
‘Hand movements’, specific references to ‘Hand gestures’ were additionally made (Table 5.10).  
 
Table 5.10 Content Analysis (Most Frequent) 
 
 
Although the following nine cues were not used frequently, they provided relevant explanations 
for believed deceptive cues. The coded behaviours (not in order of frequency) were in relation to 
the senders’ ‘confidence (behavioural)’, if they ‘smiled’, and whether or not they ‘fidgeted’. More 
strategic methods were also mentioned, in that receivers claimed to look for signs relating to the 
code ‘cognitive load’, in that senders appeared to think too deliberately about a topic. Receivers 
also made use of the baseline video, as some mentioned that they compared the senders’ behaviour 
to the baseline. Others stated that they looked for evidence of behavioural change, amount of detail 
in the stories, if the stories made sense, and finally some made a vague reference to the sender’s 
‘descriptions’ in terms of the story details (Table 5.11). 
 
Table 5.11 Content Analysis (Relatively Frequent) 
 
 
Code Frequency
Body language
Looking at the eyes
            Eye contact
Facial expression
            Smiling
Hand movements
            Hand gestures
Code Frequency
Logical flow
Compare to baseline
Behavioural changes
Description
Fidgeting
Confidence (Behaviour)
Cognitive load
Smiling
Story Detail
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Cues that were mentioned the least (of those included in this description) included: Movements / 
actions of the senders’ legs, as well as their composure. Judgments were made, by the receivers, as 
to whether the senders’ behaviours matched the story that they were telling. Audible cues that were 
considered included the number of pauses, how confident they sounded, as well as the pace and 
tone of the senders’ voice (Table 5.12). A full list of codes can be found in Appendix K. 
 
Table 5.12 Content Analysis (Least Frequent) 
 
 
5.4.1.1. Categories. 
In terms of the overall codes, most could be divided into one of three categories, which are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. These can be referred to as: ‘Nonverbal behaviours’, ‘Strategic 
observations’, and ‘Vocal indicators’. Nonverbal behaviours refer to those behaviours that could be 
seen by the receivers. Strategic observations included those descriptions where the receivers used 
the information that they had access to, not as a passive observer, but rather more actively. These 
included comparing the senders’ behaviours between the baseline video and the veracity message, 
or judging if their behaviours matched the stories that they were telling. Finally, Vocal indicators 
include cues such as ‘pauses’ and ‘voice tone’, specifically those behaviours that could be heard 
(Table 5.13). These categories are elaborated on below. 
 
Table 5.13 Categories of Nonverbal Cues Related to Deception  
 
 
This analysis seemed to indicate that the ‘Nonverbal behaviours’ of senders, which comprised 
the visual observations of receivers, were the most influential (according to the claims of receivers) 
(Table 5.13). The four codes that were mentioned the most in this study were classified as 
Code Frequency
Leg movements
Pauses (Voice)
Composure
Behaviour matching the story
Confidence (Voice)
Speech pace
Tone of voice
Names Frequency 
Nonverbal behaviours
Strategic observations 
Vocal indicators
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nonverbal behaviours, namely: ‘Body language’, ‘Eyes’, ‘Facial expressions’, and actions relating 
to the senders’ ‘Hands’. Other behaviours that were also found to be important were related to 
‘Fidgeting’, ‘Confidence (Behavioural)’, ‘Smiling’, and behaviours that were related to the senders’ 
‘Legs’. Behavioural cues mentioned less often within this category were in relation to senders’ 
‘Composure’, ‘Body posture’, and if their movements could be described as ‘Strained’. Although 
other nonverbal behaviours were additionally mentioned (see Appendix K), the above codes were 
used most often.  
 
Receivers in this study further took an approach to deception detection that can be described as 
strategic, which was combined into the second most coded category (Table 5.13). The frequency 
counts for this category did not include the code concerned with multiple cues. The main reason for 
this decision was that it was not actively mentioned by the receivers. Codes used specifically for 
this category were in relation to how logical the receivers perceived the message to be (if it made 
sense), or comparing the senders’ behaviour between the baseline and veracity messages. In 
addition, receivers actively judged if the senders’ behaviour changed through the messages. 
Receivers made judgments on the descriptions, or looked for evidence of ‘Cognitive load’. This also 
included if the senders’ behaviours matched the story that they told (i.e. behaving the way that the 
receivers expected, in relation to their description). Other codes, which additionally provided an 
indication of ‘Strategic observations’, related to judging the length of the story, or the timeline that 
was followed, as well as making use of more than one behavioural cue (not included in the 
frequency table above). Moreover, one receiver recognised the content of a truthful description, and 
based their judgment on their additional contextual information.  
 
Vocal cues were coded the least (Table 5.13). These cues referred to: ‘Pauses’, how 
‘Confidence (Voice)’ the senders sounded, the ‘Pace’ at which they spoke, or the ‘Tone’ of their 
voice. To a lesser extent receivers mentioned cues that referred to the ‘Vocabulary use’, the 
‘Volume’ of the senders’ voices, speech fillers, and voice pitch. Some of the least coded beliefs that 
were mentioned considered if the story seemed ‘strained’ or if the sender stuttered.  
 
5.5. Conclusion  
This chapter provides a description of the results obtained from the analysed data. In accomplishing 
this goal, the chapter starts by describing the response-rate and demographical information of 
receivers, as well as the relevant descriptive statistics of the constructs that were created to answer 
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the four research questions. The results were then described. In order to improve the legibility of 
this chapter the results are discussed in the order set out by the research questions.  
 
The first four research questions’ answers were analysed by making use of inferential statistics. 
The results from Question 1 indicated that receivers made more correct truth judgments on truthful 
messages than was predicted by chance. The findings regarding Question 2 did not find differences 
between receiver judgments and the gender of either receivers or senders. The answers to Question 
3 could not be fully explored due to a limited sample size. However, a slight difference was found 
in the way that receivers made judgments on the deceptive messages of black and white senders. 
This suggested that a lie bias was present. However, the analysis violated the assumption of 
normality, and a Wilcoxon Signed rank test was conducted which confirmed the result. The results 
pertaining to the fourth research question found that there was not a difference between Total 
constructs of first and second language receivers. However, first language receivers were more 
likely to make more truth judgments, and second language receivers performed closer to chance on 
both the truthful and deceptive messages. This suggests that the language status of the receivers did 
not seem to affect their judgment accuracy (Total score). But, there was an influence on the way 
that the truthful and deceptive messages were judged.  
 
The discussion relating to the final research question contained the explanation of the Content 
Analysis that was conducted. It was found that receivers mostly provided vague descriptions of 
‘body language’, the ‘eyes’, the ‘facial expressions’ and actions concerning senders’ ‘hands’. It was 
also possible to group the cues into three more general categories. These categories are referred to 
in order of most mentioned to least; ‘Nonverbal behaviours’, ‘Strategic observations’, and ‘Vocal 
indicators’.   
 
The following chapter interprets these findings within the larger context of deception detection 
literature, the South African context, as well as considering methodological influences and 
limitations. The discussion chapter follows a similar pattern as the results chapter in order to discuss 
findings relevant to each of the research questions. The discussion concludes this dissertation with 
an elaboration on possible recommendation for future studies. 
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Chapter 6 – Discussion  
 
6.1. Introduction 
The overall purpose of this study was to explore the possibility of a lie bias towards second 
language speakers within the context of South Africa: Thus augmenting the literature within the 
field of deception studies, in addition to providing results relevant to the South African context. 
Answers to the research questions in the current study can therefore be used to inform future 
studies, or provide a possible indication of areas where caution needs to be taken in the 
interpretations of deception judgments. This exploration was guided by making use of IDT as a 
theoretical framework, in addition to an examination of results of previous studies in this field. 
From these sources overarching hypotheses were developed that were subsequently tested and 
answered (see below).  
 
The current chapter interprets the answers obtained from the data analyses, as well as the 
literature review, in order to provide coherent answers for the research questions. Towards this goal, 
this chapter follows a similar format as the previous chapter, and starts by discussing some of the 
relevant issues regarding the response-rate and the biographical information. Subsequently findings 
from each of the research questions are discussed in light of the theoretical framework and literature 
review. This discussion begins by providing an answer to the overall research question (Are second 
language speakers more likely than chance to be judged as deceptive?). This is followed by the 
answers to each of the succeeding questions. This dissertation concludes with an outline of the 
limitations of the study and recommendations for future work within this topic field. 
 
6.2. Response-Rate and Biographical Information 
The response-rate for the current study was 0.64% (64 of the total 10,000 emails sent), far below 
what was expected. From the 64 receivers who replied, all were between the ages of 18 and 44, 
which was within the selection criteria for the sample. Age was, however, not used as a variable in 
the data analyses of the current study, as described in the method chapter. From the literature 
review, it was not expected that age would have an effect on deception judgments, although it 
remains an avenue for further research within this context. In terms of the gender of receivers, the 
sample were divided into female participants (48.4%) and male participants (51.6%). This was 
considered sufficient to make use of the desired parametric tests to indicate if there was a difference 
in deception detection accuracy, or bias, due to the gender of the receivers. However, the variable 
considering the racial identification of the receivers did not receive the desired attention within this 
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study due to the limited responses. The self-reported language status of the receivers was divided 
into first language speakers (59.4%), and second language speakers (40.6%). A parametric test was 
used to indicate if there was a difference in the deception detection accuracy, or bias, due to the 
language status of the receivers. In terms of the response-rate it appeared that issues relating to 
access, or interest, in the survey could have influenced participation. This poses a limitation on the 
current study, and is thus elaborated on more thoroughly within the limitations section. In addition, 
the very low response-rate requires the reader to be cautious in interpreting the results found by this 
study, as an increased sample size could have resulted in different findings. 
 
Several constructs were also described in the initial section of the results chapter that was 
broadly concerned with the receivers’ veracity judgments and confidence. The average of the score 
relating to the Total veracity construct was 0.525, close to the 0.5 score, as alluded to in the 
literature review. Furthermore, the receivers in the current study seemed to be truth biased towards 
the senders. This finding is discussed more thoroughly below, as it forms the foundation of 
answering the first research question. When examining the receivers’ confidence scores relating to 
all the messages (Confidence Total), the truthful messages (Confidence Truth) and the deceptive 
messages (Confidence Lie), it was found that these three confidence constructs were consistently 
between 67%-68%. Because of the lack of variance between the scores, no significant differences 
were found between the various combinations in the results. Therefore, this aspect of the data is not 
included in this discussion, because it does not add value to this research project. However, what 
could be derived was that the receivers consistently reported to be moderately confident in their 
ability to detect deception.  
 
The research questions are discussed below in the order in which they were asked. The first 
research question, which addresses the possibility of a lie bias towards second language speakers, is 
therefore, discussed first. This is followed by the discussions of the research questions that consider 
the possibility of differences ascribed to gender (research question 2), race (research question 3), 
and the first or second language status of the receivers (research question 4). Research question 
five, which considers the observed deception cues as mentioned by the receivers, discusses the 
findings in relation to previous studies. This chapter concludes with the limitations and 
recommendations for future work.  
 
6.3. Research Questions 
This section of the discussion chapter focusses on the answers provided in the results chapter, and 
places those findings within the context of the wider literature as described throughout this study. 
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However, as mentioned above, the results relating to receivers’ confidence are not discussed. The 
confidence scores throughout this study were consistently high enough to suggest that the receivers 
felt confident in their ability to make veracity judgments. This finding provides evidence contrary to 
the hypothesis predicted by the current study. The hypothesis predicted that receivers would be less 
confident when making judgments on deceptive messages, which was not the case according to the 
findings of this study. Nonetheless, in line with previous literature (Solodukhin, 2015; Vrij et al., 
2010; Vrij & Mann, 2001) these scores were also consistently found not to be significantly related 
to the veracity judgments. This suggests that receivers consistently overestimated their own ability 
to make correct judgments. This does not however suggest that the receivers’ confidence scores 
were not influenced by confounding variables. These may become more apparent in studies with 
larger sample sizes, or those making use of scaled veracity question as suggested by Burgoon 
(2015).  
 
In continuation of this discussion, the research questions are answered sequentially. The 
dissertation concludes with a discussion on the limitations found during the investigation, as well as 
recommendations for further studies. These, which are also placed within the context of South 
Africa, emphasise the results that were obtained from this study.   
 
6.3.1. Research Question 1: Are second language speakers more likely than chance to 
be judged as deceptive? 
The first research question investigated if second language speakers would be judged as deceptive 
more often than by chance. The hypotheses made two distinct assumptions. This first was that the 
accuracy of receivers would not differ significantly from chance. This hypothesis was based on 
previous arguments, as discussed in the second and third chapters, and was supported by the results 
from the current study. The second was that receivers would be less confident when making 
judgments on deceptive messages, however this prediction was not confirmed in the current study.   
 
As previous research suggests it may be possible to detect deception from behavioural displays, 
however this is not a simple process. Some of these studies suggest that there are differences 
between the behaviours of senders when telling a truthful story versus telling a deceptive story 
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Porter & ten Brinke, 2010; ten Brinke et al., 2012). Another study also 
indicated a difference in these two veracity conditions between senders speaking in their first 
language as compared to their second language (Caldwell-Harris & Ayçiçeği-Dinn, 2009). 
However, differences in behaviour, as a result of first and second language speech, was not 
consistently found in deception studies (Castillo, 2011). The above findings suggested the 
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possibility that deception, as well as speaking a second language, could have an observable 
behavioural difference. 
 
As indicated in the results chapter this study found that the accuracy (Total construct) of 
receivers did not deviate significantly from chance. This was in line with the expectations of the 
current study, in that the receivers were not more accurate than dictated by chance. This has been 
found to be a common theme in deception literature (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Morgan et al., 2013; 
O’Sullivan, 2003; Wright et al., 2012), which additionally translated into studies which investigated 
second language speakers (Da Silva & Leach, 2013; Evans & Michael, 2014; Leach & Da Silva, 
2013; Snelling, 2013; Solodukhin, 2015). An unexpected result of this study was that the receivers 
were truth biased towards the second language senders. This truth bias was measured with the Truth 
construct score, which was found to be significantly higher than chance. The effect size, which was 
measured in this instance was low to medium. A low effect size indicates that the significant 
difference was weak, thus the scores might not be useful in practice, as it remains close to chance. 
The truth bias found in the current study was also in line with previous literature considering second 
language speakers (Snelling, 2013; Solodukhin, 2015), as well as those that did not consider second 
language as a factor (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Morgan et al., 2013; O’Sullivan, 2003). The truth bias 
that was found in this study however, also seems to contradict some studies that investigated 
deception with second language speakers. Previous studies, which considered second language 
speakers, revealed a lie bias (Castillo, 2011; Da Silva & Leach, 2013; Evans & Michael, 2014), this 
was not supported by the current findings. In addition, the correct judgments on deceptive messages 
(Lie construct), which could suggest a lie bias, did not significantly differ from chance. This is 
consistent with some findings from second language studies (Leach & Da Silva, 2013). The results 
from the current study seem to confirm the typical results found in deception research as reported 
by previous studies that did not include second language speakers (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Morgan 
et al., 2013; O’Sullivan, 2003). Thus, the findings supported the first hypothesis, in that the 
receivers’ judgments were not measured to be more accurate than chance. Furthermore, the findings 
suggest that a truth bias was present in the judgments of the second language speakers. However, 
findings did not support the second hypothesis as no difference was found between the Confidence 
Truth scores, and Confidence Lie scores. A difference may however become apparent if larger 
samples are used. 
 
The finding which indicates that receivers were truth biased, seems to be consistent with the 
theoretical assumptions made by this study. IDT makes the assumption that receivers will usually 
be truth biased. Furthermore, there needs to be an event that elicits suspicion before receivers 
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consider the possibility that senders might be lying. There could be behavioural indicators that they 
associate with lies, for example, inconsistent information. Thus, it could be argued that the reason 
why receivers were not successful in making veracity judgments is because they did not recognise 
deceptive cues (Burgoon & Buller, 2014).  
 
As described in the method chapter, the first research question technically provides an answer 
for the entire purpose of the current study. However, in taking into account the rich context of South 
Africa, the impacts of other variables are also of interest to possibly provide more detail within this 
context. These variables are discussed below in order to answer each of the remaining research 
questions.   
 
6.3.2. Research Question 2: Is there a difference in judgments or confidence when the 
gender of the receiver / sender is taken into account? 
The second research question attempted to discover if there was a potential bias that can be 
attributed to the gender of either the senders or receivers. Previous literature reports mixed findings 
in this regard. Literature, which investigated the gender difference in the ability to read nonverbal 
behaviour, suggests that a gender bias could be evident in deception studies. Literature, in this 
regard, suggests that different gender roles, gender socialisation, and motivation may play a role in 
deception detection (Baron et al., 2009; Hodges et al., 2011). However, other studies found that 
these factors only ‘seem to indicate’ a gender bias, and that these differences are not evident in 
deception detection research (Hall, 2011; Remland, 2009). Based on these studies, as well as those 
discussed later, the hypothesis was that there would not be a significant effect because of the gender 
of the participants. 
 
Findings from the current study supported the predicted hypothesis, in that gender did not seem 
to affect the results. As indicated in the results chapter, the gender of the receivers did not appear to 
have any significant effect on receivers’ level of accuracy (Total construct), or bias (Truth and Lie 
constructs). These results are consistent with findings from various previous studies (Aamodt & 
Custer, 2006; Heijboer et al., n.d.; Levitan, An, et al., 2015; Levitan, Levine, et al., 2015; 
Solodukhin, 2015). However, this did not support results from Tilley et al. (2005) who found that 
the accuracy of women was higher, than that of men, in detecting deception on electronic media 
platforms. This could possibly suggest that different mechanisms are in place during this type of 
detection task, which is more in tune with the perception of women. Nonetheless, more research 
within the South African context is needed in order to provide a clearer contextualised picture in 
this field.    
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With regard to the gender of senders, the results from the current study did not find significant 
differences in accuracy (Total construct), or bias (Truth and Lie constructs) of receivers. This 
supports existing literature (Levitan, An, et al., 2015; Levitan, Levine, et al., 2015; Tilley et al., 
2005). In contrast however, Heijboer et al. (n.d.) found that there was a lie bias against male 
senders, and a truth bias towards female senders. This was not evident within the current sample, 
although more research is needed within the South African context in order to gain more 
information on this matter. One avenue for future research on this specific topic could address 
gender differences in participants from different cultural backgrounds. This could provide evidence 
for, or against, the above argument of differences as a result of gender socialisation (Baron et al., 
2009; Hodges et al., 2011).  
 
6.3.3. Research Question 3: Is there a difference in judgments or confidence when the 
race of the receiver / sender is taken into account? 
The third research question was aimed at discovering if there would be a difference in accuracy or 
bias as a result of the sender or receiver’s race. Previous literature, in terms of this variable, 
suggests that receivers’ judgments are influenced by various potential stereotypes, which could lead 
to judgment biases. Vrij and Winkel (1991) found that the nonverbal behaviours of senders were 
different depending on the senders’ racial identification. According to their findings, behaviours 
that are associated with different racial identifications could also be mistakenly recognised as 
possible cues of deception. Their findings gained some support in the research of Vrij and Winkel 
(1994) that indicated that a lie bias was detected because the above-mentioned behaviours were 
mistaken for cues of deception. Identifiable racial indicators (e.g. skin colour, accent), was not 
found to be related to deception judgments. The authors suggested that a racial bias could become 
evident within countries with clearer racial prejudice (Vrij & Winkel, 1994). The hypothesis that 
guided this question predicted that the race of the senders and receivers would not have a significant 
effect on veracity judgments.  
 
Due to the limited response-rate, the analysis concerning the racial identification of the receivers 
could unfortunately not be conducted within the current study. Previous studies on this particular 
variable did not find a significant relationship between the receivers’ racial identification and their 
accuracy or bias (Solodukhin, 2015; Vrij & Winkel, 1994). However, stereotypical beliefs have 
been found to strongly influence decision making (Baron et al., 2009). Therefore, more research is 
needed in this area, and specifically in South Africa, in order to provide clearer results on this 
matter.  
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The results of the current study found that the racial identification of the senders did not 
significantly affect the accuracy (Total construct), or truth bias (Truth construct) of the receivers. 
However, a significant difference was found in the number of correct deception judgments that 
were made (Lie construct) in that black senders were judged as deceptive more often than white 
senders. However, the effect size was small with regards to this result, and deception judgments 
were close to chance (0.5), which is common in deception studies (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). 
Caution is advised for interpreting this result, as the assumption of normality of the data distribution 
was violated. In spite of this violation, a Wilcoxon sign-rank test confirmed a significant difference.  
 
These results thus partially support previous studies that examined the racial identification of 
participants. However, the findings did not seem to support the argument made by Lloyd (2015) 
that more accurate judgments would be made towards the dominant racial group. This is however, 
the opposite of what was found in this study, as both black participants (South African racial 
majority) and white participants (South African racial minority) (Statistics South Africa, 2012), 
were judged at chance level. Again, a larger sample could provide a clearer picture.  
 
6.3.4. Research Question 4: Is there a difference in judgments or confidence when the 
first- / second language status of the receiver is taken into account? 
The fourth research question investigated whether the receivers’ linguistic ability would influence 
their judgment accuracy or bias. Within this study, the receiver’s linguistic ability was measured by 
dividing the sample between first and second language English speakers. It was hypothesised that 
first language English speakers would be more accurate in their judgments based on the assumption 
that they would not have the additional cognitive burden of making sense of the messages that were 
delivered in English. This prediction is supported by IDT that maintains that increased cognitive 
demand distracts receivers from making correct interpretations (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). In 
addition, this would influence the number of truthful judgments receivers make as predicted by 
IDT’s first proposition (Burgoon & Buller, 2014).  
 
Findings relating to the fourth research question suggest that there was no difference in the level 
of accuracy (Total construct) between the first and second language receivers. This provides 
evidence that does not support the predictions made by the current study. Although interestingly, 
when considering the correct truthful judgments (Truth construct) and correct deceptive judgments 
(Lie construct) separately, there was a distinct difference between the first and second language 
receivers’ scores. This does not support the findings from Snelling (2013), who argued that the 
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linguistic ability of receivers does not make a significant difference. The results from the current 
study suggest that first language receivers were truth biased as they correctly judged 60.5% of the 
truthful messages, and 46% of the deceptive messages (Figure 5.3). This supports the findings 
found in previous studies that did not consider second language speakers (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). 
In contrast, second language receivers made judgments that suggested that they were lie biased as 
they made correct judgments on 47% of truthful messages, and 55% of deceptive messages (Figure 
5.3). This supports findings from some previous studies that focussed on second language speakers 
(Da Silva & Leach, 2013; Evans & Michael, 2014). The current findings, which considered the 
results from both first and second language receivers, furthermore support the results of the research 
by Cheng and Broadhurst (2005). As previously discussed Cheng and Broadhurst (2005) found that 
judgments, which included first language participants (both senders and receivers), tended to be 
more truth biased, whereas the condition that included second language participants (both senders 
and receivers) seemed to be more lie biased. These findings provide some evidence for the 
argument put forth by Lev-Ari and Keysar (2010) that the bias found in studies, that include 
accented speech, could occur because of an increase in the receiver’s cognitive load.   
 
As described throughout this dissertation, Lev-Ari and Keysar (2010) contended that listening to 
someone who has an accent (specifically speaking in a second language), requires receivers to think 
more intensely about the message. This additional cognitive load, of the receiver, in turn influences 
their veracity judgment. According to their study, the authors found that when senders speak with a 
stronger accent (interpreted as causing more cognitive load), the receivers tended to make more 
deceptive judgments (Lev-Ari & Keysar, 2010). Vrij and Winkel’s (1994) study also suggested that 
the fluency and the style in which participants spoke affected the way that judgments were made.   
 
Interpersonal Deception Theory maintains that receivers’ judgments are influenced by their own 
cognitive load. This could lead to more biased judgments due to the amount of information they 
already need to manage (Burgoon et al., 2008). From the argument made earlier in this study, this 
effect could lead to increased stereotypical beliefs, as suggested by the research results of Biernat et 
al. (2003). Although the current study was not able to measure stereotypical beliefs, the anecdotal 
evidence does suggest that this type of bias becomes more possible, or evident, during second 
language encounters. The evidence from the current study suggests that cognitive load influences 
the judgment bias of receivers. However, the analyses did not find evidence for the fundamental 
attribution bias, as this could arguably have indicated stronger differences because of the gender or 
race of participants (Gilbert, 1989). Even though the results from the current study do not provide 
evidence to support an argument for the fundamental attribution bias, it becomes a possibility that 
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warrants further investigation within deception studies. Particularly those studies that involve 
second language speakers, or situations where receivers experience higher cognitive load than 
normal (O’Sullivan, 2003).   
 
Results from Sweeney and Ceci (2014) provide some evidence to support the argument that 
increased cognitive load affects judgment bias. Although their study was specifically concerned 
with age differences, their sample allowed for some interpretation with regards to the effects of 
cognitive load. As reported earlier, the authors found that older participants’ performance was lower 
on some of the deception detection tasks. The current study argues that this could provide evidence 
for the effects that cognitive load has on receivers. This is mainly driven by the association that has 
been found between old age and decline in cognitive abilities (Louw & Louw, 2009).   
 
Taking the above perspective into account, there are some assumptions that can be made about 
deception detection, which could in turn be applied to some of the previously discussed findings. 
The first assumption is that the receivers’ cognitive load can be increased by listening to accented 
speech (i.e. the sender is a second language speaker) as it requires greater cognitive processing than 
listening to a first language speaker (Lev-Ari & Keysar, 2010). As previous studies suggest, this 
could possibly become more evident in contexts where receivers are not accustomed to listening to 
second language speech (Da Silva & Leach, 2013; Leach & Da Silva, 2013; Snelling, 2013). 
Alternatively, the receiver’s cognitive load could be increased by her/him trying to make sense of a 
message that is in their own second language (receiver as second language speakers). The second 
assumption, is that the receivers’ cognitive load does not necessarily influence their judgment 
accuracy, but may influence their judgment bias as found in the current study (seemingly by making 
more deceptive judgments). Previously discussed findings, which provide some support for this 
assumption, found a lie bias towards second language speakers in that there were differences in the 
judgments made by receivers towards first and second language speakers. Within these studies 
(including the current study) it was suggested that speaking in a second language could increase the 
cognitive load of the senders, and therefore make them appear more deceptive. But these studies are 
also open to the current argument that the increased cognitive load experienced by the receivers 
listening in their own second language (Solodukhin, 2015), or by listening to the senders speaking 
in their second language (Da Silva & Leach, 2013; Evans & Michael, 2014; Leach & Da Silva, 
2013; Snelling, 2013), could have biased their judgments. These notions could have several 
implications for future research or methodological recommendations. These are discussed at the end 
of this chapter.  
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However, the above argument also provides some anecdotal implications for the Interpersonal 
Deception Theory. The updated version of IDT excluded a previous proposition that was seemingly 
not supported by studies within the field of deception detection. This proposition suggested that the 
communication skill of receivers would increase their deception detection accuracy (Burgoon & 
Buller, 2014). The proposition was removed because the meta-analysis by Bond and DePaulo 
(2008) found that there were no individual differences in the ability of receivers to detect deception 
(Burgoon & Buller, 2014). As mentioned on several occasions, the current study did not find any 
differences in judgment accuracy across the relevant research questions. However, the distinct 
difference in bias (truthful and deception judgments) alluded to above could suggest that receivers’ 
communication ability may be an influential factor within these interactions. This is suggested 
because the communication skill of receivers has the potential to assist them in managing the 
additional cognitive load experienced within these interactions, and thus might function to buffer 
the lie bias evident within the above results (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). However, more studies, 
using different methods of inducing cognitive load, are required to provide evidence for this 
argument and development of IDT.   
 
In contrast however, the studies conducted by Levitan, An, et al. (2015) and Levitan, Levine, et 
al. (2015) did not find a difference in the ability of first and second language senders or receivers, 
which could suggest that a mechanism, other than cognitive load, could be more influential in 
judgment bias. Snelling (2013) suggested that such a mechanism could be the familiarity that 
participants have with second language speech. While other authors suggest that increased cognitive 
load could increase the possibility of other biases influencing the receivers’ judgments (Vrij & 
Winkel, 1994). Although these arguments were not supported in the current study, they should form 
part of future investigations in order to provide a more comprehensive answer to the issue.  
 
Finally, some caution in interpreting these results needs to be reiterated. Within this study the 
sample of second language English speakers consisted mostly of receivers who spoke Afrikaans as 
a first language. This presents a possible bias within the sample of participants, as South Africa 
recognises 11 official languages (Statistics South Africa, 2012), and the majority of the second 
language English speaking group in this study consisted of only one language group. The argument 
made in answer to this research question is that the bias present in the findings is the result of higher 
cognitive load. Thus, even though the argument expects that the results would not be affected by 
any particular accent or language, caution is still advised in interpreting these results. 
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6.3.5. Research Question 5: What are the perceived deceptive cues that receivers 
looked for to base their veracity judgments? 
The fifth research question aimed to discover which behavioural cues were perceived as indicative 
of deception for this specific sample of receivers. As this study was based on the theoretical 
foundation of IDT, it shared the assumptions made by the theory. One assumption pertinent to this 
question is that there are no universal behavioural indicators of deception (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; 
Burgoon & Buller, 2014). However, the absence of universally diagnostic cues does not imply that 
there are no behavioural indicators of deception. This is because differences between honest and 
deceptive behaviours have been found (Castillo, 2011; DePaulo et al., 2003; Porter & ten Brinke, 
2010; ten Brinke et al., 2012). Rather it implies that these behavioural cues change over time. From 
this foundation one can extrapolate that there are no inherently correct beliefs about deceptive cues, 
however there are behavioural cues that are not related to deception. In addition, stereotypical 
beliefs about deception could lead to biased judgments, which might not affect the receivers’ 
judgment accuracy. Thus, biased beliefs could then further be influenced by stereotypical beliefs. 
Stereotypes (Vrij & Winkel, 1994), and false beliefs about deceptive behaviour may then involve, 
or be influenced by, behaviours that have been found not to be related to deception at all (Buller & 
Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & Buller, 2014). This justification for measuring beliefs about deceptive 
cues holds true even with the argument that there are no behaviours related to deception in any way, 
as put forth by Masip and Herrero (2015b). This is because behavioural cues could be used 
incorrectly to legitimise incorrect suspicions or accusations. Therefore, from the discussion above, 
this study expected to find that receivers would claim to base their judgments on behavioural cues 
that are stereotypically related to deception.  
 
In order to investigate this, a content analysis of the answers to the open question at the end of 
the survey, was conducted. As the answers provided by the receivers were quite short, the various 
cues that they looked at were coded only once per receiver. Thus, the degree of importance of a 
particular cue could not be determined as it was noted as to whether the cue was simply mentioned. 
However, the analysis did provide some measure on how relatively important these terms were to 
the sample of receivers as a whole. One of the advantages of this type of analysis is that it can 
provide a quick and understandable overview of a topic. However, the information from a content 
analysis can often be superficial, and lack the depth. This is because it is limited to recorded 
material, such a question asked in a survey, and cannot provide information beyond that question 
(Babbie, 2008).  
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As described in the fourth chapter, the results from the current study could unfortunately not be 
compared directly with the results of previous studies (Al-Simadi, 2000; Castillo, 2011; Global 
Deception Research Team, 2006; Hurley et al., 2014). The main reasons for this lack in 
comparative ability are twofold. The first reason is attributed to differences in codes used by Hurley 
et al. (2014), the Global Deception Research Team (2006) and those of the current study. The 
second reason is because a structured questionnaire of the deception cues was not used as reported 
in previous studies (Al-Simadi, 2000; Castillo, 2011; Global Deception Research Team, 2006; 
Hurley et al., 2014). Despite these limitations, some interpretation of the findings is however 
possible.   
 
The results from the content analysis suggested that there were 41 different types of 
observations made by the receivers in terms of potential deception cues. However, this discussion 
will not consider every code, as only a few behaviours were coded on enough occasions to warrant 
discussion for the purpose of the current study. Rather, only behaviours that were used frequently, 
or that had special interest for the current study, are discussed. The discussion of the various codes 
begins with the three most frequently mentioned cues. These related to: ‘body language’, ‘eyes’, 
and ‘facial expression’. The code that considers multiple cues is discussed later in this section as 
these cues were not directly mentioned by the receivers, but rather inferred when receivers claimed 
to look at more than one behaviour. After discussing the individual codes, the remaining discussion 
refers to three overall categories that could be created from the codes. These are ‘nonverbal 
behaviours’, ‘strategic observations’, and ‘vocal indicators’ in which behaviours could be classified 
(A complete list of the codes can be found in Appendix K). 
 
The code that was mentioned by most of the participants was ‘Body language’. By itself this 
coded behaviour does not refer to specific actions, although it might be used to legitimise intuitive 
beliefs about deception. There were some receivers who gave examples of what they meant, 
referring to actions such as gestures, or fidgeting (which were also coded as actions in themselves), 
where others used only vague descriptions. For this reason, this code requires further investigation 
to determine what participants meant by referring to ‘Body language’. One needs to consider if the 
receivers were referring to specific behaviours, their intuitive senses, or their own assumed 
experience in making veracity judgments. A deeper investigation needs to be undertaken to gain 
more clarity regarding the meaning of the concept of body language.  
 
An alternative explanation of the vague answers could be gained from the way in which the 
survey question was asked. The question asked what the receivers looked for to base their 
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judgments (Appendix H). In order to be more specific a short explanation, which provided a topic 
framework or the answer, was added to the question. The explanation read: “This could include the 
person's behaviour, believability of the story, etc. Please give as complete answer as possible” 
(Appendix H, p. 161). Because the explanation that was provided gave vague suggestions, it could 
have influenced the answers provided by the receivers. However, in their study on perceptions of 
deception cues the Global Deception Research Team (2006, p. 62) asked their participants: “How 
can you tell when people are lying”. In their analysis of the answers the code ‘Body movements’ 
was found in slightly more than 25% of their sample. Furthermore, in the study conducted by 
Hurley et al. (2014) unspecified beliefs around ‘body language’ were coded in 18.6% of the sample. 
This provides some evidence to the statement above that suggests that more in-depth studies are 
needed. This could possibly investigate if receivers look at specific behaviours, or take a more 
intuitive approach to lie detection.  
 
This analysis found that reference to sender’s eyes was the second most coded behaviour within 
this study. However, the receivers who mentioned eye behaviour in the current study seldom 
mentioned specific actions. Those actions that were mentioned the most related to holding eye 
contact, although receivers again seemed to prefer vague descriptions. In previous studies it was 
found that looking at the sender’s eyes did not provide strong evidence to support its relation to 
deception (DePaulo et al., 2003; Wiseman et al., 2012). This behaviour could thus potentially 
increase judgment bias. That being so, beliefs about behavioural cues that relate to the person’s eyes 
were found consistently in previous studies (Castillo, 2011; Global Deception Research Team, 
2006; Hurley et al., 2014) across multiple cultures. Research conducted by the Global Deception 
Research Team (2006), found a pervasive belief around the world that liars avert their gaze. In turn, 
Castillo (2011) found that beliefs about eye contact that seemed to be present across two different 
cultures (Columbian and Australian).  
 
The third most coded behaviour was in reference to the ‘Facial expressions’ of senders. Again, 
this comprised mostly vague references to behaviours that were not specifically mentioned. This 
was also found in the research conducted by Hurley et al. (2014). However, during the current study 
there were occasional references to ‘smirks’ or explicit references to facial features such as 
movements of the eyebrows or lips. Specific references to ‘smiling’, was also noted a number of 
times, consistent with previous studies (Hurley et al., 2014). Most of the receivers who noted 
‘smiling’ or ‘grinning’ also mentioned facial expressions, providing a little more specificity to the 
term. Previous studies indicated that smiling or smirks could be indicative of deception, notably 
‘duping delight’ as referred to by Ekman (2009). In addition, Castillo (2011) found that both 
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Colombian and Australian participants believed that senders smile more frequently when they are 
being deceptive than when they are telling the truth.  
 
In terms of the overall codes (including those described above) three categories were created. 
These were specifically in relation to ‘Nonverbal behaviours’, ‘Strategic observations’, and ‘Vocal 
indicators’. During the final literature review it was found that these categories shared similarities 
with those created in Hurley et al. (2014). The authors used exploratory factor analysis using survey 
data with regards to beliefs around deception. The themes created in this factor analysis were 
labelled “Emotion & Arousal”, “Nonverbal Behaviour”, and “Verbal Content” (Hurley et al., 2014, 
p. 27). Similarly, the codes relating to the themes that they found corresponded roughly to those in 
the current study. That is, if one considers that the codes relating to ‘Nonverbal Behaviour’ referred 
to behaviours that could be seen. Those relating to ‘Emotion and Arousal’ relate to the strategic 
observations in the current study (with some Vocal cues in the mix). Finally, those that related to 
‘Verbal Content’ needed to be heard (Hurley et al., 2014). These similarities provide some basis for 
comparison, although as stated earlier this type of direct comparison is methodologically 
problematic.  
 
From this analysis one might surmise that the behaviours that were believed to be more 
important were mentioned the most. In the current study these behaviours referred to the visual, 
‘Nonverbal behaviours’, that needed to be seen. This is consistent with the visual bias described 
earlier (Burgoon et al., 2008) in addition to results in previous studies (Hurley et al., 2014). In 
determining credibility receivers claimed to actively look at ‘Body language’, ‘Eyes’, ‘Facial 
expressions’, and the senders’ ‘Hands’. These behaviours, which were mentioned either vaguely, or 
to specific actions, but have been found in previous studies not to be indicative of deception. 
However, they could influence the perception of receivers who constantly focus on those 
behaviours.  
 
The visual area seemed to be more important than what the receivers hear, and involves 
behaviours that are orientated towards the senders’ faces. The combined references to eyes and the 
face were coded more often than those relating to body language, additionally the face was 
suggested as an area of interest by Ekman (2009). However, codes for specific actions related to the 
senders’ Head, ‘Blinking’, and ‘Eyebrows’ were coded the least (of the nonverbal behaviours), thus 
presenting the possibility of an alternate explanation. One such explanation is that receivers 
possibly look at regions of the body that are perceived to be more expressive in everyday 
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communication, rather than only areas around the face. This argument is further supported from the 
evidence that the code considering sender’s hands was the fourth most mentioned belief. 
 
To a lesser extent receivers seemed to take an active stance in determining the veracity of the 
senders’ messages. Although receivers had access to a limited amount of information at the time, 
they claimed to have used behaviours that could be classified as ‘Strategic observations’. This 
included examining the baseline videos in order to compare the senders’ behaviours exhibited 
during their veracity messages. Receivers claimed that they have paid attention to multiple 
behavioural cues – this suggests that they scrutinised multiple channels of possible deceptive 
indicators. These endeavours were possibly not very elaborate as they had very limited access to 
information. However, this provides some evidence against the idea that this type of research 
method involves only passive observations (Levine, 2014a; Levine, Clare, Blair, et al., 2014), as 
their answers were indicative of active reflections. Nonetheless, the critique by Levine, Clare, Blair, 
et al. (2014) remains, in that this method does not make enough information available to receivers 
to provide a more ecologically valid measure. It does however provide some support for the ALIED 
theory, that access to more information could make receivers more accurate in detecting deception 
(Street, 2015, 2016). This topic however requires more research in order to provide a more defined 
answer.  
 
This active attempt to discern between honest and deceptive messages further finds some 
support in the attempt of receivers to consider the logical flow of the messages. This code has 
additionally found some evidence within the discussions of the Global Deception Research Team 
(2006). The authors found that 25% of their sample reported that they would make more deception 
judgments if the stories were incoherent. Hurley et al. (2014) found that 15.5% of participants 
mentioned beliefs that senders contradicting themselves, or that their behaviours would change 
(11.2%) throughout the interaction if they were deceptive. This further suggests that receivers do 
not act as though they are passive observers, but make use of the available knowledge to form a 
conclusion. 
 
There were, in addition, various codes that seemed to relate to the cognitive load of senders 
while they delivered the veracity messages. These included the codes related to ‘cognitive load’ and 
‘pauses’. The Global Deception Research Team (2006) found that speech fillers (using the ‘uhm’ 
sound), or pauses were considered, by their participants, to indicate deception. Findings by Castillo 
(2011) indicated that receivers looked for longer, or more frequent pauses, to indicate deception. 
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This concurs with Hurley et al.’s (2014) study, that found frequent references to errors in speech, 
contradictions, and hesitations.  
 
In this study, ‘Vocal indicators’ were mentioned the least, making this group of beliefs 
seemingly less important than other behaviours. In contrast Hurley et al. (2014) found that cues 
relating to the current study’s descriptions of ‘Vocal indicators’ were mentioned more often. 
Previous studies have also indicated that cues that are heard influence judgments strongly. Thus, 
vocal indicators, which receivers might be unaware of at the time, may have a stronger 
subconscious influence than other behaviours. This may especially be so when considering that 
more accurate deception detection seems to be strongly influenced by whether or not senders can be 
heard (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Bond et al., 2014; Sweeney & Ceci, 2014). This could additionally 
have resulted because of cultural differences when considering past results (Hurley et al., 2014).  
 
Finally, some of these codes could also indicate that senders were perceived as nervous. 
Previous studies have shown that nervousness was a stereotypical belief about deception (Castillo, 
2011; Global Deception Research Team, 2006; Hurley et al., 2014). In the current study, indications 
of nervousness were mentioned in the form of fidgeting, or the senders’ verbal and nonverbal 
confidence. In light of these codes, some similarities were found in previous studies. The Global 
Deception Research Team (2006) and Hurley et al. (2014) reported that some receivers mentioned 
nervousness directly, that liars changed their posture, or stuttered more often than truth tellers. 
Castillo (2011) also found that many speech errors and hesitations were mentioned by participants 
as indicators of deceitful messages. However, the author also found culture differences between 
Colombian and Australian participants with regards to their views on gestures, vocal pitch, and 
upper body movements. 
 
Unfortunately, the current study could not capture more detail on cultural differences, or culture 
specific beliefs about deceptive nonverbal behaviour. As differences were found as a result of 
culture within previous studies (Al-Simadi, 2000; Castillo, 2011), the rich context of South Africa 
could provide some insight into the views of the different cultural participants. However, due to the 
low response rate, an overall analysis was conducted. This exercise was thus useful in determining 
the generic beliefs of South African students. However, the findings lacked the nuanced differences 
that were originally sought within this study.      
 
The analyses of nuanced differences could be useful when studying the various beliefs held by 
different cultures within South Africa. Furthermore, such research could also be informative when 
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investigating what participants mean when they refer to different nonverbal aspects, such as ‘body 
language’ or ‘facial expressions’. This would assist in identifying if there are particular behaviours 
that inform these judgments, or if a more intuitive approach is taken, which translates into specific 
behavioural references when asked if specific behavioural indicators are used. However, if an 
intuitive approach is used, listing the possible behaviours in a survey format might not provide the 
answers one would be searching for, as any behaviour, after the fact, could be used to legitimise 
veracity judgments. The current argument is that such results may consist of a combination of these 
two aspects, because both vague and specific descriptions were used. However, more research, 
which uses a research approach that allows for a more in-depth understanding of how these beliefs 
are constructed or experienced, is needed in this field, specifically within the context of South 
Africa. This could, in turn, stimulate further research to investigate how biased judgments occur and 
what could influence them. 
  
6.4. Limitations and Recommendations 
Within this study there were several limitations that need to be discussed in terms of interpreting the 
results, and to inform future research that has a similar content or uses comparable methods. In this 
section, the limitations in interpreting the results, are addressed. Followed by a discussion that 
addresses the limitations of the method used within this study. Throughout this section, 
recommendations are made for future studies. The recommendations form part of the limitations in 
order not to fall into the trap of highlighting a problem, and not providing possible solutions. This 
discussion begins with the limitations regarding the response-rate found within this study, and 
describes possible issues of interest and access. After which some of the limitations in regards to the 
research instrument are described that could have provided more relevant information. 
 
The major limitation of the current study was the very poor response-rate (0.64%). There are 
various possible reasons that can be inferred for the response-rate gained in the current study, 
however this discussion suggests that potential participants did not see the survey invitations. 
Because this survey was taken online, access to the survey was thus restricted on two layers; that is, 
access to a myLife email account (Unisa student email), and access to a reliable internet connection. 
With regards to the first possible barrier; the study by Mbatha and Naidoo (2010) suggests that 
around 50.9% of Unisa students may not have access to their myLife email account. The second 
possible barrier was suggested by the limitations of internet access in South Africa (Vermeulen, 
2015), and builds on the possible issue with regards to access to the survey. The reason for this 
suggestion is that previous studies that used online methods reported response-rates slightly above 
10% (Manfreda et al., 2008). The rationale, in planning the current study, was that students would 
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have a strong online presence: Unisa is an open distance institution and students geographically 
dispersed, contact is at times exclusively via electronic methods (“Our future,” 2012, Unisa at a 
glance, 2013). Therefore, even when considering the results from Mbatha and Naidoo (2010), that 
50.9% of Unisa students do not make adequate use of their myLife email accounts, a large number 
of respondents was still possible. However, the response-rate that was achieved by the current study 
was measured at 0.64%, far below that of literature indications. This could be because of a complex 
interaction between student access, interest, and the survey time (which amounted to around 40 
minutes). As only 389 of the 10,000 students who were emailed clicked on the email link (3.89%), 
it is possible that the number of students who had access to (or knowledge of) the myLife email 
accounts, provided by Unisa, is far below what previous authors found (Mbatha & Naidoo, 2010). 
The 64 participants who completed the survey made up 16.5% of the total 389 participants who 
clicked on the survey link. This response-rate (while higher than literature indicators), is closer to 
the above reported response-rate of 11% (Manfreda et al., 2008). This suggests that the majority of 
students who were contacted may not have had adequate access to their myLife accounts, or had 
little reason to access these accounts even though they are mandatory upon registration. This is 
partly supported by Roberts (2011) (as cited in Molepo & Mothudi, 2014), who claimed that the 
majority of Unisa students do not have access to their myLife accounts. The possibility exists that 
up to 96% of the students (9,611 of the sent emails) may not have seen the invitation within the data 
collection timeframe. Two possible solutions, to keep in mind for future studies, are to have an 
extended data collection time period, in addition to accessing other communication methods, such 
as private email addresses and social media. As the limitations of access was not under the control 
of the researcher, only people who had internet access could be reached. Therefore careful 
consideration of this method is recommended when researchers deliberate various sampling 
methods (Babbie, 2008). 
 
Because of the weak response-rate, discussed above, the sample of receivers was not large 
enough to fully analyse the answers to all the research questions within this study, and thus limited 
the ability of this study to generalise the findings. This is specifically evident in the research 
question that addressed the racial identification of receivers, in addition to interpretations of the 
language compilation of receivers. The racial compilation of the students was limited, and biased 
towards participation from white students. This raises specific questions about access, as well as 
interest in participating in the current study, or online studies in general. As the demographical 
information was asked at the end of the survey, unfortunately no explanations could be gained about 
the demographics of the students who discontinued the survey. The main reason that these questions 
were at the end of the survey was to divert attention away from the linguistic ability of the 
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receivers. However, possible future research could request the demographical questions first, and 
ask the questions that may bias results at the end of the survey. This would provide information 
about which participants discontinued and if the sample bias could have occurred because of issues 
surrounding access or interest.  
 
Some of the limitations of the research instrument were alluded to in the beginning of this 
section. However, a more detailed description is required for future studies that intend using online 
surveys. One such limitation is that standard testing conditions cannot be ensured due to the use of 
an online survey method. This, is a known limitation of self-report measures (Babbie, 2008), 
however, needs to be taken into account within the study design. Theoretically, this limits the 
interpretation of the scores obtained within this study, as the conditions for each receiver cannot be 
kept constant. This is a risk of online studies: One sacrifices the control over participant’s 
environments. However, the benefit is that the researcher has access to a large sample.  
 
The baseline videos, in the current study, seemed to be of limited use. This resulted in a very 
time consuming survey. This could have contributed to the attrition of receivers, and consideration 
should be given to possibly omitting baseline videos, or changing their role within this type of 
study. One argument is that the receivers did make use of the baseline videos, as described during 
the content analysis. Previous studies have found that baseline videos provided a significant benefit, 
however the benefit gained from including baseline videos might be of limited use as the literature 
indicated that there was only a 3.65% gain in correct answers (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). In the 
current study the survey would have been eight minutes shorter had the baseline videos been 
removed. Thus, one recommendation is that more studies should investigate the method of using 
baseline videos, and the influence that these have on judgment accuracy or bias. This could inform 
future work as to whether it is necessary to include baseline videos within such studies.  
 
In terms of the order of the questions, as mentioned above, it may have been more advantageous 
to ask the demographical questions first, rather than last, in order to gain a profile of the 232 
receivers who withdrew their participation. The aim of the current study was to ask all the 
biographical questions at the end of the survey so as not to influence the receivers’ attention to the 
linguistic aspects of the study (the receivers were asked to self-report on their linguistic ability). 
However, it must be noted that self-reported questions are sensitive to bias. Self-report measures are 
methodologically flawed in that it is assumed that receivers have a realistic and objective view of 
their competence (Babbie, 2008). A linguistic measure could have been useful in measuring the 
senders’ and receivers’ linguistic abilities, but the researcher was unable to find a measure that 
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provides relevant information about speech ability. A possible solution to this problem could have 
been to ask the biographical information first, and to include a linguistic ability measurement after 
the survey was completed. However, one needs to first determine if written measurements also 
access the linguistic ability in spoken language. The way that this was mitigated within the current 
study was to make use of the crude differentiation between the receiver’s self-identification as first 
or second language English speakers. Although this divide did not provide information about the 
linguistic ability of receivers, it did suggest that some linguistic mechanisms are influenced within 
deception research. This provides justification for further studies on deception detection and the 
influence that the cognitive load experienced by the receivers might have on judgment bias.  
 
Finally, one of the obvious limitations related to the ecological validity of the study in that only 
students were used within the investigation. This has been a common critique within deception 
studies (Hartwig & Bond, 2014; Porter & ten Brinke, 2010). The main reasons for using students 
within this study was because: (a) it was assumed that higher education students would have the 
necessary technical skills and access to complete an online survey and (b) they were likely to have 
some ability and experience of understanding, and communicating in English, as required by South 
African higher education institutions. According to a meta-study by Hartwig and Bond (2014) there 
was no difference between using a student population and ecologically valid populations during this 
type of study. Providing some support that making use of student samples do provide comparable 
results within this type of study. However, more studies concerned with deception detection are 
needed in the South African context in order to gain a broad understanding of how deception is 
judged within culturally diverse contexts. This understanding could be useful in creating 
ecologically valid instruments for future research.  
 
6.5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to discover if a lie bias would be found within a South African 
sample. In order to accomplish this, the study was conducted in two phases. The first phase was 
concerned with creating the research instrument. It consisted of 24 video recorded truthful and 
deceptive messages from 12 second language senders. The second phase involved gathering data in 
the form of deception judgments and confidence scores form a second sample of 64 receivers via an 
online survey. As English is the lingua franca in South Africa (Khokhlova, 2015), and only spoken 
by 9.6% of South Africans (Statistics South Africa, 2012), this context was well suited for such an 
investigation. However, in attempting to discover if there would be a lie bias towards second 
language speakers, variables concerned with gender and the linguistic ability of the receivers were 
additionally investigated. This was to provide more nuanced answers to the findings of the current 
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study, which was likewise the basis of the rationale in asking receivers what behavioural indicators 
they used to make deception judgments.  
 
The findings from the current study were unfortunately limited due a very poor response-rate. 
As a result, only anecdotal evidence could be provided, however some conclusions could be derived 
from the data analysis. The findings suggested that there was no lie bias towards second language 
speakers. Furthermore, the findings indicated that there was no difference in the judgments of 
receivers due to gender differences. Anecdotal evidence was found to suggest that the race of the 
sender did not influence receiver’s accuracy or correct truth scores. However, there seemed to be a 
difference in the way in which deceptive judgments were made. The linguistic ability of receivers 
indicated a significant effect on the way that they made veracity judgments. That is first language 
receivers tended to be truth biased, and second language receivers tended to be lie biased in their 
judgments towards the senders. However, this finding was also restricted because of the low 
response-rate. The argument that was made from the results is that receivers become biased as a 
result of their own cognitive load. This provides some support for the same argument as described 
by Lev-Ari and Keysar (2010). However, this does not imply that stereotypical beliefs about gender 
and race (in addition to other stereotypes) do not influence deception judgments. In contrast, it is 
possible that the stereotypical beliefs of receivers could become stronger with higher levels of 
cognitive load (Biernat et al., 2003). This is an avenue that should be explored in studies that have 
larger samples. 
 
The above argument provides support for two distinct directions for future research. The first is 
that more studies are needed to provide a more detailed explanation of the effects that the cognitive 
load of receivers have on their accuracy or bias in detecting deception. The second direction, which 
follows from this position, is to investigate the communication ability of receivers that might 
mitigate the influence of their own cognitive load. As suggested, the conversation ability of the 
receivers would possibly not assist them to be more accurate at detecting deception, as discussed in 
the updated version of IDT (Burgoon & Buller, 2014). However, this ability could assist in 
mitigating the lie bias found by the results within this study.  
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Appendix A  
Interpersonal Deception Theory 
 
1. “Context features of deceptive interchanges systematically affect sender and receiver 
cognitions and behaviors; two of special importance are the interactivity of the 
communication medium and the demands of the conversational task.” (Burgoon & Buller, 
2014, p. 352) 
 
2. “Relational features of deceptive interchanges systematically affect sender and receiver 
cognitions and behaviors; two of special importance are familiarity and relationship 
valence.” (Burgoon & Buller, 2014, p. 352) 
 
3. “Interactive contexts and positively toned relationships are associated with higher 
expectations that a sender is truthful.” (Burgoon & Buller, 2014, p. 353) 
 
4. “Deceivers’ fear of detection is positively influenced by how familiar receivers are with 
general deceptive behavior or knowledge of the sender; it is inversely related to receivers’ 
expectations for truthfulness and how relationally familiar (acquainted) they are with the 
deceiver.” (Burgoon & Buller, 2014, p. 353) 
 
5. “Interactive contexts heighten strategic activity and lessen nonstrategic activity over time.” 
(Burgoon & Buller, 2014, p. 354) 
 
6. “Target benefit alters strategic and nonstrategic activity during deception such that: 
a. Deceiving for self-gain prompts more, and qualitatively different, strategic activity 
than deceiving for the benefit of others; and 
b. Deceiving for self-gain prompts more nonstrategic behavior associated with 
concerns over detection and increased strategic activity to avoid detection than 
deceiving for the benefit of others.” (Burgoon & Buller, 2014, p. 354) 
 
7. “Deceiver motivation to behave strategically is: 
a. Inversely related to receiver expectations for truthfulness, 
b. Positively related to relational familiarity with the target, and 
c. Positively related to communicator skill.” (Burgoon & Buller, 2014, p. 354) 
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8. “Receivers are more likely to judge senders as credible when 
a. The context is interactive, 
b. Senders are skilled communicators, 
c. Receivers are truth biased, and 
d. Sender communication adheres to the receiver’s expectations for normality.” 
(Burgoon & Buller, 2014, p. 355) 
 
9. “Receivers are less likely to detect deception when 
a. the context is interactive, 
b. senders are skilled communicators, 
c. receivers are truth biased, 
d. sender communication follows expected pattern, and 
e. receivers are unfamiliar with sender information and behaviour. (Burgoon & Buller, 
2014, p. 355) 
 
10. “Receiver suspicion prompts change in receiver strategic and nonstrategic behavior.”  
(Burgoon & Buller, 2014, p. 356) 
 
11. “Senders attune to receiver suspicion.” (Burgoon & Buller, 2014, p. 356)  
 
12. “Sender perception of suspicion is positively related to 
a. receiver deviations from expected behavior, and 
b. receiver behavior signaling disbelief, uncertainty, or the need for additional 
information.” (Burgoon & Buller, 2014, p. 356) 
 
13. “Receiver suspicion (perceived or actual) evokes changes in the sender’s strategic and 
nonstrategic behavior” (Burgoon & Buller, 2014, p. 356) 
 
14. “Deception and suspicion displays change over time.” (Burgoon & Buller, 2014, p. 356) 
 
15. “Reciprocity is the dominant interaction adaptation pattern between senders and receivers 
during interpersonal deception.” (Burgoon & Buller, 2014, p. 356) 
 
16. “Terminal judgments of sender credibility and receiver detection accuracy are a function of: 
a. Last receiver cognitions (suspicion, truth biases), and 
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b. Last sender behaviour displays.” (Burgoon & Buller, 2014, p. 357) 
 
17. “Senders’ perceptions of deception success are a function of 
a. Perceived suspicion and 
b. Last receiver behavioural displays.” (Burgoon & Buller, 2014, p. 357) 
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Appendix B  
Interview Questions (Pilot Questions) 
 
1. What is your favourite ice-cream? 
2. What hobbies do you have? 
 
Video Baseline: 
3. What kind of movies do you like to watch? 
 
Video Question: 
4. Could you describe to me what was happening in this video?  
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Appendix C 
Interview Questions (Final Questions) 
 
1. Tell me about your worst exam experience? (What it was and why it was the worst) 
2. Tell me a bit about your favourite subject? (What it was and what it was about) 
 
Video Baseline: 
3. In about 2 minutes’ time describe your favourite movie. (What was it, who played in it, what 
was it about?) 
 
Video Question: 
4. Could you describe to me in detail what was happening in this video? 
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Appendix D 
Research Procedure (Sender Information Form) 
 
Biographical Information of the Senders: 
Please only provide your name and contact details if you want feedback on your performance. This 
information is not necessary for the purpose of this study.  
Original video Number 
(Admin): 
Watched: 
Name and Surname 
(Optional): 
 
Email / Cell (Optional):  
Pronunciation Test Score:  
 
Biographical Questions 
Please answer the following information in full. 
Gender:  
Age:  
Race (Please circle 
the appropriate 
answer): 
Black, Chinese, 
Coloured, Indian, 
White,  
Other: 
Home language:  
Second Language:  
Third Language:  
 
Senate Research and Innovation and Higher Degrees Committee Reference Number: 
2015_RPSC_006 
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Sender’s Informed Consent Forms: 
Dear Participant 
Thank you for volunteering and for your cooperation. Your participation will allow the researcher 
to expand on the research within this field.   
Please be aware that the selection of participants in this study is based on the following criteria: 
You have to be a South African, a current student at UNISA, as well as currently living in South 
Africa. In addition, you have to be able to speak and understand English to some degree. 
The purpose of this study is to determine how well South African university students are able to 
detecting deception, and if there is a second language bias in how participants are judged. 
Therefore, the reason for this meeting is to create the recordings that will be used towards the 
purposes of this study. These recordings will be judged as either honest or deceptive by a sample of 
UNISA students. 
During this session, your full image will be recorded with a video camera. Your identity and the 
information that you provide will be stored anonymously and be kept confidential as far as possible. 
The recordings will be stored safely by the researcher, and not be directly linked with your personal 
information. Your participation in this study will take at most 1 hour.  
You will first be given some biographic questions to answer, as well as a short language 
pronunciation test. After which a video camera will begin to record, and you will be asked some 
baseline questions. This will take the form of three relatively easy questions, and it is expected that 
you answer them honestly. Please refrain from giving information that could potentially identify 
you to a stranger. After which you will be shown a short video clip, and asked to describe it 
honestly. There will be a short break, and you will be shown another video. Here you will be asked 
to lie about the content. The session will be concluded with some extra information as well as 
opportunity for questions. During the session, only the researcher, cameraman and the current 
participant will be in the room. The video clips will not consist of any potentially harmful footage. 
For your participation, you will receive R100 after the session is concluded. If you would like 
feedback on your participation you will be required to provide your name and surname, as well as 
either your email address or cell phone number. This information will be held confidentially, and 
will be deleted one week after feedback was provided, to ensure that you’ve had time for any 
queries. No other forms of compensation will be provided. The researcher and the University of 
South Africa will not accept any responsibility of any loss or injury sustained by volunteering for 
this study.  
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Please be advised that this study is voluntary, and you may stop participation at any time for any 
reason. If you do wish to stop participation you will unfortunately not qualify to receive the R100. 
There will be no other penalties for stopping participation, as well as that the video recording will 
be deleted, and not be used in any way. It is believed that participation in this study will not lead to 
any harm. But for any reason, if the researcher judges that the study might become harmful, 
participation will automatically be stopped for further investigation. This could lead to participation 
being stopped completely. If this occurs, it will be handled in the same manner as when the 
participant wishes to stop voluntary participation.  
 
In case of a problem or query please send an email to the researcher:  
Herman Janse van Vuuren  
Hermanjvvuuren@gmail.com 
 
I ______________________________________ hereby give my consent to participate in this 
study, as well as agree to be recorded. I know that the recording could be used for current and future 
research. I further agree that I have read and agreed with the above description and participate 
through my own free will.  
 
___________________      ________________ 
Participant         Date 
 
___________________      ________________ 
Researcher       Date 
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I _______________________________________ hereby sign that I have received the payment of 
R100 from the researcher for my participation within the current study.  
 
___________________      ________________ 
Participant         Date 
 
___________________      ________________ 
Researcher       Date 
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Appendix E 
Video Release Form 
 
Video Recording Release Consent Form: 
 
Date:     
Research Title: Second Language Bias and Accuracy of Deception Judgments 
Researcher: Mr Hermanus Hendrik Janse van Vuuren         
Supervisor:  Mrs J. K. Moodley 
 
Description: The current study looks at the potential bias that could be related to deception 
decisions made about second language speakers.  
 
Contact and Ethical Information: Please contact the researcher; Hermanus Hendrik Janse van 
Vuuren, Hermanjvvuuren@gmail.com, with any questions related to the research. This study was 
reviewed and ethically cleared by the Department of Psychology Ethics Committee. Permission was 
also granted to video record interviews, distribute an online survey, and access to student emails by 
Unisa Senate Research and Innovation and Higher Degrees Committee (SRIHDC) on 20 January 
2015. Permission was granted from 25 January 2015 to 31 December 2015. SRIHDC Reference 
Number: 2015_RPSC_06.  
 
Release Statement: I understand that in signing the release statement that the data and recordings 
will only be used for academic and educational purposes. In addition, the final project will involve 
scrutiny of academics, research participants and students. I know what the risks and contributions 
are of my participation in this study and consent to be involved.  
I consent to the use of the video recorded footage as well as allow that these would be displayed to a 
target audience. This includes the viewing for the purpose of this project, and in addition potential 
training, research, or academic viewing of the footage.  
   
Anonymity: The researcher undertakes not to include or directly link the participant’s personal or 
contact information with the video recordings. Personal information like names and contact 
information will only be kept on written consent forms, and not be included in this research study or 
future use of the material. The researcher also undertakes to only use the recorded material for 
research purposes, and that the material will not be released to the media, unauthorised persons, 
social media sites etcetera.  
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Consent: I                                                                    give my consent in relation to the video 
recorded material in the following: 
That the material is used for future research 
That the material is used for future training purposes 
That the material may be shown to other academics and students.  
That direct quotes may be used from the recordings in documents and publications. 
 
Indemnity: I indemnify the researcher and the University of South Africa, including its employees 
harmless and safe against any prosecution due to the use of the video material in which I appear or 
am quoted.  
I am signing this release form voluntarily and out of my own freewill. 
Name:          
Date:          
Signature:         
Researcher: Hermanus Hendrik Janse van Vuuren   
Date:          
Signature:         
 
Thank you for your participation in this project.  
 
 
Senate Research and Innovation and Higher Degrees Committee Reference Number: 
2015_RPSC_006 
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Appendix F 
Sender Email 
Dear Student 
 
Thank you again for participating in my study on second language deception detection. I have 
collected all the data, and as promised this email is meant to inform you of the overall results. 
 
The purpose of the study was to see if a person would be judged as lying more often than judged as 
being honest while they are speaking in their second language (English). The way this study tried to 
accomplish this, was to have students give one truthful and one deceptive message while being 
video recorded. This was the part of the study in which you participated. The videos were then 
edited, so that only the honest or deceptive part of the messages could be seen, and were developed 
into an online survey. A secure link to the survey was then sent to a second group of students, who 
were then asked if they believed whether the messages in the videos were lies or truths. The correct 
judgments were scored. The scores gathered from the videos where thus then the opinions of the 
second group of how truthful (or deceptive) the messages were. 
 
In-line with the literature, as well as our previous discussion, most of the people who made these 
judgments seemed to have guessed (in this study if they scored close to 50% it was just as good as a 
guess). This is apparent from the average score (52%) that was attained. The average score on 
truthful messages was 55%, and the average score on deceptive messages was 50%. Thus, there 
seems to have been a slight tendency to make more truth judgments when making judgments on 
truthful messages. But when looking at the total score, the tendency to make truth judgment appears 
to be less. 
 
One of the limitations of this study is that it did not use more natural methods of conversing, we 
don’t normally have camera(s) pointed at us, and we are not always forced to tell a complete truth 
or lie. But from the results as well as the wider literature on the topic, it appeared that people tended 
to guess when forced to make veracity choices, and it seems that speaking in a second language 
could also have an effect on these judgments. 
 
If you have any more questions, please feel free to contact me. 
Regards 
HH J.v. Vuuren 
Senate Reference: 2015_RPSC_006  
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Appendix G 
Ethical Clearances 
1. Department of Psychology Ethical Clearance. 
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2. Senate Ethical Clearance 1. 
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156 
 
3. Senate Ethical Clearance 2. 
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Appendix H 
Survey 
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As the questions of the survey took on a similar format as the above, those pages were 
omitted from this appendix. Thus, the following page was placed after the last question was 
answered. 
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Appendix I 
Receivers email 1 
 
Dear Student 
I am currently completing my Masters in Research Psychology at Unisa. I obtained your email 
address from the Unisa database. My study is about the ability of students to see if someone is lying 
to them or not, by watching a series of video clips. I would like to invite you to participate in this 
study by completing an online survey.  
The survey takes approximately 40 minutes to complete and you will need a reliable internet 
connection. I recommend that you use a WIFI connection instead of mobile data (the study should 
take about 90mb of data). As well as preferably not completing the survey using a mobile phone. 
After completing the survey, you will see a percentage score that shows how accurate your 
judgments were.  
The survey is voluntary, and there is no compensation for participating. I do not ask you for 
personal information that could identify you. The survey is anonymous, and will remain 
confidential. You will only be able to complete the survey once, and submissions will close on 31 
August 2015. 
Please click on the link in order to complete the survey.  
<LINK> 
Permission and ethical clearance was obtained from the Department of Psychology Ethics 
Committee, as well as Unisa Senate Research and Innovation and Higher Degrees Committee 
(SRIHDC Reference Number: 2015_RPSC_006). If you have any questions, you can email the 
researcher. 
Thank you for your time. 
Regards 
HH Jv Vuuren 
Researchsurveystudy@gmail.com 
 
  
167 
 
Appendix J 
Receivers email 2 
 
Dear Student 
This is a final reminder to participate in the study in order to see if you are able to detect if someone 
is honest or deceptive. If you started the assessment, I would like to invite you to finish before the 
closing date. The assessment will close on 28 September 2015.  
The background and introduction to the study: 
I am currently completing my Masters in Research Psychology at Unisa. I obtained your email 
address from the Unisa database. My study is about the ability of students to see if someone is lying 
to them or not, by watching a series of video clips. I would like to invite you to participate in this 
study by completing an online assessment.  
The study takes approximately 40 minutes to complete and you will need a reliable internet 
connection. I recommend that you use a WIFI connection instead of mobile data (the study should 
take about 90mb of data). As well as preferably not completing the assessment using a mobile 
phone. After completing the study, you will see a percentage score that shows how accurate your 
judgments were.  
The study is voluntary, and there is no compensation for participating. I do not ask you for personal 
information that could identify you, the study is anonymous, and will remain confidential. You will 
only be able to complete the study once. 
Please click on the link in order to complete the assessment.  
<LINK> 
Permission and ethical clearance was obtained from the Department of Psychology Ethics 
Committee, as well as Unisa Senate Research and Innovation and Higher Degrees Committee 
(Senate Reference Number: 2015_RPSC_006). If you have any questions, you can email the 
researcher.  
Thank you for your time. 
Regards 
HH Jv Vuuren 
Researchsurveystudy@gmail.com  
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Appendix K 
Content Analysis Code list 
Content Analysis 
 
Coded Terms Totals Categories
Multiple Cues Strategic (Not Active)
Body language Nonverbal
Looking at the eyes Nonverbal
Eye contact Nonverbal
Facial expression Nonverbal
Smiling Nonverbal
Hand movements Nonverbal
Hand gestures Nonverbal
Locial flow Strategic
Compare to baseline Strategic
Behavioural Changes Strategic
Description Strategic
Fidgeting Nonverbal
Confidence (Behaviour) Nonverbal
Cognitive Load Strategic
Story detail Strategic
Leg movements Nonverbal
Pauses (Voice) Vocal
Composure Nonverbal
Behaviour matching the story Strategic
Confidence (Voice) Vocal
Speech pace Vocal
Tone of voice Vocal
Body posture Nonverbal
Strained movements Nonverbal
Giggling / Laughter Nonverbal
Length of the story Strategic
Arm movements Nonverbal
Head movements Nonverbal
Chronology Strategic
Vocabulary use Vocal
Volume Vocal
Blinking Nonverbal
Eyebrows Nonverbal
Adaptor Nonverbal
Speech filler Vocal
‘Gut Feeling’ N/A
Contextual Information (Recognized the video) Strategic
Pitch (Voice) Vocal
Story 'strained' Vocal
Stuttering Vocal
